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The idea to create this thesis was born a long time ago in 2008 when I was an 
exchange student in Austria. Not only had I had the chance to witness the reaction of the 
Austrian society to the death of a controversial politician Jörg Haider, but also to experience 
the political influences of the populist right in the alpine republic. It was then that I noticed 
the fact that there are some bewildering issues with the national identity of the Austrians. 
Haider had rejected the mainstream vision of Austrians as an independent nation and claimed 
they were still part of the greater German nation. Through many discussions with my Austrian 
friends I was confronted with an identity that, at least in my opinion, was undefined and 
feeble, quite the opposite of the Polish national identity which for me was set in stone. When 
writing my master thesis about Haider and the radical right I delved into the topic even 
deeper. What I found fascinating that in fact there is a massive collection of literature 
regarding the Austrian national identity, much more in fact than in the Polish case. Of course 
there are monographs published about the character of the Polish nation, how it was perceived 
by various writers, politicians etc. But I have never found works that either tried to prove the 
existence of the Polish nation or on the other hand questioned its existence. The more I read 
about the Austrian case the more questions were raised.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the formation of the modern Austrian nation which 
is a process that started in 1945. Any researcher, be it a historian or a political-scientist, will 
immediately see how complex and difficult task it is. The studies regarding nations, 
nationalisms and national identity could come from fields like: history, political sciences, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, economics or even biology. Each provides a 
distinct methodology which makes it almost compulsory to make any nation research either 
interdisciplinary or highly focused on one aspect. Then issues with the understanding of basic 
terms come. Not only there is little consensus about what a nation really is but there is also 
little agreement among Austrians themselves. Those issues will be discussed in the following 
theoretical chapters. Anyone who wishes to investigate the Austrian case will be confronted 
not with the lack of sources but with the abundance thereof. And yet there was one thing 
lacking in all of the research. For example in the fundamental comparative study of Miroslav 
Hroch there was no mention of the Austrian case. He did not forget the Baltic nations 
(Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians) but omitted the Austrians. A similar omission was made by 
a Polish scholar Józef Chlebowczyk, who trying to find patterns in the development of small 
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nations. The only mentions of Austria were regarding the ill-fated Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and refer to the German speaking population of that country as German-Austrians1. Somehow 
the inclusion of the Habsburg realm seemed to be sufficient and it is hard to blame anyone as 
the empire crumbled under the pressures of different national groups within and it provides 
more examples and stories that can be digested by scholars. And yet the complex history of 
the role of nations and nationalism in the fall of the Austrian Empire obscures the role that 
Austrian-Germans played, and in fact it is often overlooked. At the same time Austrian 
researchers tend to focus on proving the existence of the Austrian nation before the II World 
War and while they provide magnificent works the theory of nation building is often set aside. 
Paradoxically the Austrian example created one of the most ground-breaking works in regards 
of national identity: the discursive analysis2. The Austrian case is interesting in the way it 
contrasts with other nations and nationalism in Europe (or even just in Central Europe). The 
nationalist movements and modern nation building did not occur as is in other cases in the 
XIX century it appeared in the second half of the XX and was compressed to the lifespan of 
barely two generations.  
The goal of this thesis is to fill in the gap and to confront the findings about the 
formation of the Austrian nation with the theories of nation formation. Only in this way, I 
believe, the answer to the question, how the Austrian nation was made, could be provided. 
The theories will be validated or falsified by the Austrian case-study and in a reflexive way 
the Austrian nationhood will be validated (or not) by the theories. Secondary goals of this 
thesis focus on including the achievements of Polish scholarship and placing the Polish 
national theory within the global mainstream.  
For the sake of clarity all of the quotations in this work that are coming from different 
languages (German and Polish) were translated by the author to English.   
Structure of the thesis is as follows: 
1. First chapter is devoted to methodology and theory 
2. Second chapter focuses on the role of historians, history and its use in Austrian nation 
building  
3. The third chapter focuses on the political aspects (parties and education) of nation building  
4. The last chapter concludes the thesis.  
                                                          
1 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983. p 33.  
2 Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., Zur disukrsiven Konstruktion 
nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998.    
7 
 
Special thanks need to be given to all that helped and contributed to the creation of this 
thesis. Most notably the two tutors: prof. Piotr Madajczyk and prof. Stefan Creuzberger. Prof. 
Ralph Schattkowsky‟s support towards the co-tutelle deal between the Institute of Political 
Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the University of Rostock was indispensable. I 
would also like to thank dr Paweł Popieliński for his diligent reading of the draft. Other 
include my Austrian friends that helped me with accessing libraries in Vienna and Klagenfurt: 
Sai Pavan Veeranaki, Valentina Schaschee, Christine Kern. My stay in Vienna was not 
complete without discussions with the head of the Polish Academy of Sciences station in the 
capital of Austria – prof. Bogusław Dybaś. I would also like to thank Bogusław Kiernicki for 
allowing me to write the text in his calm office. Most of all I would like to thank my wife 


















1. Methods and theories 
 
1.1  State of the art – the Austrian nation  
 
When trying to determine the amount of books that tackle the difficult topic of the 
Austrian nation one can be surprised by the sheer amount of them. The rather small alpine 
nation was and still is the object of a scholarly dispute that was not only limited to Austrians 
but attracted researchers from all over the world. For a Polish reader the sheer amount of 
literature about the Austrian nation and Austrian national identity is astounding. There is no 
historical structure in Europe that is so strongly associated with identity problems of its 
members like Austria3, as Friedrich Heer puts it. Perhaps it is this uncertainty of identity (such 
foreign a feeling to a Pole) that incites Austrian scholars and writes to deal with this issue 
again and again. Yet despite the amount of works there are scientific fields regarding the 
Austrian nation that seem to be untouched by scholars. I will list the shortcomings of the 
literature on the topic below.  
While the discussion among historians was prevalent throughout the whole time since 
the foundation of the Second Austrian Republic in 1945 it were the late 70ties and 80ties that 
produced the most important works. Friedrich Heer‟s Kampf um die Östereischicche Identität 
and Ernst Bruckmüller Nation Österreich4. These two books are fundamental and form the 
backbone of the intellectual work covering the topic of the Austrian nation. There is however 
a problem with them, namely they barely if not at all touches the topic of the modern Austrian 
nation. Herr ends his narrative with the Anschluss and Bruckmüller devotes only a very short 
and superficial chapter to the modern Austrian national identity (called 
Zugehörigkeitsidentiät), which he basically compares to the German Verfassungpatriotismus5. 
In this work I will try to prove that this is not entirely true in the Austrian case. But before 
these two pinnacles emerged several discussions were held in the journal Forum in the 50ties. 
The 60ties presented the readers with an edited by Albert Massiczek volume Die 
Österreichische Nation: Zwischen zwei Nationalismen (1967). Then from an unexpected 
direction came an American contribution of William Bluhm Building the Austrian nation 
                                                          
3 Heer, Kampf um die Österreichische Identität, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar 1996, p. 6. 
4 Heer‟s book was a clear reference to the work of Heinrich Friedjung‟s Der Kampf um dies Vorherrschaft in 
Deutschland, published in 1897, which described the downfall of Austria and the loss of Austrian influence in 
the German speaking realm.  
5 Term coined by Jürgen Habermas that people are more attached and loyal to the ideas of a liberal constitution 
rather than nation. Verfassungpatriotismus corresponds mostly with the vision of a political nation rather than 
cultural or ethnic one.  
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(1973), which focused mainly on interviews with party members. It is an invaluable source 
for history of national consciousness among the elites. Sadly Bluhm‟s work omitted 
interviews members Freedom Party, who opposed the idea of the Austrian nation leaving 
scholars with other sources. This omission will be filled in by this thesis. Another American 
Peter Katzenstein in his book Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany (1976) proposed the 
implementation of an abstract model of coexistence of two states with focus on systemic 
processes of integration and disintegration proving that it were not cultural development that 
led to the formation of Austrian nation but rather external and internal systemic differences. 
Another indispensable contributions are Felix Kreissler‟s Der Österreicher und seine Nation: 
Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen (1984)6 and two edited volumes Nation und 
Nationalbewußtsein in Österreich edited by Albert Reiterer (1998) and  Identität und 
Nationalstolz der Österreicher edited by Max Haller (1996). The most important work is 
however the 2001 book by Peter Thaler The ambivalence of Identity¸ which has covered most 
of the work regarding intellectual and institutional nation formation. Thaler‟s work while 
being priceless for the topic has several lacks. While emphasising the role of historians Thaler 
does not investigate the issue of history schoolbooks. He also focused more on state 
institutions which lead to underrepresentation of the role played by political parties, which in 
the Austrian case is of utter significance7. Also the last chapter of Thaler‟s book which 
promised to confront the Austrian nation-formation with theories of nationhood does not 
deliver on the promise. One of the goals of this work is to fill in the gaps left by Thaler. 
Outside of historical and political works there are also numerous and rather essayistic 
works by Anton Pelinka and interesting and well written essays of Robert Menasse that 
contribute to the discussion about the Austrian nation8.  Another two essays written by a 
German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann in a short book: Die Spur Österreichs in der 
deutschen Geschichte. Drei Staaten - zwei Nationen - ein Volk? (1989) created quite a fuss in 
the Austrian discourse. Erdmann proposed a vision of one people divided into three states: 
                                                          
6 In fact this book was firstly published in French as La prise de conscience de la nation autrichienne, Paris 
1980. In 2006 an edited volume (band 6) of the Emigration – Exil – Kontinuität. Schriften zur zeitgeschichtlichen 
Kultur- und Wissenschaftsforschung was published in memoriam of Kreissler who died in 2005. The volume 
titled Österreichische Nation - Kultur - Exil und Widerstand contains considerations about his life and work but 
also about the Austrian nation. 
7 In the 60ties there were more members of the SPÖ and ÖVP than in the German party counterparts. Austria has 
about the tenth of Germany‟s population. See: Fiedor K., Historia polityczna Austrii,  
8 For the given topic the most important Pelinka A., Zur österreichischen Identität : zwischen deutscher 
Vereinigung und Mitteleurop¸Vienna 1990.  See also: Pelinka A, Austria: out of the shadow of the past, Oxford 
1998. Menasse‟s work include: Erklär mir Österreich. Essays zur österreichischen Geschichte, Frankfurt am 
Main 2000, and Das war Österreich. Gesammelte Essays zum Land ohne Eigenschaften, Franfurt am Main 2005. 
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West and East Germany and Austria. His essays were met with fierce rejection by the 
Austrians and created an interesting discussion9.  
The list would not be complete without contributions made by historians like Georg 
Wagner whose edited volume Österreich. Von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewußtsein (1982) 
preceded the massive Österreich Zweite Republik (1983-87)10. In both of these works Wagner 
sought the Austrian nation in the most ancient of times. The edited volume is a great source 
for understanding the mindset of most Austrian historians that tried to prove the continuity of 
the existence of the Austrian nation way in the medieval times (or even older). Wagner 
published his opus magnum to celebrate the thirty years of the existence of the Second 
Austrian Republic. His fellow countryman and historian Olivier Rathkolb followed the 
tradition and published the Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005 in 200511. 
There are also several other works which deal with the topic of Austrian identity with 
Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität edited by Ruth Wodak being the most 
significant one. The breaking work of several scholars introduced a new quality to nation-
formation research with the focus on discourse. Wodak followed the constructivists, 
especially Benedict Anderson, who stressed the importance of communication in creating the 
imagined community of the nation. The analysis of discourse is multi-layered containing 
speeches, interviews and discussions. The Austrian national identity is understood as a 
cultural construct which creates a cultural nation. Wodak directly contradicts Brückmuller‟s 
proposal of political nation. The discursive construction of national identity serves as a great 
inspiration for this thesis although the focus will be shifted more to the discourses relevant in 
the past rather than in the present. Wodak tries to answer the question: what the Austrian 
nation is, rather how it was formed.  
Additionally the yearly Contemporary Austrian Studies has to be mentioned. This 
annual is produced by the Centre Austria based in New Orleans in USA with the main editors 
being Günther Bischoff and Anton Pelinka. It is often the best source to get introduced to 
Austrian studies as it features texts from all prominent scholars dealing with the topic. Of all 
the 26 volumes that were published up to date several prove to be of value to the issue of 
                                                          
9 Most Austrians rejected Erdmann‟s ideas (among them the historians Gerhard Storzuh) but there were some 
who acknowledged some of the points made by Erdmann like Fritz Fellner. See: Storzuh G., Vom Reich zur 
Republik, Fellner F., The problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945, [in:] The Journal of Modern History 60 
(1988).  
10 Wagner G, Österreich : von der Staatsidee zum Nationalbewusstsein, Vienna 1982. Wagner G., Österreich. 
Zweite Republik, Vienna 1983,1987.  
11 Rathkolb O., Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005. An English edition was published later.  
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Austrian nation formation, especially volume 5 that is specifically dedicated to this problem12. 
Very often though the texts submitted are just abbreviated versions of books, monographs and 
articles that already were published in German in Austria.  
In Poland, the issue of Austrian identity was briefly analysed by Adam Romejko13. 
The lonesome article of Romejko shows that there is a need for a Polish monograph to tackle 
the topic of the Austrian nation. There are however several works about the history of Austria. 
Albeit most of the focus on the Habsburg period like the fundamental works of Henryk 
Wereszycki Pod berłem Habsburgów (1975) and Historia Austrii (1972). Only a few 
historians managed to reach the time after 1945 like Karol Fiedor in his Austria: zarys dziejów 
politycznych (1996) but his book is rather superficial or Jerzy Kozeński in: Austria dzieje 




When researching nations one could apply a myriad of theories from different fields 
like history, political sciences, sociology, psychology etc. Each of these approaches would 
force the use of a different methodology.  Since this thesis needs to balance between history 
and political sciences, I will employ methods coming from these two disciplines. Political 
sciences and history overlap with regard to many topics. In fact in many cases political 
sciences deal with the recent history (in Polish, Zeitgeschichte, historia najnowsza) that is 
usually dated since 1945. This work will use parts of political thought: theories of nation, 
nation-formation and nationalism. When talking about nation formation a systemic approach 
including the analysis of genetic, structural and functional aspects of this process are 
necessary. It is impossible to omit history as the legacy of the past plays a pivotal role in 
building nations. 
There are many ways to write history and probably almost all historians would agree 
that the ideal is to write as objectively as possible, to write sine ira et studio – without any 
                                                          
12 Bischof G., Pelinka A., Contemporary Austrian Studies 5: Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity. 
But other volumes contain texts relevant to the topic like volume 2(The Kreisky Era in Austria) ,3 (Austria in the 
nineteen fifties), 7 (The Vranizky Era in Austria), 17 (New Perspectives on Austria and World War II), 19( From 
Empire to Republic: Post World War I Austria), 25 (Austrian Studies Today) 
13 Romejko A., Przemiany austriackiej tożsamości narodowej, [in]: Procesy migracyjne w kontekście przemian 
kulturowo-cywilizacyjnych, Polak E., J. Leska-Ślęzak J., (ed.), Pelplin 2007.  
14 Wereszycki H., Historia Austrii, Wrocław 1972;  Wereszycki H, Pod berłem Habsburgów: zagadnienia 
narodowościowe, Kraków 1975; Fiedor K., Austria: zarys dziejów politycznych, Łódź 1996, Kozeński J., Austria 
1918-1968: dzieje społeczne i polityczne, Poznań 1970.  
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bias and emotions. This ideal however is never reached because of the shortcomings of the 
writers. Historians are always influenced by their background, their education, the time and 
place they live in or by the language they write in. Perhaps the best way to get as close as 
possible to the ideal would be to acknowledge those shortcomings, to be conscious of them 
when writing and help the reader to identify them. Jerzy Topolski, one of the founding fathers 
of the Poznań school of methodology thinks that all history is a construct15. That a historian is 
not recreating the past, in which case the struggle to get as close as possible to facts is 
justified and required. A historian creates a new story, creates a new past. The work of a 
historian is in fact a narrative construction.  There is always a reason or a certain goal in front 
of each historian, which influences his or her work. The nationality of the writer and his or 
hers academic surroundings all contribute to the shape of the final product of the work of a 
historian. But probably the most important is always what the scholar wants to achieve with 
the work. Every historian when constructing a narrative is always driven by more or less 
pronounced cohesive vision of the world and man16. For me the special focus is the Austrian 
nation therefore all the history that will be used in this work will serve the purpose to fit in the 
narrative about the Austrian nation formation. This does not mean cherry-picking from 
Austrian history. A general outline of events and character from Austrian history needs to be 
prepared and presented, only that the focus will reframe the history to be seen through the lens 
of nation formation. Some events were of higher and some of lesser significance for the topic 
of the thesis. The role of the researcher is to explain and justify the choices that were made.  
A bridge between history and political sciences lies in the historical method which 
serves the purpose of collecting a vast array of sources and using them in the analysis of the 
origins of political phenomena17. This is especially the genetic method that focuses on the fact 
that every process has its origin and creates results. The other bridge is of course the source 
analysis which in political sciences takes a more detailed form of text and discourse analysis. 
When talking about nations, which is a very broad topic it is impossible not to use a broad 
look of the systemic analysis – the general legal, institutional, economic and cultural 
framework in which the analysed process took place. On top of that the theoretical framework 
                                                          
15 Topolski J., Metodologia historii, Warszawa 1984, For more about the narrative structures of writing history 
see: Topolski J., Jak się pisze i rozumie historię, Warszawa 1998.  Jerzy Topolski represents a postmarxist, 
constructivist approach to history and historiography. After the “linguistic turn” he was under the influence of 
Hayden White (White H., Metahistory. London 1973, White H., Tropics of discourse. Baltimore-London 1988)  
16 Topolski J., Wprowadzenie do historii, Poznań 2009, p. 23. 
17 Chodubski A., Wstęp do badań politologicznych, Gdańsk 2008, p. 127.  
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of Hroch, Hobsbawm, Anderson and others could be used both by historians and political 
researchers. 
For the most part of the thesis however I will be using text analysis and the discourse 
analysis with the main focus on the historical and political discourse. More detailed 
explanations will be given in the chapters that require using them. As theoretical framework 
for nation-formation my inspiration comes mainly from the writings of Miroslav Hroch and 
Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska. I do not want to omit the constructivist approach of Eric 
Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, but the more balanced way of Hroch and Budyta-
Budzyńska is more suited to the Austrian case. While nation is a construct it is not an artificial 
or arbitrary one and there are factors deeply rooted in history that contribute to the emergence 
of one nation and I do not want to make this omission in my thesis18. 
1.3 Basic terminology  
 
For every researcher that tries to vie with the notion of nation is confronted with 
several issues with framing the research. The first thing would be the choice of the subject of 
analysis and the paradigm of the ontological status of nations19. The nation could be seen in 
historical terms and treated as an existing entity. In that case it would not make sense to 
reduce the nation into the sum of its members. It would also be possible to attribute traits (or 
characteristics) to a nation. The nation could also be viewed as an unreal entity.  
The unreal paradigm can be divided further. The nation could be understood as an idea that 
has an axiological system based on culture, language and customs or it could be understood as 
an imagined, abstract community with invented traditions20. The last but not the least unreal 
postmodernist paradigm would treat a nation as something in use. It would only emerge in 
discourse, communication between people or between institutions and people (in which case 
the discourse would be political21. For the sake of this work I will use the notion of the nation 
as a really existing entity even if the realness of their existence is based on discourse, 
                                                          
18 See more in Chapters 1.6 and 1.7.  
19 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010  p. 29-30.   
20 See: Hobsbawm, Anderson B., Imagined communities, London, New York 2006.  
21 A myriad of postmodernist approaches towards nation was presented by Anthony Smith in the chapter Beyond 
Modernism p. 199 -220.  A fundamental work for discussing the role of discourse as factor for nation emergence 
is Wodak R. (ed.), Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998. Perhaps the best 
description of this understanding is given by Roger Brubaker: Nation is not a substance but an institutionalised 
form, it is not a collectivist but a practical category, it is not a being but a possible event. A nation is not a really 
existing group it is a conditioned construct, it is fluid, not necessary but it happens. It is fluidity, a relation, not 
an entity. [in:] Brubaker R., Nacjonalizm inaczej. Struktura narodowa i kwestie narodowe w nowej Europie, 
Warszawa-Karków 1998.  p. 22.  
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communication or culture. As in the famous joke made by the comedian Groucho Marx: “He 
may look like an idiot and talk like an idiot but don't let that fool you. He really is an idiot.‖ 
Similarly if a community thinks they are a nation, behave like a nation and are recognized by 
others as a nation they are a really existing nation. It does not matter if their realness is only 
proved in social interactions; they are a real product of those interactions. It is also impossible 
to speak of the nation without the notion of national identity which brings another word that 
needs clarification – identity. This is not a psychological or philosophical work so identity 
would only serve an auxiliary role. I am more interested in the mechanisms of identity 
creation with regards to the nation. But what is identity? Jan Assmann writes: identity is the 
knowledge of a person to be himself, to be unique and unmistakable22 . Assmann leaves the 
question of identity into the realm of cognitive abilities of a person. Identity is subjective, 
fluid and multi-layered. It is a product of a dynamic process, with the result that an individual 
can also have multiple identities, each activated in different contexts and degrees. A person 
can at the same time have a class, professional, political, local, national or supranational 
identity. I am not writing in plural to indicate that all those identities can exist simultaneously, 
overlap and influence each other. In some cases identities can contradict each other which are 
a great inspiration for writers and filmmakers. This process creates an identity that is never 
solid; it is ever-changing with passing time and ageing of a person. The personal feeling of 
identity congruence and coherence that people possess is in fact an illusion.  Identity also 
serves a teleological goal – it helps with social interactions with other people. If one can 
identify himself he or she will be able to identify others, it is a basic psychological and social 
mechanism when the “I” confronts “The other”. 
 Identity has to be divided into individual and collective (me and we). A collective 
identity can be shared among individuals and in order to do so ways of communicating social 
identities need to be developed23.  The individual identity is also a social construct it comes 
from exogenous influences coming from other individuals. In addition to physicality, practical 
and intellectual abilities, a key aspect of individual identity is also the social component: 
society contributes significantly to cognitive and emotional development. Max Haller in his 
research about Austrian national identity defines identity as  a socially constructed definition 
                                                          
22 Assmann  J., Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, Munich 1992. p. 130. For Assman identity means becoming reflexive 
of an unconscious self-image so it remains on the level of one‟s consciousness. Also Antonina Kłoskowsa 
follows the same pattern calling identity: a type of self-knowledge, a reflexive relation of the subject towards 
itself. Kłoskowska A., Kultury narodowe u korzeni, Warszawa 2005, p. 99.  
23 Hall S., Kulturelle Identität und Globalisierung, [in:] Hörnig K., Winter R,. (ed.), Widerspenstige Kulturen. 
Cultural Studies als Herausforderung, Frankfurt am Main 1999, p. 369. For a more detailed analysis see: Du 
Gay P., Hall S., Questions of Cultural Identity, Los Angeles 2009.  
15 
 
of an individual that is, a social construction and ties identity to the respective cultural 
patterns and rules of interaction24. Those rules of interaction that create a collective identity 
include symbols, rituals, celebrations and most importantly narratives that are constantly 
repeated and disseminated among a social group that wants to nurse a common identity. 
 My focus is not on the individual identity, not even on the collective identity, albeit it 
is more significant for this study, but rather on the ways that the collective identity is 
constructed. I do not want to focus on general rules of collective identity formation rather use 
a case study of a particular collective identity: the Austrian national identity. The national 
identity is a part of a broader civilizational and cultural identity. For Stuart Hall national 
cultures are among the main sources of cultural identity. A national identity is not imprinted 
in our genes; nevertheless, it is thought to be part of our nature25. Even if national identity is 
a cultural construct it certainly feels primordial26. A renowned Austrian political scientist and 
essayist Anton Pelinka is clear about the natural feeling of national identity. He proposes three 
types of understanding of this phenomenon:  
 
1. National identity is not a phenomenon of nature, but of culture - that is 
dependent on social development. It is changeable and controllable, because only the 
political socialization makes a person a member of the nation.  
2. National identity is only one of many identities existing simultaneously. 
3. National identity is not only an ontological reality but also an indicator 
of a person‟s identity. Various conditions (biological, cultural etc). may change the 
intensity of expression of national identity.27 
 
For the needs of this thesis I would paraphrase the definition of Assman in regard of 
national identity. It is being reflexive of a national self-image. Kłoskowska expands this 
definition stating that a national identity of a national collectivity is their self-knowledge, self-
                                                          
24 Haller M (ed.)., Identität und Nationalstolz der Österreicher,  Wien-Köln-Weimar 1996, p. 38.   
25 Ibidem, p. 415. 
26 It is within the realm of possibility that the psychological effect of the naturalness of national identity is one of 
the reasons why primordialism was once the predominant narrative about nation-formation. More on the topic in 
chapter: Also there are new ramification for identities with the onset of modernity which is argued in detail in: 
Giddens A.,Nowoczesnośc i tożsamość. Warszawa 2001. Giddens argues that in the times of late modernity the 
functioning of identity changed to previous times and confronts the problems of existing in a post-modern 
reality. 
27 Pelinka A., Nationale Identität, [in:]  Nationale und kulturelle Identitäten Österreichs: Theorien, Methoden 
und Probleme der Forschung zu kollektiver Identität, Wien 1995. The work is a result of a scientific project 
Identitätswandel österreichs im veränderten Europa. 
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identification28. The national identity as being a collective one can only exist within a group 
of people that form a society. The identity is the validated, updated and used through means 
of communication which vary from everyday talk, through public discourse to the use of 
symbols. A symbol is and expression of a mixture of individual and collective sensations and 
experiences or an act that can be understood either unconsciously or as a deliberate attempt at 
implying a certain (or several) meaning. Symbols are omnipresent and seem to be obligatory 
for any kind of social life. In the case of national symbols they could include expression of 
tradition, archetypical stories and tales, documents, painting, sculptures and monuments, 
buildings or even certain people29. Not all culture is national but national expression is 
cultural. For Stuart Hall a nation is a system of cultural representation and the culture itself is 
just a discourse30. If we would logically follow the steps of Hall or Wodak it would lead us to 
the statement that a nation exists only in communication in a discourse. It is however 
important to make the distinction between national identity and a nation. The national identity 
is a subjective part of each individual‟s personal identity but it is also created and moulded 
outside of one‟s identity. It is a given of a habitus in which one socialises and grows up. It is 
reinforced or changed through interactions with other people or their cultural creations or 
ideology driven policies. No nation can exist without its personal expression of its members. 
In other words a nation is expressed through national identity but it is not just a national 
identity. Going further, the nation is an expression of identity through the means discourse but 
it is not the discourse itself31. Paul James distinguishes three methods of nation-formation that 
could also serve as an example for sustaining the nation in social interactions. It is the face-to-
face integration (personal lever); agency extended integration (institutional level) and 
disembodied integration (postmodern, multivoice and multisource)32.  
The difference between identity and consciousness has to be brought up for the sake of 
clarity of further investigations. The terms national consciousness and national identity are 
sometimes used interchangeably. Consciousness has to be understood as a cognitive 
competence of a person. Without being conscious there would be no feeling of identity. With 
                                                          
28 Kłoskowska A., Kultury narodowe u korzeni, Warszawa 2005 p.99 Kłoskowska mentions an issue with 
treating the national psyche as if it belonged to a single person. Nation is not a psychological unit with cognitive 
abilities. She is also critical of using national identity as an analytical category.  
29 Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., Zur disukrsiven Konstruktion 
nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 37.  
30 Du Gay P., Hall S., Questions of Cultural Identity, Los Angeles 2009 200-201. 
31 Very much like the narrative identity is created through discourse but the discourse is not the narrative 
identity. The theory of narrative identity postulates that individuals form an identity by integrating their life 
experiences into an internalized, evolving story of the self that provides the individual with a sense of meaning 
and integrity. See: Wodak, p. 55-56, 61-71.   
32 James P., Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, 23-37, London 1996. 
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this understanding, you could BE conscious of your identity that you HAVE. So when writing 
about national consciousness it means writing about people who consciously identify as 
members of the nation. There is a semantic difference but for the general understanding of the 
national question it is not that important.  
Another focal definition that needs to be addressed here is discourse. The term itself 
comes from Latin discursus which means a chat or a speech. Nowadays however the term is 
overused and abused to such extent that discourse can basically means almost anything. Jerzy 
Szacki said: the word discourse made a stunning career in modern humanities and it is 
harder and harder to be certain that it means anything at all. I it used in many various ways, 
and not seldom as a scientific term to name any longer statement or text33. At first discourse 
was used in linguistics to demarcate the whole process of communication or an organised oral 
statement. David Howarth traced the evolution of the ever expanding meaning of discourse34. 
In short the term went from linguistics through structuralism, and (post)Marxist theories. 
Especially the Marxist influence is significant because the approach focusing on the 
mechanism of power and politics in discourse led to the creation of the so called critical 
discourse analysis (CAD) which according to some scholars should be regarded as a separate 
discipline in itself35. It was Michail Bachtin who first stressed the importance of context in the 
use of speech or text. But it was Michael Focault that emphasised the role of power in the 
structure of discourse. The post-marxist approach includes also more specified ways of 
analysis like the importance of ideological context and outcome of discourse36. This is a part 
of Antoni Gramsci‟s theory of hegemony.  There is however no need to become so specific. 
As Anna Duszak says discourse is a text in context37. The choice of context belongs to the 
researcher; it could be used in gender or postcolonial studies or in more general context like 
public, political or media discourse38. Discourse can be analysed on different context  levels 
as the following list prepared by Ruth Wodak is showing:  : 
                                                          
33 Szacki J., Historia myśli socjologicznej, Warszawa 2005, p. 905. 
34 Howarth D., Dyskurs, Warszawa 2005, p. 11-15. 
35 Duszak A., (red.): Krytyczna analiza dyskursu , Kraków 2008, p. 7. An identical definiton is given by: van 
Dijk T., (ed.) Dyskurs jako struktura i proces, , Warszawa 2001, p. 12. 
36 See Focault M., Porządek dyskursu, Gdańsk 2002;  
37 Ibidem p. 7.  
38 For postcolonial use of discourse see Edward Said‟s Orientalism, a basic read in this field. Since Said other 
scholars replicated his achievement in different contexts for example: Thompson E., Trubadurzy Imperium, 
Kraków 2002, uses the discourse analysis to create a theory of Russian imperialism. Bill S., Seeking the 
Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory, [in:] Online Journal in the Humanities 12, 
2014, used the postcolonial framework to analyse the intricacies of Polish culture. Nevertheless it does not 
matter if the study regards the gender theory, or national theory or postcolonialism – they all are in fact limited to 
discourse analysis.  
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1. Language (text) level, 
2. Intertextual, interdiscoursive relation between discourses, 
3. Sociological and institutional framework (mezocontext)  
4. Broader social, political and historical context39. 
 
Depending on the source that will be analysed a different lever of inquiry will be 
required. For instance school textbooks need a deeper investigation into the linguistic level 
and whole works of historians need to be predominantly set in the historical and political 
context.  
A typical CAD tries to check all the upcoming points:  
1. make a diagnosis based on discourse analysis as to the state of 
knowledge, values, ideology of the authors  
2. get an insight into the goals and assumptions that accompany 
communication - both explicit and those that the participants of the communication 
were not aware of 
3. discover and describe the internal dynamics of power and subordination 
among the participants of communication; 
4. reveal persuasive mechanisms and attempts to manipulate; 
5. look for loopholes, inconsistencies, and communication errors40 
 
 In my case I will limit myself to the historical (historiographical) and political 
discourses as they are the most relevant in the process of nation formation. The reason for this 
is that there already exists an extensive work prepared by a team of researchers under Ruth 
Wodak which deals with the topic of Austrian national identity41.Another reason is that it is 
almost impossible to recreate or replicate the work done by Wodak in regard to the past. The 
CAD is only true for the moment in which it was conducted. The only solution is an attempt 
to get as close as possible to the results of this kind of inquiry with more limited tools.  More 
technical details on text and discourse analysis will appear in respective chapters of this thesis 
                                                          
39 Wodak R,. Dyskurs populistyczny: retoryka wykluczenia a gatunki języka pisanego, [in:]. W: A. Duszak A.,  
i N. Fairclough N., (ed.), Krytyczna analiza dyskursu. Kraków, p. 185–214. 
40 Kopińska V., Krytyczna analiza dyskursu – podstawowe założenia, implikacje, zastosowanie, [in:]Rocznik 
Andragogiczny 26, 2016.  
p. 317-318. 
41 Wodak R., de Cillia R., Reisigl M., Liebhar K., Hofstätter K., Kargl M., Zur disukrsiven Konstruktion 
nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998.    
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as different sources require different apparatus42. There is a difference in approaching school 
textbooks, academic history books or interviews with politicians and each one of them 
requires a more specified analysis.  
 
There are two vital terms that were not discussed yet. Nation and nationalism require 
however a much more detailed description which is elaborated below.  
1.4. Not so basic terminology - the significance of nation 
 
In the history of humanities and social sciences it is hard to find a more ambiguous term than 
the nation. Every person understands what nation means. The problem lies in the issue that 
everyone understands it in a different way and with highest probability will find it difficult to 
easily and quickly explain what it means. The nation is an essentially disputed concept the 
proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes on the part of their users43. The lack 
of common understanding is interwoven into the very fabric of the disputed idea. The problem 
deepens when one will take into account that people from different countries (or should I say 
nations?) do not mean the same thing when they say nation. As Marek Waldenberg puts it: 
The definitions of nations always carry a very significant trait of the author‘s nationality44. A 
Frenchman means something different than a German when they say the word “nation”, the 
Polish equivalent naród carries even more dissimilar meanings. The German word das Volk is 
not the same than the French le peouple or Polish lud and yet they all could be, in certain 
circumstances, used synonymously to describe a nation. The problem deepens even further 
with the fact that “nation” is also a historical term and its meaning have shifted and changed 
throughout the passing years, decades or even centuries.  
Even within one national group it is hard to find a common base for understanding. 
The main reason for that situation is the fact that the term nation is quite politicized. Various 
political groups use it to achieve their goals or even in some cases their goal is to reframe the 
meaning of the nation itself.  
The innate complexity of the term nation is exactly proportional to its importance. In 
the humorous words of E.J. Hobsbawm: “Suppose one day, after a nuclear war, an 
                                                          
42 See Chapter 3.2.3. 
43 Smith K., Mutually Contested Concepts and Their Standard General Use, Journal of Classical Sociology, Vol. 
2, No.3, (1 November 2002), pp. 329–343. 




intergalactic historian lands on a now dead planet in order to enquire into the cause of the 
remote little catastrophe which the sensors of his galaxy have recorded. He or she […] 
consults the terrestrial libraries and archives which have been preserved, because the 
technology of mature nuclear weaponry has been designed to destroy people rather than 
property. Our observer, after some study, will conclude that the last two centuries of the 
human history of the planet Earth are incomprehensible without some understanding of the 
term nation and the vocabulary derived from it. This term appears to express something 
important in the human affairs. But what exactly? Here lies the mystery”45. The mystery 
seems to be unresolved ever since Ernest Renan on 11th of March 1882 in the noble halls of 
Sorbonne in Paris asked his famous question: Qu‘est-ce qu‘une nation? Despite the fact that 
hundreds if not thousands of works tried to answer it the question stands open still to this very 
day. I do not wish nor believe I would be able to answer it in a satisfactory manner. This work 
does not aim to create a new definition of nation or create a new theory of nation building. 
Miroslav Hroch has accurately named the problem that every researcher of nations and 
nationalism is facing. Anyone who has been keeping up-to-date with the world of academic 
publications, even from a distance, knows that nation and nationalism belong among the most 
frequently studied matter and it is legitimate to question the point of adding another book on 
the topic. One‘s scepticism would be all the more justified if the aim of this book were to 
present yet another new theory of nationalism. Any author who aspires to extend themselves 
beyond a mere description or narrative is by definition, making an attempt to be original. 
Admittedly, such originality for too often rests either on taking one aspect of the issue out of 
context and blowing it out of proportion46. To try and tailor a new theory of nation just to fit it 
to the Austrian example of this dissertation would be mere folly. Nevertheless it is important 
to establish a theoretical background and at least try to summarise the most vital narratives 
regarding the understanding “nation”. The proposed analysis, by no means, will be a 
comprehensive one. The sheer amount of works, books and articles is too overwhelming 
creates a situation when any attempt to delve into this topic will create only partial and 
imperfect results. That should never hold anyone back from trying though. 
One of the very first things that a researcher can and should do is to investigate the 
etymology of the word that describes his or her research subject. Such linguistic inquiry not 
                                                          
45Hobsbawm E.J., Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990, p. 1. It is both interesting and 
magnificent how Hobsbawm incorporates the common tropes and fears of the late Cold War period into his 
academic considerations. 
46 Hroch M., Preface of: European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015 p. I.  
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only helps to establish, at least, a basic meaning but also serves as a good introduction to the 
topic. It would make sense to do the same with “nation”.  
In the Polish language the term naród stems from the verb rodzić się (to be born, a 
reflexive verb), even till the XVth century it was used to describe offspring47. It is no surprise 
that the Latin root of the word nation – nascor,nasci means the same thing (to be born). Even 
the other Latin word used to describe nations: gens, comes from the verb gigno,-ere – to give 
birth. The majority of European languages use variations of the Latin root-word: nation, 
nazione, nacion, nacija, nacja48. The connection of the term nation with birth or giving birth 
is a strong indicator of understanding nation as a family, a people of the common blood and of 
a common ancestor. The etymological analysis brings one of the understandings of nation – as 
a group of common ethnicity. The Greek word ethne bears the same meaning as the Latin 
gens and emphasises the bond of blood among a group of people. In a similar fashion the term 
for one‟s land, one‟s country: patria, Vaterland, ojczyzna also bring connotations to the 
family – in this case to the figure of the father (pater, Vater, ojciec). This genetic 
understanding of the nation is by far the most popular among historians. There are two other 
ways that identify the nation: functionalist and substantial. The functionalist approach, used 
by anthropologist and some sociologists puts its emphasis on the function that the nation 
serves. The substantial approach lists characteristics of the social entity that is the nation. All 
three schools create their own definitions. It is no mistake or coincidence that the title of this 
subchapter speaks about describing and not defining. It is very hard to define a nation. If we 
were to create a list of characteristics that constitute a nation it would quickly turn out that 
there are not so many nations that fit. A nation is too complex to simply put it into a 
definition, which in turn would be more exclusive rather than inclusive. Małgorzata Budyta-
Budzyńska addresses this problem and states: Instead of speaking about the definition of the 
nation it is much better to talk about an idea, concept or an ideal type (in weberian sense) of 
the nation49. 
The ideal type of a nation is more inclusive and its biggest advantage is that the real 
entities that are in question do not need to fulfil all the requirements to become labelled as a 
nation. One can only compare them to the ideal type and establish whether they more or less 
                                                          
47 Zientara B., Świt narodów europejskich, Warszawa 1996, s. 18. 
48 Benedict Zienara wrote an extensive analysis of all the words that describe nations in various European 
languages. He traces the meanings from the ancient Greek ethnie to the Germanic tribal expresions thiuda and 
luit, which evolved into Deutsch and Leute.. Ibidem, p. 22-27. 
49 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 22.  
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congruent. Weber defined the ideal types as constructs introduced from the real world or 
historical reality. In order to create an ideal type, it is necessary to delve into the historical or 
social reality, and then generalize and enhance the traits or phenomena that really exist. The 
ideal type is not a model derived from an theory based on a hypothesis rather than an 
experiment (a priori), it is not a nominalist concept, it is an overdrawn generalisation of the 
existing reality50.  
How to create an ideal type of a nation? Of course Budyta-Budzyńska presents the 
reader with her proposition. But before establishing it here it would be necessary to sum up 
the main threads of the discussion about the origins and the ontological status of nations and 
then pick up the most important features that would serve as a brick in the construction of the 
ideal type of the nation. Those main threads are: primordialism, historicism, naturalism and 
constructivism. The primordialists argue that nations have always existed and only their form 
had changed with the passing of time. The supporters of the historical approach say that 
nations appeared at some point of time. The origins of nations could be traced to the times of 
the fall of the West Roman Empire and the great migration period, to early medieval period 
and the formation of the Carolingian Empire, late medieval period or the renaissance and the 
emergence of various languages. Others argue that nations were formed only after the French 
Revolution in modern times. The second division is between the naturalists and 
constructivists. The naturalist approach states that nations have emerged in a primordial and 
natural way, the constructivists on the other hand argue that the nation is a casual 
phenomenon, and in its most radical version purely accidental. From the constructivist branch 
stem the ideas of nationalism as a tool that creates and shapes nation. By accepting this 
argument a nation would be something that could be brought to life but also dissolve and be 
replaced by a new nation or something else entirely. 
The last or maybe the first issue that needs to be addressed is how nation was 
understood in the past and how its meaning has evolved over centuries. In order to create a 
coherent description of what a nation is and what it is not, it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning of certain terms. In that way this work would be liberated from unnecessary 
ambiguities. As Miroslav Hroch puts it: Indeed, the sheer quantity of partial findings and 
sophisticated theories appear to have turned the issues of nation and nationalism into a very 
chaotic terrain, within which researchers often find it hard to orientate themselves.[…] a 
                                                          
50 Ibidem, p.22.  
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mutual understanding is difficult, since only a minimal consensus has been reached about the 
terms, hence the need to offer a clarification of the basic terms and concepts51. As it is with 
the case of Hroch I would like to limit this inquiry just to the Western world, namely Europe. 
The inclusion of non-european nations would create an even deeper terminological chaos. 
Other parts of the world adopted the European terms and tried to adapt their own unique 
situations to Western concepts. 
1.5 Ride through history – the changing understanding of nation 
 
As it is the case with almost all important European issues of historical importance the 
first meanings of the term nation come from antiquity. The Romans differentiated between 
two groups of people. One was the populous Romanus – the civilized people of the Roman 
Empire. On the other side of the limes lived gentes and nationes – various barbarians. The 
biggest divergence between those two terms is the understanding of communities. Populus 
was a nation (people) organized in a specific state. Cicero wrote: The people (populus) is not 
in the least a gathering of people brought together by any mean, it is a huge group united by 
acknowledgment of the common law and the benefits of existing together52. Gentes and 
nationes were united by common ancestry, usually coming from a legendary hero that gave 
the name to a certain nation-tribe. Interestingly gens (or more commonly used gentes) at first 
signified the noble families of the Roman patriciate. This meaning in the times of the 
Republic had shifted and was expanded to general ethnic groups. It makes sense that the 
familial origins of the word evolved into a description of a community united by ancestry. 
The use of natio for “uncivilized” peoples was not only a remark by a Polish historian 
Benedykt Zientara. Also an Austrialian researcher of social theory Paul James supports this 
understanding and quotes Sallust (nationes ferae), Cicero (natio servituti nata) and 
Hieronymus (innumerabiles et ferocissimae nationes)53.  
Those antique meanings were transferred to the early medieval period as the majority 
of the inhabitants of Europe used the surviving Latin texts as their source of information. 
Zientara emphasises the role of the wrings of Isidore of Seville, as well as those of Boethius 
and Cassiodorus. The fall of the Roman Empire brought a change in the meaning in the use of 
                                                          
51 Hroch, M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015,  p.2  
52 Cicero, De re publica, as cited in Zientara B., Świt narodów europejskich, Warszawa 1996, p. 26.  
53 James P., Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, London 1996, p. 11. 
See also: Greenfield L., Nationalism. Five roads to modernity, Cambridge, London 1992, p. 5.  
By following the research of Guigo Zerrato Greenfield compares the Latin nation to Greek ta ethne or to Hebrew 
ammamim. The Greek root-word ethne evolved to signify something different than the Latin nation. 
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the word nation. Closely linked with natus [birth] and natura [inborn characteristics], it 
vaguely indicated a larger context than gens or populus, but without there being any fixed 
distinction between the three terms. The Vulgate [that is, the authorised Latin version of the 
biblical scriptures prepared mainly by Hieronymus near the end of the fourth century] used 
gentes, populous, nationes interchangeably for the nations of the Old Testament, and that 
biblical usage determined the significance of nation for the time being. It indicated a fairly 
indefinite interrelationship of tribe, tongue and region, sometimes in a restricted sense, 
sometimes in a broader one. [Later in the Middle Ages]The Burgundians, the Bretons, the 
Bavarians, and the Swabians were called nations, but so were the French, the English, and 
the Germans. Unlike patria, nation did not have an administrative significance and initially 
not a political one either. But little by little the various relationships of dependence and 
community obtaining exerted an influence on the restriction and delimitation of the concept of 
nation54. It is beyond discussion that the most important text of the early Middle Ages was the 
Bible and its Latin translation. Johan Huizinga was not entirely right in his assessment of the 
use of nation in the Vulgate. Saint Hieronymus did in fact use populus to distinguish the 
chosen nation of Israel from heathen nations – gentes. Even in in the late Roman period St. 
Augustine used the term populus to indicate a community of the same faith55. Interestingly 
Augustine also described the people of the old Greek and Roman faith as gentes – civilized 
people of a different faith. Nevertheless the contribution of the bishop of Hippo did not 
change the overall shift in meaning that created a division between the civilized Romans and 
the pagan barbarians. It has to be mentioned that populus had also a different meaning – a 
mass of people (similar in the meaning to the words: peuople, Volk or lud). When Isidore of 
Seville wrote his Etymologiae in the beginning of the VII century he used populus in the latter 
meaning. For all other early medieval communities he used the terms gens and nationes 
interchangeably and meant a gathering of people of common ancestry. He also analysed the 
issue of the language but it was of secondary importance. Many of the Germanic tribes that 
invaded and settled in the lands of the former Roman Empire used a similar language or 
dialect; they even had a similar ways of life. This did not prevent the tribes to create various 
independent political bodies. Yet there was little difference in meaning between for instance 
gens Thuringorum and natio Picardorum. In our times we would just call them tribes (or 
peoples) based on their shared ethnicity.  
                                                          
54 Huizinga J., Men and Ideas, New York 1959, p. 106-107. 
55  De civitate Dei, XIX, 24, as cited in Zientara B., Świt narodów europejskich, Warszawa 1996, p. 23. 
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The meaning of gens and nationes evolved over time thanks to the influence of the 
Catholic Church. According to Zientara the churche used natio for communities that were 
much broader than gens, and had a territorial meaning rather than linguistic or ethnic. This 
statement is partially contradicted by Paul James who writes: nation came later to refer to all 
aggregations, or classings, of people with a common ethnic background, including the most 
prestigious and civilized of associations the university corporations56. The university used 
nation is a fascinating construct. Universities were (as their name suggest) universalistic 
places where the working language was Latin and yet even there a specific type of 
particularism arouse. Students were grouped into corporate like nations57. Those nations were 
grouped rather arbitrarily based on their general place of origin and their way of speech.  For 
instance the University of Paris had four nationes: France for people speaking romance 
languages (including Spanish and Italian), Picardie for people from the Netherlands, 
Normandie for students from the North and East of Europe and Germanie for students from 
current Germany and England. The Polish natio at the University of Prague included people 
from: Poland, Lithuania, Ruthenia, Silesia as well as German speaking Saxony and Thuringia. 
The self-identification with those nationes was quite strong. There are historical recordings of 
riots, fights and even killings in the name of university nations. Such conflicts and divisions 
even led to secession from Oxford and creation of a new university in Stamford in 1333. Also 
the Church used nation in a similar fashion. The councils had divided the bishops into several 
nations regarding their geographical origin. This method was firstly used at the universal 
council in Lion in 1274. At the council of Vienne there were eight nations: French, Italian, 
Spanish, German, Danish, English, Scottish and Irish. Central European peoples were 
assigned to the German nation and the Scandinavian ones into the Danish one. The council in 
Konstanz that took place in the years 1414-1418 was witness to interesting developments. 
Various groups wanted to be acknowledged as a nation, especially the envoys from Portugal 
and Hungary. Even more interestingly the representatives of Savoy, Lorraine and Provence 
wanted to secede from the German nation because they spoke French. To sum up the term 
natio had evolved from its antique Roman roots to a word that encompasses a territorial or in 
the case of universities and church councils a more general geographic meaning. The late 
medieval period brought changes that continued into the next era.  
                                                          
56 James P., Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, London 1996, p. 11. 
57 In the Polish language those university natio is called nacja instead of naród, which suggests that it has a 
different significance.  
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Another development comes with the turn of the ages and the coming of the Early 
Modern period. In France and the Holy Roman Empire the term was used to designate ruling 
classes as opposed to the common folk (named peuple and Volk respectively). The first use of 
nation that broke the distinction between the elites and the folk/plebs/people as Liah 
Greenfield argues happened in England. She believes that the change of meaning for a 
broader and more inclusive signifies the birth of the first modern nation.58 Central Europe saw 
a different line of development where the nation remained to be used by the elite and the 
semantic change and understanding of what nation is happened within the ruling classes – the 
nobility. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as well as in Hungary the ruling classes 
distinguished themselves from the peasants and viewed themselves as the only legitimate 
members of the nation The ethnic origins were not as important as belonging to the estate of 
nobles. It was quite common among the Polish noble (szlachta) to identify as Natione 
Polonus, gente Ruthenus or Natione Polonus, gente Prussicus; or even Natione Polonus, 
gente Ruthenus, origine Judaeus. The separation of the early medieval meanings between 
nation and gens had solidified and was clear even ten centuries later. What is more 
fascinating in this context is the political use of the term nation. To be part of the nation meant 
to have political right of which the lower classes were deprived. In Western Europe it was not 
until the turn of the seventeen century when the English started to use nation to describe 
whole people of the country and this understanding began to spread. In 1650 Jan Amos 
Komensky a Czech philosopher wrote that a nation is a community of people who occupy a 
common territory, have a common past and a common language, and are bound by a love for 
their common homeland59. Komensky‟s definition could still hold up to this day.  
The early modern period saw a slow development of interchangeability between the 
terms state and nation. Various kingdoms and realms could be references as nations. In this 
way some ethnic groups were arbitrarily omitted. There is no surprise though, as the XVII an 
XVIII century are the time of absolutism. The absolute monarchies strived to create 
uniformed state by the means of bureaucracy. Ernst Bruckmüller coined the term 
Hofratsnation – the nation of the royal bureaucrats60. In his curious search for the Austrian 
nation in the times of the Habsburgs he argued that the creation of new administrative 
                                                          
58 Greenfield L., Nationalism. Five roads to modernity, Cambridge, London 1992, p. 6. 
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apparatus of the empire was a social basis for national identity. Obviously this kind of nation 
was very scarce in numbers even if it grew with the development of bureaucracy after the 
reforms of the time of Enlightenment. And yet there is nothing really new in what 
Bruckmüller proposes. As stated before both in Germany and France there was a clear 
distinction between the nation and the people (Volk, peuple). In his anachronistic attempt to 
find the Austrian nation in history he just replicates the developments of different countries. 
The fact that he distinguished the nation of the elites at the very end of XIX century just 
shows that this development was clearly lagging behind other modern nations. But let us not 
get ahead of ourselves as this topic will be analysed in detail in later chapters. The Austrian 
example‟s purpose in this context serves just to prove the existence of a new social group that 
could also be included into a nation. The feudal society found its ultimate limits in the 
absolutist monarchies. The structure of those premodern societies organically and naturally 
favoured a limited understanding of nation that was limited to the higher strata – estates. With 
the slow development of capitalism nation changed its meaning, was transformed into a more 
egalitarian definition. It was then when the Latin word status started to describe not a social 
class but a state. In a similar fashion nations meant all the people living in one country. As 
Paul James notes the first usage of nation in that sense surfaced as early as the XVI century 
and gained momentum in the upcoming XVII and XVIII centuries61. At the same time another 
development occurred: the status - state started to became synonymous with nation. Coming 
from the late XVIII the equation nation=state made its way into becoming of the rule of 
international order after the I World War and the agenda of the US president Woodrow 
Wilson. The tradition of perceiving states and nations as one and not two strongly intertwined 
entities became the norm in Western Europe and the US. In Central and Eastern Europe the 
understanding of nation was different: there could be a nation without a state and in most 
cases even before a state came into existence. It was in this region that the dominating 
definitions emphasised the primal ethnic and cultural bonds.  
The focus on the understanding of nation switched in the late XVIII century and took a 
more modern form. Adam Smith in his most known work An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations writes: … every separate community, society, nation, state or 
people (term which, as far as our subject is concerned may be considered synonymous…‘62. 
Eric Hobsbawm links this understanding with the coming of modernity, of which he 
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distinguishes two major processes: economical and governmental development. He illustrates 
the rising importance of both economy and state institutions in defining what nation is by 
quoting the changing explanations of the word nation in The Dictionary of the Royal Spanish 
Academy. As Hobsbawm notes the Spanish dictionary does not operate with modern 
terminology before the year 1884. Nation meant the aggregate of the inhabitants of a 
province, a country or a kingdom. The year 1884 brought a pivotal change; the nation was 
from now on: a state or political government, the territory constituted by that state and its 
individual inhabitants, considered as a whole63. The role of the public administration became 
crucial in the late XIX century Spanish definition. The focus on institutions also brings into 
attention the problem of territory. It is natural that what a government does is governing over 
a certain territory (or even over certain group of people living in that territory). Territory has 
become an important factor as early as 1795 and is evident in the French declaration of 
Rights: Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who 
compose it and the extent of territory it occupies. The independence sovereignty has to be 
understood in this context as a possibility to organize one group with the same institutions and 
government, which could be formed by some representative of the given group. With this 
example it is easy to notice how slowly ideas could spread into neighboring countries like it is 
the case of France and Spain. 
If one thing can be said about the new revolutionary nation is that it was not perceived 
in ethnic sense. The connecting bond, the fundament of a community was the common 
interest. It was not a problem for an American writer and radical Thomas Paine to become a 
member of the Assemblée nationale. He too could be part of the nation. In a similar fashion 
the American Revolution distinguished not between the Americans and the British but rather 
between the royalists and revolutionaries. This revolutionary concept of nation was truly 
idealistic. It was devoid of ethnic or linguistic limitations but that does not mean that those 
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limitations would not appear in time, and as history proved, they did64. Even if the French 
revolutionaries fought to omit the language as an important factor contributing to the 
inclusion in one nation they did not stop the ever growing power of central government that 
enforced standardized spoken French. France today is known for its struggle of retaining the 
„pure French language‟65. A nation believes in its own language as a Frenchman Marcel 
Mauss stated in 196966.  
On the other side of the spectrum are the Germans, who because of their scattered 
geographical distribution in Central Europe were more inclined to lean towards a cultural 
understanding of the nation and the easiest and most basic indicator of belonging to that 
culture was the language. This point of view sometimes took interesting forms, for example in 
1860 Richard Böckh, a Prussian statistician and mathematician argued that Jews who spoke 
Yiddish were a part of the German nation. And yet not all German speaking people would be 
included in this kind of community. Ernest Renan when deliberating on the phenomenon of 
the Swiss nation wrote: Switzerland, so well made, since it was made with the consent of her 
different parts, numbers three or four languages. There is something in man which is superior 
to language, namely, the will67. The XIX century definitions of nation can become quite 
contradictory. What was functioning in one land was not popular in the other one time it is the 
territory or a government that is the vital part of understanding a nation, other times it is 
language, culture and will. Furthermore there are layers of meaning that contradict each other 
is the tension between the single person as an entity and the collective. Edwin Cannan in 1894 
considered a nation to be just a collection of individuals living in the territory of the state and 
considered whether the fact that in a hundred years‘ time all these people would be dead, 
made it impossible to speak of the nation as a continuously existing entity68. But a hundred 
years before him Edmund Burke already understood his national community as conection of 
generations after generations and in 1882 Ernest Renan had written the now famous words: A 
nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one 
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and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the 
present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present 
consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that we 
have jointly received. Messieurs, man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is 
the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions. Of all cults, that of the 
ancestors is the most legitimate: our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past with 
great men and glory (I mean true glory) is the social capital upon which the national idea 
rests. These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past 
and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to 
make them again.69.  For Otto Bauer the nation was a relative community of character, as he 
believed that each nation, very much like a living person, has a character that can change 
overtime70. The nation is not an absolute, but only a relative community of character, because 
the individual members of a nation, although they share the characteristics common to the 
whole nation, also have individual characteristics {and local, class, and professional 
characteristics that distinguish them from one another, Bauer continued.  
With that in mind, a prevailing feature of the XIX century understanding of the nation 
was that it had one generally (but not by all) accepted common denominator. It was 
primordialism, (also to some extent called perennialism). It is a belief that nations were a 
natural and very ancient phenomenon. Of course this type of thinking was not exclusive to the 
XIXth century. In fact it was as ancient as primordialism wanted nations to be. Ancient poems 
or the works of medieval and early-modern historians when describing tribes or peoples 
always searched for roots of the current communities even if those stories were not really 
factual. Many European nations traced their origins to the times of the fall of the Roman 
Empire or even further. Those with little evidence, like the Polish, tried to find “their ancient” 
ancestral tribe. In this case it were the Sarmatians, but putting an equation mark between 
Dacians and Romanians, Franks and the French, Visigoths and Vandals and the Spanish was a 
common practice. It cannot be a surprise that historians of the XIX century continued build 
upon and expanded these traditions 
However, even with that common denominator of primordialism, it is clearly seen that 
XIX century created quite a mess when it comes to defining nations. It would be more precise 
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to actually speak of the understanding of the nation as a tree. It may come from the same roots 
and have the same trunk (with a hole or two) but as we get up the tree everything becomes 
complicated. There are thousands of branches some bigger, some smaller. Little branches 
growing from the strong and firm ones do so in all directions sometimes intersecting and 
intertwining with one another. But it is the XXth century that brings the multitude of meaning, 
definitions and new approaches that creates real chaos in the nomenclature, classification and 
identification. The XXth century theories would be the leaves of the tree. Some definitions 
would still cling to the bigger branches of the tree, as it is the case of Marxist way of 
perceiving nation. Neither Marx nor Engels did develop any coherent understanding of nation, 
as they thought of it as a thing of the past – the new communist society would transgress the 
local, geographical limitations of the nation and create a worldwide classless society. At the 
same time Austro-Marxists like Otto Bauer focused on character and culture, which was in 
line with the German understanding of nation. Stalin trying to piece it all together in 1913 in 
his work Marxism and the National Question enumerated the conditions of an existence of 
nation: A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis 
of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a 
common culture 71. Stalin also emphasised the role of capitalism in forming modern nation. It 
seems that the Marxist theory does not bring much to the fray, but other social sciences that 
are derived from Marxism created interesting insights into the question of what is a nation. 
Sociologists like Durkheim or Weber included nations as a part of a broader and more general 
theory of social forms and constructs. Some focused on the ethic or even racial foundations of 
the nation, which created foundations for ideologies like Nazism. A change of focus on the 
nation was the result of the II World War and the concurrent ideologies that influenced it 
(Fascism and Nazism). Miroslav Hroch noted that: The vast majority of researchers distanced 
themselves from the perception of a nation as a community of blood and decreasing interest 
was shown in the idea that a nation was a perennial category. There was general agreement 
about the fact that a nation could not be defined by ethnic features (language and culture) 
alone. A nation was now increasingly recognised as an independent community only if its 
members could be demonstrated to be aware of their belonging together, and to value it. This 
gave rise to a growing emphasis on the subjectivist characterisation of a nation over the 
following decades and nationalism being studied as a manifestation and even precondition for 
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the existence of a nation72. Quite amusingly Hroch only listed those perceptions to try to 
challenge them with his comparative work. Nevertheless the subjectivist turn was a fact. 
Nation was now viewed from the lenses of different theories that each formed it in its image. 
The finest example would be Karl Deutsch and his idea of a community of complementary 
social communication. In this understanding the nation does not exist physically it is present 
in the very action of communication. It is not an ontological being it is a process. 
Psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, anthropologist and even biologists hopped on the 
bandwagon of national theory. A myriad of definitions and meanings was created. 
Postmarxists, constructivists and structuralists, like Ernst Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Paul 
James, Eric Hobsbawm, Zygmunt Bauman and others shed a new light on the nation 
formation process but without trying to exactly define what nation really is or offering very 
vague definitions73. For instance Gellner does not define nation but what it means to have or 
belong to a nation. He proposes a cultural and voluntaristic explanation. In the first case two 
people belong to the same nation when they use the same culture to communicate in the 
second when they believe they belong to the same nation74. This is a rather simplified 
utilitarian approach as it mixes personal identity and group identity without even investigating 
the valence (the process of using national group identification as a personal trait)75.  
Most of the mentioned scholars identify nations as a European phenomenon but a 
Benedict Anderson has shown, some national movements appeared outside of Europe at the 
end of the XVIII century, which is earlier than the process occurred in several European 
nations. His idea of creole pioneers directly contradicts the writings of Gellner as not all Latin 
American colonies entered the industrial phase remaining feudal or post-feudal societies when 
the national movements came to life in that region. For Anderson a nation is a political 
community - imagined to be inevitably limited and sovereign. Even so Anderson treats nation 
as a cultural phenomenon that replaced religious and dynastic communities. Despite the 
differences in finding the origins of nations, Anderson quite similarly to Gellner chooses the 
voluntaristic definition as a single person needs to believe he is a part of a national 
community.   
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That does not mean that there were no new attempts to define a nation. Małgorzata 
Budyta-Budzyńska for example states that a real nation are always a conglomerate of demos, 
ethnos and Kulturnation, and they only differ with each other with the emphasis put on one of 
those features76. Ethnos may be understood in several ways: as an ethnically bonded nation, 
as an ethnic group or an ethnicity. This multitude of meanings does not help with 
understanding what nation is according to Budyta-Budzyńska. Nevertheless ethnos plays an 
important role in nation theory. Ethnos usually is in the focus of anthropologists and 
sometimes of sociologists and historians. Scholars like Bronisław Malinowski research tribes 
in order to find the meaning behind the social interactions, its functions in the construction of 
society and trying to define what culture is. The insight of ethnologists and anthropologists 
are important to comprehend the issue of social structures (one of which could be a nation) 
and how they were made. At the same time ethnos is useful when deliberating about ethnic 
minorities that inhabit states with a different dominant culture. In many cases the ethnic 
minorities strive to gain their own state or independence of other states. This struggle can be 
connected with the effort to establish oneself as an independent nation, as is the case with the 
Kurds or Basques. Ethnic groups are important for historians as well as they provide a basis to 
compare with folk or peasant cultures of Europe77.  
Demos has to be understood in this context as the political nation, which is one of the 
most common ideas of nation description of the XX century. Ernst Gellner, Liah Greenfield, 
Eric Hobsbawm and Charles Tilly focus on the “modern” political nations. The emphasis on 
the demos is laid on the issue of sovereignty and citizenship. While Tilly seeks the beginning 
of the political nation in the early-modern period Hobsbawm wants to limit this process to the 
XIX and XX century. Despite those temporal differences there seems to be an agreement that 
it is not the ethnical bond that creates a nation, it is a process led by state institutions and a 
very specific segment of culture which Gellner identifies as nationalism. Other thing that 
brings the aforementioned scholars together is the idea that citizenship is crucial for belonging 
to a nation. It is a matter of recognition by existing states, not only the one that grants the 
citizenship but also the recognition of other states that honour this declaration of belonging. 
The nation is either state driven or state seeking. When the goal of having an own sovereign 
state the nation becomes state driven. A similar way of thinking is present in the writings of 
Józef Chlebowczyk. For the Polish historian it does not matter if a certain social group starts 
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as an ethnic, cultural or political community. In a Hegelian fashion he shows a one way 
development scheme which always ends in achieving a sovereign state. A 
language/cultural/ethnic group develops into a nationality. Nationality develops into a nation 
(or a national minority). Then the nation or the minority tries to achieve both internal and 
external sovereignty78. He distinguishes two phases of nation formation: the language-cultural 
phase and the second one the political phase. For Chlebowczyk a true nation in its most 
developed form is the political one.  
The Kulturnation is easy to explain and as seen before this definition is used by many 
scholars like Gellner. The nation is bound by common culture not by territory, state or 
government. The cultural understanding of nation was more spread in central Europe which 
geographically consists of many language and ethnic groups mixed on a relatively small area. 
The idea of Kulturnation was most prominent in societies striving to unite themselves in one 
sovereign state. Miroslav Hroch names this process unification nationalism and names 
Germans, Poles and Italians as examples. Thomas Eriksen also uses the cultural meaning 
attributing to anthropology. “Nation‖ was used imprecisely as a grand category of people or 
societies with a more-less uniform culture79.  
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Another Polish sociologist Anna Kłoskowska delivers a rather vague definition that 
has to be understood as Kulturnation: nation is a collectivity connected with a certain 
community of culture that helps and enables reciprocal understanding and a certain unity of 
its members80. Anthony Giddens on the other hand understands nation in a completely 
different way, it is a collectively existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is 
subject to a unitary [and uniform] administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal 
state apparatus and those of other states81. There are problems with the definitions provided 
by Deutsch, Budyta-Budzyńska and Giddens as they are at the same time enriching the debate 
about the meaning of nation. The problem is that those definitions cannot be used as stand-
alone ones and  each is fragile in its own way. Most certainly the nation is not just a process, 
with the definition provided by Budyta-Budzyńska one would need to firstly define the three 
ingredients of her definition.  With the case of Giddens shows the problem with the Anglo-
Saxon tradition of focusing on the state as a key factor in the existence of nation. The 
definition of Kłoskowska on the other hand is in line with Gellner and focuses on the cultural 
totally omitting the ethnic and political. Other scholars do not even think of the nation as en 
existing entity, it is thought of as a process of communication, a narrative or just a political 
product of certain actors of public life (elites). Hroch mentions a point of view in which there 
is no nation just nationalism82. Budyta-Budzyńska, while providing a definition on her own, 
decided to shy away from using definitions and proposes using more fluid terms like idea, 
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concept, variation or an ideal type. For her definitions always tend to be imperfect because 
they exclude certain groups that clearly are nations but do not fit the description83. Problems 
like too big emphasis on the role of state, focusing on territorial cohesion or ethnicity or 
language might work in defining one nation but do not work with another. The perfect 
example would be a rather broad definition made by Stalin but even with its multi-layered 
inclusivity it would not name Jews as a nation, which they clearly are. To avoid such 
problems Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska instead of trying to define what nation is, proposed a 
model of an ideal type of a nation which consists of objective and subjective traits. A nation 
has: 
1. A name (own or given by others but accepted by the 
           community). 
2. Language, which is treated as a mother tongue 
3. Territory (also called motherland), which is inhabited by at 
least a part of the nation 
4. A belief in common ancestry 
5. Own history 
6. Own culture in which a significant part of the community 
participates and identifies with 
7. Own state or a desire to poses a sovereign state organization 
8. A feeling of emotional bond 
9. A feeling of otherness towards other communities and the 
            feeling of worth84 
 
By framing the national question into the form of an ideal type a lot of problems are solved. 
Not all of the points of the list have to be checked to identify a group as a nation. Also the 
division into subjective and objective traits allows shifting focus from one to another. For 
instance the assessment of physical existence of territory or the existence of culture, state and 
languages would be different from the subjective ones like: identity or consciousness. With 
that different types of scholars could focus on different aspects and each contribute to the 
understanding of one nation. Also the list presented above could serve as test if a certain 
community is a nation. For example the Polish nation would check all from the list above but 
the Swiss would omit point 2 (language) and point 4 (a belief in common ancestry). The 
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Kurds would serve as another example. They are an ethnic group, speaking at least two 
different languages, living in four different countries (Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran). 
Depending on which country they live in their relations are more tribal than national and not 
all of those groups desire to have their own state while others do which leads to lack of 
cooperation between divided Kurds. They share common ancestry but their histories are 
different. There is no consensus if in theoretical terms the Kurds should be treated as nation. 
Depending on the theoretical framework they could be treated as such or the results can be 
entirely dissimilar.  
There is also one more issue with defining nation. With the exception of Karl Deutsch 
whose thinking was precursory to the modernist turn in XX century philosophy; other 
definitions are renditions of previous existing terms. In other words the snake started to eat its 
own tail. The issue of nation became so complicated that with highest probability I could say 
that it is impossible to define it with just one explanation and a mixture of many are required 
to reach an understanding. In the conclusion of his work Anthony Smith lists several problems 
that are also encountered in this work, and which conveniently could be used to summing up 
the discussion above: 
1. The failure to reach a consensus on the delimitation of the field; in 
particular, the disagreement between those who wish to treat problems of nations and 
nationalism as quite separate and distinct from issues of ethnicity, and those who 
regard ethnic and national phenomena as comprising different aspects of a single 
theoretical and empirical field, a distinction that corresponds to that between the 
modernist and the perennialist (and primordialist) paradigms. 
2. The notorious terminological difficulties in the field, and the failure to 
reach even a preliminary agreement on the definitions of key concepts. It is also clear 
that scholars have quite different approaches to the question of definitions, and in 
particular whether the concept of the ‗nation‘ can only apply where a majority of the 
designated population is included (and participates) in the nation. 
3. The problems of definitions arise, in part, from the deep divisions 
between basic paradigms and methodological approaches in the field. Once again, 
there is no agreement about the fundamental theoretical objectives, let alone 
substantive elements, of explanations, for example: whether explanations should be 
causal, whether they ought to be framed in purely individualistic terms, how far they 
should be reductionist, and so on. 
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4. From these broad differences spring the many divergent research 
programmes and interests in the field. Coupled with the swiftly evolving politics of 
ethnicity and nationalism, it is hardly surprising if research should be carried out on a 
wide range of topics and problems within the vast terrain of ethnic and national 
phenomena; and that it is often quite difficult to relate various research concerns to 
each other to form a more composite picture of progress in the field. 
5. Finally, there is the problem of different value-orientations to issues of 
ethnicity and nationalism. From these spring often quite opposed ideological positions 
vis-à-vis ethnic and national phenomena, which in turn help to determine different 
research problems and interests—as, for example, with the current interests in civic 
nationalism, hybridised identity and globalisation85. 
 
 The age of the definite is over over and the age of late modernity or postmodernism 
was born. As Zygmunt Bauman writes, the times of late modernity or postmodernity are 
rejecting the modernist order and delve into the territory of relativism86.  Trying to define the 
term nation was like trying to name the ineffable and it no longer became a possibility. Nation 
became an essentially contested concept. It means that this contested concept gives a name to 
a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a 
variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that 
dogmatism ("My answer is right and all others are wrong"), skepticism ("All answers are 
equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth"), and eclecticism ("Each 
meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better") are none of them the 
appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings87. In my understanding every new entry 
and research tries to shed a new light on what nation is and does not necessarily exclude the 
validity of other works and this is the basis on which I will conduct my research.  
1.6 Nation as a principle of organisation of society 
 
Nowadays in most states there are only two primary ways of becoming a citizen of a 
country, (which might also mean becoming a part of a nation): either through ius sanguinis 
(the law of blood) or ius soli (law of land). The first law draws attention to the natural bonds 
of blood and family and echoes the ethnic understanding of a national community. The law of 
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land is connected to the territorial aspect of citizenship. It would be required only to be born 
in a certain land to become a citizen. Both types of recognition require the existence of states 
and their institutions to validate the citizenship which has to be recognized internally and 
externally. In a perfect world all existing countries would legally acknowledge the existence 
of others, which is sadly not the case now. There are also secondary ways of becoming a 
citizen but in most cases they concern people who already got their first citizenship in the 
aforementioned two ways. Ius soli and ius sanguinis are prime examples of practical ways of 
basic society organization and have to be understood as a necessity. They are the most 
simplified essence of the problem of belonging to a polity and to a society but do not cover 
the myriad possibilities when it comes to identity: ethnic, national, regional etc. Such is the 
role that law plays in creating fundamental roles for societies. In the case of belonging it 
focuses on blood and land. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Nazi propaganda used Blut und 
Boden as tool in nation formation directed towards the peasant masses88.  
Ius soli and ius sanguinis carry a huge historical baggage of the ways in which nations 
and their nation-states were formed. In this subchapter I would like to focus on the theories of 
nation-formation and try to answer not only how nations came to life but also why (the 
answer to the latter is somewhat spoiled in the title of this chapter). As with trying to define 
what nation is one finds a similar problem with trying to find an answer on how nations came 
to life. Luckily this time the major narratives and ideas can be brought together in to distinct 
groups.  
1.6.1 How it is made? – Main narratives of the origins of nation   
 
The first big difference between scholars and researchers lies in the concept of when 
nations emerged or appeared in this world. Anthony D. Smith names five groups with the two 
most prominent ones being primordialists and modernists. It would serve best to quote Smiths 
definitions89:  
 
Primordialists attempt to understand the passion and self-sacrifice characteristic of nations 
and nationalism by deriving them from ‗primordial‘ attributes of basic social and cultural 
                                                          
88 For more information on national and social engineering in Nazi Germany look in: Madajczyk P., Marzenie o 
narodzie doskonałym. Między biopolityką a etnopolityką, Warszawa 2017.  
89 It has to be underlined that Smith uses the word paradigm for his five distinguished groups which I find 
unjustifiable. Not only some of his “paradigms” are too similar too each other but in general when used 




phenomena like language, religion, territory, and especially kinship. Primordialist 
approaches, whether of the cultural or the sociobiological varieties, have sensitised us to the 
intimate links between ethnicity and kinship, and ethnicity and territory, and have revealed 
the ways in which they can generate powerful sentiments of collective belonging. This is 
evident, not only in the work of van den Berghe and Geertz, but also in Grosby‘s research on 
ancient Israel. 
Perennialism views nations over the longue durée and attempts to grasp their role as 
long-term components of historical development—whether they are seen as temporally 
continuous or recurrent in history. Perennialists tend to derive modern nations from 
fundamental ethnic ties, rather than from the processes of modernisation. Perennialist 
approaches, like those of Fishman, Armstrong, Seton-Watson and, in respect of ethnicity, 
Connor and Horowitz, have contributed greatly to our understanding of the functions of 
language and ethnic ties, and the power of myths of origin and familial metaphors, in rousing 
popular support for nationalism. Here they serve as valuable correctives to the more extreme 
modernist interpretations and remind us of continuities and recurrences of ethnic 
phenomena90. 
It is hard to actually justify the distinction between primordialists and perennialists. 
Both of these groups view the issue of nation formation with the longue durée in sight. Both 
emphasise the importance of ethnicity, language and other objectively exiting factors that 
contribute to making a nations. Powerful sentiments from primordialists carry basically the 
same meaning as the perennial power of myths of origin. Perhaps Małgorzata Budyta-
Budzyńska, who takes a different approach and omits perennialists entirely, could shed more 
light. The difference that Smith is seeking lies in the way that scholars distinguish the origins 
of nations. One group is naturalists and other is constructivists. Naturalist claim that nations 
are primeval, that came to life in a natural and organic way. They are neither created nor 
brought to life. Nations have always existed only they did not have the awareness of their own 
existence. The only historical process involved is the rising tide of national self-
consciousness. These beliefs were often held by writers of the romantic period as well as 
nationalist ideologues. On the other side of the spectrum are the constructivists who claim that 
nations are something accidental and unnecessary. They were created by various and yet 
specific agents through the means of ideology, nationalism, the work of elites etc. 
                                                          
90 Smith D.A., Nationalism and modernism, New York 1998 p 223-225. 
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Interestingly though, nations had to be formed around certain ideas or myths like language, 
culture or fatherland which may sound primordial but could as well be invented or imagined 
traditions. For Budyta-Budzyńska the primordialist approach usually is naturalist: nations 
existed for a long time only their form changed. But the naturalists could reject the 
romanticized primordial idea and lean to the historical approach91. The historical approach 
says that nations appeared in a specific moment of time, but to find that point of time is no 
easy task. Historians who focus on a certain period of time usually tend to favor the subject of 
their research as the moment of origins of nations. There is little consensus when exactly that 
happened. The starting point could be placed in the dark ages that followed the Great 
Migrations of barbarian tribe from IVth to the VIth century A.D. Going further in time 
historians like Christopher Dawson emphasize the era of Charlemagne or like Mark Bloch the 
times of the Crusades. More on the constructivist side some scholars focus on the role played 
by the institutions of states and the birth of printing press and capitalism. Charles Tilly argues 
that state centralization forced uniformity. The same argument was repeated by Ernst Gellner 
only that he described the same process that happened 300 years later in the XIXth century. 
Gellner also frames the process of industrialization. The invention of the printing press and 
capitalism seem to be of utter importance for Benedict Anderson but also the sociologist 
Antonina Kłoskowska who traces the roots of national cultures to the early modern period. In 
this group also Liah Greenfield has to be included. Although she focuses on the development 
of civic nations she still places the English example in the early modern era. Józef 
Chlebowczyk, writing under the Marxist influence, attributes the nation development process 
with the end of feudalism and eve of capitalism (which could happen in different periods of 
time in different countries). And last but not the least are researchers that view nation 
formation as a typically modern phenomenon dating from the American Revolutionary War 
and the French Revolution (eg. Hobsbawm). There are also historians and sociologists that try 
to bring those various opinions together and create a coherent narrative like Miroslav Hroch 
who tries to marry the perennial-naturalism with modernization theory.  
Since modernity and modernization have been evoked, this probably is the best place 
to return to the definitions of Anthony Smith:  
Modernists seek to derive both nations and nationalism from the novel processes of 
modernisation, and to show how states, nations and nationalisms, and notably their elites, 
                                                          
91 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 23-25 
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have mobilised and united populations in novel ways to cope with modern conditions and 
modern political imperatives. Modernist approaches like those of Anderson and Hobsbawm 
have been particularly illuminating in uncovering the role of discursive networks of 
communication and of ritualised activities and symbolism in forging national communities. 
Scholars such as Mann, Breuilly, Tilly and Giddens have done much to demonstrate the 
formative role of the state, warfare and bureaucracy, while the often decisive role of political 
elites and their strategies has been explored by scholars like Brass and Hechter. This is 
paralleled by the work on the intelligentsia‘s seminal role by Hroch, Nairn and others, who 
have developed the powerful insights and wide-ranging analyses of Gellner and Kedourie92. 
For Budyta Budzyńska the modernism as exemplified by Smith would be put into the 
historical-constructivist end of the axis. But Smith makes the issue more complicated by 
trying to find a middle-ground between perennial and modernist approach and proposes a new 
idea of ethno-symbolism.  
Ethno-symbolism aims to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for 
particular nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and 
reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as 
they face the problems of modernity. Here too the attempts by Armstrong, Hutchinson and 
myself to trace the role of myths, symbols, values and memories in generating ethnic and 
national attachments and forging cultural and social networks, have added to our 
appreciation of the subjective and historical dimensions of nations and nationalism. This is 
matched by a parallel concern with investigating the ways in which nationalists have 
rediscovered and used the ethno-symbolic repertoire for national ends, in particular the 
myths and memories of ethnic election, sacred territory, collective destiny and the golden age. 
In this way Smith tires to mix the pre modern roots of the nation. The idea is that 
Gellner and Hobsbawm and other modernists are wrong in the assumption that there were no 
nations before modern times. It is not hard to think of examples like the Jews, Armenians or 
Persians whose national roots could be traced not to medieval times but to antiquity. What to 
do with the example of ancient Roman citizens? Were they a nation in a modern sense? The 
other issue is the continuity of communities that formed in medieval ages in Europe and only 
changed overtime. Zientara, a historical perennialist (in Smithian terms), does see the 
difference between modern nations and their predecessors are only quantitative and not 
                                                          
92 Smith D.A., Nationalism and modernism, New York 1998 p 224. 
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qualitative93. In other words, nations existed and over time more and more parts of society 
were included in the participation in the national community. Kłoskowska also follows this 
logic by quoting sources from the early-modern period94. Trying to find a compromise Smith 
argues of the perennial origins but modern ways of nation building. Probably a most poetic 
example for Smiths views would be the one used by Peter Alter95. He compared the forming 
of European nations to the construction process of a gothic cathedral. With foundations laid in 
medieval times the cathedrals stood unfinished during the early modern period only to find 
their towers built in the XIXth century. A very interesting remark, in this regard, comes from 
Ernst Gellner as he compares the traditional agrarian society to a natural species and the 
industrial society to an artificially generated one96. If a continuity between medieval ethnic 
communities and certain modern nations could be traced then the ethno-symbolical approach 
would be validated (and the constructivist model of Gellner would be contradicted). Paul 
James on the other hand leans towards Smiths ethno-symbolical approach with a new touch of 
the theory of abstract communities. For him abstract communities existed since the medieval 
ages and he sees continuity in the change of those communities. Each new age brought a 
development and broadening of the abstraction and in most cases (at least in Europe) it was a 
continuous process. Medieval nationes created an abstract sense of place, the early modern 
state apparatus played a dominant role but it managed to bring a broader abstraction that led 
to politicization of the concept of the nation97. Then came the nationalist movements of the 
XIX century that looked for a mass community that had to be abstract because no one would 
be able to meet that amount of people in person. The mass mobilization created the public 
sphere with abstract ideas of public sovereignty and national citizenship98. The nation state 
when finally formed was an amalgamation of abstract community and an abstract state 
apparatus. Then came the post-modern nation of the late XX century with neo-nationalism 
                                                          
93 Zientara B., … . p 18. 
94 Kłoskowska p. 52-75. The reason behind Kłoskowska going so back to the past is the fact that in the given 
chapter she analyses the correlation between the fatherland (patria) and the national identity. In most cases 
fatherland means the same as a state and state driven nation can occur before the modernisation period of the 
XIX century. That is the result of using the cultural understanding of the nation and focusing on identity which is 
highly subjective. 
95 Alter P., Nationalism, London 1991.  
96 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009, p. 138. 
97 The idea of the Two bodies of the king is a great example of this abstraction. The term was coined by a 
German historian from Poznań – Ernst Kantorowicz. For more information see: Sowa J., Fantomowe ciało króla,  
98 Not dissimilar to Hroch‟s theory of phase A-B-C. Only for Hroch the model was predominantly used for non-
state nations. This model is described in the following chapter of the thesis. 
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and globalization. For Paul James there are continuities within the social form of abstract 
community from medieval to postmodern times99.   
The upcoming postmodern definition serves as a gateway to the future, to show where 
current trends are taking the idea of nation. The insight of postmodernist focuses on identity 
and could contribute to the development of understanding of nation by adding analyses of 
other parts of a person‟s identity (like gender) that could overlap with the national identity.  
Postmodern analyses have revealed the fragmentation of contemporary national 
identities, and suggest the advent of a new ‗post-national‘ order of identity politics and global 
culture. Analyses of such postmodern themes as fragmentation, feminism and globalisation 
can be seen as continuations of components of the modernist paradigm. Some of them, 
notably those of Bhabha, Chatterjee and Yuval-Davis, have embraced a ‗postmodernist‘ 
deconstructionism, whereas others—for example, those of Mosse, Schlesinger, Kandiyoti, 
Brubaker and Billig—are intent on exploring novel postmodern dimensions. Though they may 
eschew a more general theory of nationalism, they embody significant advances in our 
understanding of the dynamics of identity in plural Western societies100. 
Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska takes a different approach and speaks of primordial - 
historical and natural – constructivist dichotomous approaches101. She dismisses both the 
perennial category and merges it with the primordial, as there are not enough differences that 
would justify such an act. She also does not distinguish ethno-symbolism as a viable 
paradigm. That treatment of proposals forwarded by Smith has some footing. It is hard to say 
that both primordialism and perennialism are paradigms when they are hardly distinguishable. 
The same goes for the newly proposed ethno-symbolism, which seems to be a bridge between 
the primordial and the modern.  If we were to combine both frameworks proposed by Smith 
and Budyta-Budzyńska and organize the paradigms on the axis of approaches the results 
would look like the ones presented in Table 1.  
                                                          
99 James P., Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, London 1996, p. 191.  
100Smith D.A., Nationalism and modernism, New York 1998 p. 225. Quite paradoxically many of the 
postmodern approaches do not differ that much from Renan‟s remark of national identity being a constant 
plebiscite, the difference lies in the much more developed theoretical and methodological apparatus but the 
assumption of how national identity works traces back to the XIXth century. Perhaps it is a good example on 
how little the foundations of what constitutes the nation in the eyes of researchers and scholars had changed over 
the passing centuries.  














By applying the paradigms proposed by Smith on a graph based on Budyta-Budzyńska 
proposal of approaches we can easily observe the fluidity of several categories and the uneven 
distribution of the so called paradigms. The perennial paradigm occupies to fields as it 
employs parts of both primordial and historical approaches, as well as constructivist and 
historical. It has built upon the primordial theory but has not reached the constructivist end of 
modernism. That is the main reason why I would argue against naming it a paradigm as the 
overlapping with different paradigms is too big to justify that distinction. Ethno-symbolism is 
in fact just another version of modernist constructivism that heavily looks into the past and 
uses primordial (or perennial) categories in a modern way. There are other problems at hand. 
For example some modernists consider ethnicity as one of the building blocks of a modern 
nation and the post-modernism focuses much on the present and partial identities that are only 
emergent. The graphic representation in Table 1 shows the uneven distribution of theories as 
most of them lean towards the historical and constructivist approaches. In any research 
regarding nation it would make sense to shift the focus on historical and constructivist 
approaches as with the exception of primordial theories all of them linger in one area. Given 








the romantic period and by XIX century national movements it almost excludes it from 
modern research102.  
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o Anderson 
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1.6.2 Organizing society 
 
Human beings are social animals. That statement of Aristotle has been true for the 
most part of the last 2500 years. People organize or are organized into groups and form 
communities: from families, clans, tribes, through ethnic groups to modern nations. All those 
communities also function in the framework of institutions that they create or are forced upon 
by other communities. Despite the major differences between the theories of nation formation 
they do exhibit a common process of community formation led by agents and actors like the 
social elites or institutions. The Pareto principle or the iron law of oligarchy tells that in each 
                                                          
102 There are however notable exceptions like Clifford Geertz who was an anthropologist researching old 
societies in Asia and Africa. More importantly Geertz does not even use the term primordialism, as he was an 
anthropologist not a historian. This term was bestowed upon him by Anthony Smith. Nevertheless most of 
Geertz remarks about the importance of self-evident “givens” like kinship, same religious beliefs or using the 
same dialect show how communities form and with the passage of time they can evolve into organisations of 
higher level (nationhood or nation). See: Geertz C., Old Societies and New States, New York 1973. 
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society or social group elite will form103. The elites working within the framework of an 
ethnic group, a national group or within a state are the driving force in organizing society into 
nations104. Even if the nation formation process was a grassroots movement of the peasants it 
always were the elites (sometimes foreign) that stood behind nation formation such as was the 
case with the Latvians105. The other great actor in nation formation is the state and its 
institutions. Contrary to most Western scholars I am listing the state on the secondary position 
after the elites. For Paul James the nation-state is the predominant form his abstract 
communities106. The last part of nation-formation that needs to be mentioned is the economy 
and technological progress. The three foundations for (modern) nation-formation: actors 
(elites), state institutions and economical and technological progress must not be viewed 
separately. In fact it is the elites that use the existing structure of a state to form a nation 
(France) or in a different case the elites rally and organize themselves against state institutions 
to form a nation (Poland). The economic and technological advancements could not take 
place without an active role played by both the elites and the state107. The state funded or 
bought from new factories, which created new elites, brought economic progress and 
hardships for the local populations that were undergoing social changes. It was the state that 
created a net of uniformed educational system but it were the elites that provided the teachers 
and the material to teach. All those three elements are highly reciprocal each influencing the 
other two. In that way I propose to bind together the differences between scholars who tend to 
focus on any of the three elements of nation formation. At the same time another conciliatory 
                                                          
103 The term Iron law of oligarchy was coined by a German sociologist Robert Michels and was limited only to 
research devoted to political parties. Nevertheless his law was proven to be true in almost all forms of society 
and therefore could be used as a general rule of thumb. The same goes for the Pareto principle which primarily 
focused on the distribution of wealth but was developed into the theory of elite circulation. 
See: Michels R., Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, 
1915. For more modern use of this theory see: Mouzelis N., Organisation and bureaucracy: an analysis of 
modern theories, New Brunswick 2009.  Pareto V., The Rise and Fall of Elites, New Brunswick 1991. Also look 
into: Bottomore, T.B., Elites and society, London  1964. Bottomore describes the process of change of the ruling 
class into the power elites which serves as a good illustration of the development of nations. The elites do not 
need to be limited to economic power but their position also includes education, knowledge, cultural capital and 
prestige.  
104 Take note that this statement generally contradicts the point of view which states that nation development was 
a modern phenomenon. In fact similar processes could be observed earlier only they included a much smaller 
group of people (nobility, clerks, intelligentsia etc.) What modernity brought was the change from limited reach 
to mass movements.  
105 It goes without saying that also peasants as a social group developed their own elites. For the Latvian case 
see: Użule-Fons S., Między Rosją a Niemcami. Proces uświadomienia narodowego i politycznego Łotyszy w XIX 
wieku, Poznań 2004.  This Ph.D theis is available in the library of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. 
 
106 James P., Nation formation. Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, London 1996, p. 151.  
107 Giddens analyses the role of militarization and war that drove industrial advancements in Europe. These 
changes forced the social structure to adjust to modernization processes. The same can be said about the growth 
of capitalism. See Giddens A., Nation-States and Violence¸p.170. and Power, Property, State, 1981, p. 186.  
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ground needs to be found in the case of the great strife between primordial and modernist 
approaches. It does not matter if the nation had existed for a long time and dates back into 
antiquity as even primordialists and perennialist accept the fact social changes happened in 
the XIX century that transformed the way nations look. The modernists would argue that it 
were those modern developments that created the nations from scratch. Either way the result 
is the same: if we start with an ethic group (ethnie) that shows preconditions for formation of 
a nationality and then a modern nation or if we take a class-estate society that en masse has no 
national identity but through the influence of modern nation building, capitalism etc. becomes 
a modern nation.   
Since it was established that the state and its institutions play one of the crucial roles in 
nation formation a clear distinction has to be made at the very beginning:  there were nations 
that formed within the framework of state institutions and ones that developed without state 
institutions or even against them. When it comes to the example of Europe this division is also 
a geographic one with Western Europe presenting examples of the first kind and Central and 
Eastern Europe delivering examples for the second one. Józef Chlebowczyck presents the 
differences between nation formation processes in the following way:  
Western Europe: 
State community -> Community of language -> national community (nation-state) 
 
Central and Eastern Europe:  
Cultural community (community of language) -> national community -> state 
community (nation-state)108 
To go into more detail in Chlebowczyk‟s reasoning we have understand that at the 
very base of his modern nation-formation theory is the Marxist vision of progress of society. 
The progress is viewed as unilinear, which means that all societies follow the same path109. It 
is irreversible, and evolutionary. It may be viewed through a progressive lens (the progress is 
always beneficiary to societies in the higher levels). For Marx and his acolytes the linear 
development of societal organisation started with the tribal communities, evolved into slave 
states (ancient Babylon or Rome), then morphed into feudalism, which in turn developed into 
                                                          
108 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 23.  
109 Sztompka P., Socjologia zmian społecznych. Kraków, 2005, s. 130-141. The view presented by Sztompka is 
hardly universal. For instance Arnold Toynbee argues that development of societies is a cyclical phenomenon.  
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capitalism. It goes without saying that the progress would end with the downfall of capitalism 
and the final triumph of socialism. For this thesis the focal point lies in the moment when 
feudalism broke down and was replaced by capitalism. For Chlebowczyk the beginning of the 
modern, national identity is connected with the development of capitalist means of production 
which he dates on the second half of the XVIII century110. Capitalism has brought more 
mobility both territorial and social. Traditional societies that existed throughout the last 
centuries like settlements, villages, folwarks, guilds, and estates (social classes) are being 
uprooted. More and more elements of the economic system become interconnected which 
creates a vast change in comparison with the highly fragmented and scattered feudal 
structures. At the same time the economic change forces a social change and the creation of 
new social bonds. The more capitalism develops the more active and socially (nationally) 
aware people become. With the social change comes the desire to organise a more egalitarian 
society in form of democracy that is confined within a national state. For Chlebowczyk, who 
is highly influenced by Marx the modern social identity had two layers: national and class and 
he devotes a significant proportion of his writing to emphasise the tension between the two. 
The class identity helped to create horizontal bonds and the national identity vertical bonds. 
Chlebowczyk continues then to distinguish those developments into two categories regarding 
the place where they happened: national and multinational states111. Centralised 
administrations of certain Western European states created an opportunity for the nation 
forming processes, mostly through the unification of language. The process, writes 
Chlebowczyk, was firstly limited to the ruling class and the enlightened part of society112. In 
Central and Eastern Europe the limitations of the political nation to the elites lead to the 
nonexistence of classless social bonds. Only when the ruling class stopped being limited to 
just the first estate, the aristocracy and was replaced by the bourgeoisie (or intelligentsia) the 
nation formation process could fully develop in the realm of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
third estate, the people when elevated to a higher level of development acquires the mentality 
and identity of either the nation-state or the mentality of the pre-existing late feudal political 
nation. In Western Europe the nation forming process was based in the matrix of state 
institutions and this forced smaller ethnic group like Bretons, Basques, Frisians, Welsh etc.) to 
                                                          
110 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 10. This point of 
view is nothing new. Similar statements were issued in the past by scholars like Otto Bauer or Karl Deutsch. For 
reference see: Bauer O., The question of nationalities and social democracy, Minneapolis 2000, p. 80-87. 
Deutsch K., Folz W, (ed.) Nation-building, New York 1966, p.38.  
111 This is a paradox in the writings of Chlebowczyk, he already uses the term national state in regard of entities 
that were just forming. It would be more precise to speak of multi-ethnic or multicultural states. This exemplifies 
the strength of thinking in national terms even in researchers in the topic.  
112 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 
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be forced by the state to be a part of a modern nation. The two most important mechanisms of 
social engineering implemented by the state were: language use in schools and public 
administration and the general military service. Interestingly Chlebowczyk basically leaves 
Western European countries in that point claiming that further vertical national movements 
developed unconditionally through historical events like wars113. This flaw in his reasoning is 
the result of applying Marxist optics. Instead of focusing on national development the interest 
shifts to the socio-economical as if the nation was already formed. At the same time he 
includes the fourth estate the proletariat into the equation stating that the development of class 
consciousness among the proletariat was mirrored by the development of the national 
consciousness. In other words only when workers movements arise they are included into the 
fight for power in the nation-state (this is the horizontal inclusion). Only then the workers 
become the leading force in a nation. It would be a disservice for Chlebowczyk to present him 
as a mere Marxist historian, but he struggles to conform his findings about the nation to the 
Marxist theory. The moment of the inclusion of the masses to the national community is 
crucial. Firstly not only the peasant and workers become “nationalized” but the elites which 
use to exclusively regard themselves as the only members of a nation become open to the 
inclusion of the lower classes. The replacement of estate society with a national community 
based on the consciousness of ethno-linguistical community, common history and traditions 
and cultures and customs create a habitus for a classless, national solidarity114. This is 
especially true for societies of Central and Eastern Europe who needed to cooperate against 
the institutions of the state which was not their sovereign nation-state. Nevertheless the 
driving force behind social change was still capitalism. The economic progress forces the 
traditional societies to widen their contact which leads to the discovery of speaking a similar 
vernacular tongue. Small and isolated communities are merging with other similar 
communities. If there is a state that imposes a “high” version of the language the vernacular is 
being replaced or mixed with the high language. If the state uses a different language the local 
dialects expand and are elevated to the “high” status in the community that uses it. The groups 
that use a similar language enter a phase of inclusive integration and start forming 
nationalities – the first step in becoming a nation. The language also becomes the first 
                                                          
113 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 
114 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983,p. 50. Of course one 
could argue that only when nations are formed in capitalist environment only then the workers could see their 
class interest and start cooperation on an international level. Nevertheless the formation of nations seems to 
contradict the theory of class struggle, at least to some extent. Chlebowczyk also views the nation formation 
process as a linear mechanism that once started will always go in the same direction. See. Chlebowczyk J., O 
prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków, 1983 p. 43.  
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political demand – the ethnic-linguistic group fights for the right of linguistic self-
determination. As Chlebowczyk continues the process of standardization of language was a 
practical one and enabled better communication between local societies. In a parallel fashion 
the process of development of feeling of sameness occurs. It was a feeling of participation in a 
larger than local group.  
The second phase of nation formation moves to the political territory. After 
establishing the ethno-linguistic connections the inevitable next step in development is the 
emergence of historical consciousness. Historians (usually members of the elite) devote their 
time to justify the existence of a nation by presenting the civilizational output of one people. It 
does not matter if this narrative is factual or highly romanticised or even serves as a myth115.  
In most cases the rise of historical consciousness played also a formative role116. The shared 
belief of common ancestry when looked at through the historical lenses took form of stories of 
heroes, battles, glory and hardships. As stated before the stories could be mythical like the 
Finnish Kalevala. Chlebowczyk continues in his analysis and mentions the qualitative change 
of the bond that is created through the belief of common history. Sharing a language was just 
a technical matter and in the case of sharing same history it is already ideological. While the 
historian is supposed to write history sine ira et studio there is always an agenda behind the 
writer. History is not just a recalling of the past it serves as a story that evokes emotions117. 
History either legitimises the existence of a nation-state or is used as justification for the 
struggle to achieve a sovereign and independent nation state. Through this process the 
unification of enthno-linguistic groups and nationalities a nation is formed (or a national 
minority in other cases). The political expression of the desire of having a nation-state is the 
pinnacle of nation formation, as a nation can function without a state.  
Chlebowczyk also nuances the second, political phase of nation formation by adding 
two stages (“a” and “b”) to that phase. The right to self-determination could be understood 
internally (culturally) and externally (territorially) and the development of those corresponds 
with the “a” and “b” stages. The internal right of self-determination has to be understood as 
the possibility to develop one‟s culture autonomously on the basis of native resources which 
in turn will be a part of general, world-wide cultural development. It is the right to live, grow 
                                                          
115 A prime example is the story of Wilhelm Tell. 
116 Maybe with the exception of Latvians and Estonians.  
117 More on that in Conclusions of this thesis.  
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and create in an emancipated national society that is in possession of its own value system118.  
The second phase is quite simply focusing on the highest level of nation-formation: achieving 
a nation-state, which means governing over a certain limited territory and demarcating the 
geographical reach of one nation by borders. By this the nation-formation process did not only 
change the social structures of societies but the geo-political structures across the globe 
leading to the downfall of international empires. Józef Chlebowczyk prepared and proposed a 
model for nation-formation that he applied to “small” nations of Central Europe, mostly the 




Phase II Stage “a” Internal sovereignty The right for national 
self-determination 
Stage “b” External sovereignty 
(borders) 




Miroslav Hroch further specifies the nation-formation phases with regard of the non-state 
nations (the second category of Chlebowczyk) into three phases:  
 
                                                          
118 Ibidem. 51.  
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Phase A: Elite phase: Actors (players, activists, elites) strive to lay the foundation for 
a national identity. They research the cultural, linguistic, social and sometimes historical 
attributes of a non- dominant group in order to raise awareness of the common traits. This is 
the moment of creation of a national language based on dialects, creating national culture 
from folklore and creation of national history. Social bonds are understood in ethnic and 
linguistic terms. 
Phase B: Phase of mass mobilisation: elites try to rally the masses. More and more 
social groups hop on the national bandwagon. Sovereignty and territorial aspects of 
possessing or wanting to have a nation-state appear in this phase. Possible movements 
towards democratization. Social bonds are understood in territorial terms but a nation is also a 
community of destiny.  
Phase C: Political phase: the mass movement divides into conservative, clerical, 
liberal, social democratic factions119. The political agitation reaches a mass scale. Social 
bonds start to become ideological and work within a national framework.  
Hroch‟s model of phases is simpler and easier to use but Chlebowczyk‟s is more 
nuanced. However, the biggest issue with the writings of Chlebowczyk is the fact that he tries 
to balance the findings of his comparative study with Marxist theory. He admits that 
capitalism brought mobility and chances of social advance but then immediately criticizes it 
from Marxist position. Another recurring problem is the role of the proletariat in nation 
formation – this social class was supposed not only to develop national identity but also an 
international class identity. History of the I World War showed brutally that the national 
particularism was the dominant ideology among the masses and that the international 
sentiment even if always present did not achieve its dominant status. However nationalism 
can be seen as something different as just a natural result of introduction of capitalist 
organisation of society. Ernst Gellner rejected the idea that nationalism was a class ideology 
that only benefited the bourgeoisie. For Gellner it was not the ideological force of nationalism 
that created nations but rather its systemic role, its function in the times of modernity120.  
                                                          
119 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015, p. 125-127. Another 
subdivision could be made here regarding from where the elites originated. They could recruit from aristocracy 
turned bourgeoisie (Poland), directly from bourgeoisie (Germany), urban lower-middle class (Czech), 
intelligentsia of peasant origins (Estonia, Latvia). 
120 Breully J., Introduction to: Gellner E., Naród i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009, p. 25. In order to assume 
Gellners point of view it is necessary to identify what modernity is and what social change it brings within.  
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Gellner‟s functionalism stresses the importance of language and culture in nation 
formation but the mere existence of language and culture does not guarantee that a nation will 
form. It is the function that they play in organising society that makes them useful in nation 
formation. For instance in agrarian societies of medieval Europe culture and language served 
to isolate the ruling classes from the majority of the peasant population121. Each class (clergy, 
soldiers, merchants, and peasants) lives in a different and separated community. Moreover the 
system of social organisation thwarts mobility and creates cultural and linguistic differences. 
Agrarian communities are local and remote and create in a natural fashion their own 
sociolects or even dialects. Same goes for local customs and histories that are told, all is 
confined to a limited geographical space. Those segmented societies were mostly autarchic 
when it comes to both food production and the passing of knowledge of doing so. Even if a 
part of the elite (like catholic clergy) transgressed the geographical limitation their own group 
was even more isolated by the sophisticated culture and language (like Latin). In the most 
radical form the very ability to read and write already is enough to create such distinctions. In 
the case of elites the culture serves to distinguish them from the rest of the population and 
other elites as well. In the centre of Gellner‟s work lies the idea that it was the eve of 
industrial society that created nations122. Tribal and feudal organisations reinforced local 
particularisms and remoteness. When the technological advancements achieved the level of 
industrial age everything changed. Indeed it was constant change that is the core characteristic 
of the industrialisation. Before, in feudal societies change was a problem to overcome now the 
change became the norm of social order and had to be embraced. The traditional structure of 
society was incompatible with the needs of industrial economy. Industrialisation forced 
mobility from villages to cities and between cities and with mobility comes equality123.An 
industrial society will eventually have to confront the existence of estate or class barrier 
because they are hampering the process of modernisation. Of course there will be inequality 
but the social distances between groups would grow smaller and smaller124. An industrial 
society has to be mobile because otherwise the lack would halt the development and 
competition not only between industries but also between states. A country that lagged behind 
in development would be easily overrun by a technologically more advanced opponent. So it 
does not matter if industrialisation was market or state driven. The emergence of a first 
                                                          
121 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009 p.87. 
122 Gellner‟s model is verified positively by the case studies conducted by Liah Greenfield . English nation was 
first. But at the same time there are contradicting examples like the Latvians.  
123 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009, 105.  
124 Gellner contradicts the Marxist theory here  
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industrial state pushed other to follow. That is why state institutions had to introduce a way to 
create a more uniform society through the means of education125. Very much like in an army, 
every member of society should undergo at least a basic training equal for everybody. Also 
the commands taught during army drills share resemblance to the uniform language that 
started to emerge in the industrial age. Higher mobility and requirements for new types of 
workforce out of sheer necessity need a common tongue. Language, speech and written text 
need to be simplified, standardised and taught. It goes without saying that such changes have 
a profound impact on the culture. Providing participation in culture and creating the feeling of 
belonging to one‟s culture became now the dominant role of the state. Socialization of new 
generations happened not only in the local community but predominantly in state run schools. 
Such culture, argues Gellner, had to be “high” not based on the limited local and traditional 
communities. It had to be not only adapted from the elites but transformed to be more 
inclusive and fostered in the general population126. The accumulation of technology and 
science lead to creating homogenous societies. This process can be observed not only on a 
national level but in the age of globalisation at a global scale, as it creates convergence of 
lifestyles. The industrial age creates many processes of convergence: explosion of population 
numbers, rapid urbanisation, migrations, economic and political intrusion of local 
communities by global economics and centralized states. For Gellner it is the economic 
change that forced social change that in turn created nations through the ideological and 
cultural means of nationalism. This would not be far from Marxist understanding of 
development of history. There is the economic basis and the cultural superstructure that stems 
from the basis. But Gellner does not see the end of history, the appearance of nations is purely 
incidental and shall the circumstances change so will the rules governing the order of society. 
In other words there is no historical determinism in Gellner‟s work, nations just happened to 
be but history could have developed in a different way. This thinking is not entirely correct. 
Humans are social animals and form societies which need to be organised in a certain way. So 
if there is a breakdown of one system of societal organisation (feudalism) and a new one 
emerges it has to bring a new way of organising society. With the coming of capitalism new 
means of communication and industrialisation reshaped the social tissue that took the form of 
a nation. The cultural and ideological face of this societal change is expressed by nationalism. 
Gellner is aware that his proposal of the model of social change is not universal. He himself 
                                                          
125 Prussia – is an example of  a modern school system appearing before and during the early stages of 
industrialisation.  
126 High culture could also be derived from low cultures. 
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states that for one existing real nationalism, there were about nine that are potential but never 
resurfaced127. This brings us to the question whether it was industrialisation that created 
nations or this process had more steps like: industrialisation->nationalism->modern nations. 
For Gellner nationalism was a necessity to homogenise a society linguistically and culturally. 
Gellner‟s work has to be only understood as an ideal type of societal change and nation-
formation. Hroch criticizes Gellner that he coincidence of modern nation-building occurring 
with the establishment of capitalist economies and industrialisation does not necessary mean 
causation. As stated before this is clearly a Marxist point of view that completely disregards 
the fact that capitalism as an economical system tends to promote free trade without borders 
and creates international (rather than national) ties.128 A possible answer to these two 
contradiction points of view would be to assume that capitalism and industrialisation creates 
new models for social interaction which in turn leads to the creation of new culture (and 
nationalism as an ideology) which then creates a modern nation. But then a new problem 
arises – there are examples of nation-formation without industrialisation. Even the two models 
of Gellner the famous ideal types of non-existing states of the Empire of Megalomania and 
Ruritania do not provide an answer. They serve as functional, tempting and thought provoking 
generalisations. There are however examples of nationalism appearing before industrialisation 
and there are examples of industrial centres that did not show any national movements129. 
Then comes also the question of uneven development, not all regions in one state or empire 
had the same rates of industrialisation. History also shows examples of social 
homogenisation, especially linguistic homogenisation way before the industrial era. It was the 
institutions of states that started the homogenising processes. This is especially true for 
absolutist monarchies, the process was not limited to just them it was just the strongest there. 
One could argue that it was the birth of capitalism that influenced homogenisation. In that 
regard Chlebowczyk and Marxist theorists like Otto Bauer and Eric Hobsbawm would be 
closer to the truth. Perhaps it is best to say that homogenisation and social change started in 
the early-modern period but entered a quantitative change with the onset of industrialisation. 
Even Hobsbawm who himself places the nation-formation processes in the XIX century 
                                                          
127 Gellner p. 130. This estimate is not based on any research it is mere speculation. Hroch argues that for a 
successful nationalist movement to emerge a population of at least 0.5 milion people is necessary. Nevertheless 
both estimates are arbitrary.  
128 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015 p. 95. 
129 Examples of regions where nationalism emerged from different than economic factors are: the Balkans, 
Catalonia, Basque Country, Finland, and the Baltic States. One example of an industrial centre that did not create 
nationalism was Odessa in the Russian Empire.  
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writes about popular proto-nationalism130. The proto-nationalism could explain why 
Komensky, who was not coming from England, the most developed part of Europe, could 
write his quite modern definition of a nation in the XVII century, long before any modern 
nation had formed. This only proves that there are primordial (or perennial) elements in the 
writing of modernists and constructivist they are just disguised in grass-roots movements or in 
the form of proto-nationalism.  
What Gellner proposed was a turning point in the scientific discourse about nation 
formation and he needs to be credited for making a breakthrough shift to constructivism. 
Nevertheless his model that focuses heavily on modernity and industrialisation is not without 
its flaws. There are many problems with Gellners vision of nationalism as the driving force in 
nation-formation. There are examples of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural even multi-national 
states that have modernised themselves without the need of national homogeneity. Also 
nationalism appeared in agrarian societies without the influence of industrialisation.  
Probably the most comprehensive and broad theoretical model that lists modernisation 
as only one of many objective factors contributing to nation formation comes from Miroslav 
Hroch and I will not hide the fact that his ideas are closest to my understanding of nation 
formation process. Hroch listed not only modern phenomena as objective factors in nation 
making but also extended his list of preconditions with primordial aspects: 
1. History 
2. Language and ethnicity 
3. Modernisation 
4. Conflict of interest 
5. Emotions and identity 
History of each nation plays a pivotal role in nation-formation. There are always 
important events, institutions or people which came before the times of modern nations which 
are tied to the present. As Hobsbawm famously stated: Historians are to nationalism what 
poppy-growers in Pakistan are to the heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for 
the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a nation is the 
past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the people who 
                                                          
130 Hobsbawm E.J., Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990 p. 47-59. He mentions language, 
religion and state traditions as preconditions of proto-nationalism.  
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produce it. So my profession, which has always been mixed up in politics, becomes an 
essential component of nationalism131. History also has a psychological aspect. History, or 
more precisely historiography or the use of history is one of the major sources of personal 
memories. Memory is an essential part of one‟s identity and the ways of remembering, the 
ways of collective memory influence the personal memory in a reflexive way132.  
Language and ethnicity: the feeling of belonging to ethnically distinct group and 
language as a necessary sine qua non mean of communication are probably the most 
primordial aspects of nation-formation. At the same time for several modern-nations neither 
language nor same ethnic roots were a unifying factor. Despite this fact both ethnicity and 
language played a role in nation-formation even it was just secondary. Ethnic ties in modern 
nation could be transformed into the myth of common ancestry. Language is a natural way of 
distinguishing between the “we” and “the others” and could be even treated as the central 
element of the experience of ethnicity133. In the times before modernity language unified 
certain estates (aristocracy that spoke Latin or French or clergy that used Latin). With the 
coming of modernity languages became a correlate for nationality. In fact in first modern 
population censuses it was the language that was a base for attributing nationality134. 
Language plays a twofold role as a primordial way of identifying others and a modern tool of 
nation formation. There is continuity in the way that language forms identity so it has to be 
attached to a primordial factor. But as Gellner points out the need for homogenisation was 
universal for modernity. In the newly born United States German was used as an official 
language in several states but because of the need for unification was soon rooted out in 
favour of the dominant English. The French decreed the standardised French as the language 
of freedom and barred local dialects of Catalan from official use (the nation believes in its 
language). The Polish independence movement fought for the use of Polish in schools and 
administration in three partitions. There is little surprise that Hroch places language and 
ethnicity together as language was often treated as an indicator of nationality as was the case 
                                                          
131 Hobsbawm, E. , Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, [in:] Anthropology Today 8(1), 1992 p. 3-8. 
Also Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska includes a nations own history (or at least the belief in having one) in one of 
the parts of the ideal type of a nation. 
132 Kłoskowska A., Kultury narodowe u korzeni, Warszawa 2005,  131-132.  
133 Ibidem, p.48.  
134 Hobsbawm relates the example of the Russian census of 1873 that used language as a primary source of 
information about nationalities inhabiting the empire. Language plays a twofold role as a primordial way of 
identifying others and a modern tool of nation formation. There is continuity in the way that language forms 
identity so it has to be attached to a primordial factor. Hobsbawm continues with elaborating examples of  
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with censuses, the Serbian national movement or even Hitler‟s claim for the unification of 
Sudetendeutsche with Germany135.  
Modernisation is essential because there would be no modern nations without it. The 
introduction of school systems, mass communication, mass draft to the army, social changes 
like emancipation, democratization were processes that happened parallel to nation-formation 
and in many ways they have overlapped. Within modernisation Hroch includes processes like  
equalization of society or the emergence of civic society and social and political 
emancipation. Hroch creates a typology of nation formation with regards to modernisation 
processes. There are to variables: transformations within the national movement and 
transformations of the modernisation processes.  
Transformation within national movements:  
1. Beginning of national agitation (phase A-B) 
2. Transition from national agitation to mass movement (phase B-C) 
3. Adoption and presentation of political programmes (PP) 
4. Establishment of statehood or autonomy (NS) 
Transformation within modernisation:  
5. Arrival of democratisation and constitutionality (BR) 
6. Industrial revolution (IR) 
Hroch‟s examples are: 
Germans and Italians (unifying movements) : 
AB-PP-IR-BC-NS/BR 
Norwegians, Hungarians, Finns (integrating movements) 
AB-PP/BR-BC-IR-NS 
Slovenians, Lithuanians (delayed national movements) 
                                                          
135 Hobsbawm E.J., Nations and nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990, p. 81-100, Budyta-Budzyńska M., 




Serbians and Greeks (insurgent movements) 
AB.PP-NS-BC-Br-IR 
Catalans, Flemish, Basques (disintegrated movements) 
BR-IR-AB-PP-BC 
Poles (delayed mass mobilisation?) 
AB-BC/IR-PP-NS/BR 
Austrians (delayed simultaneous national movement without transformation) 
PP - IR/BR/AB/BC - NS136 
Conflict of interest is a factor brought by very few researchers. Hroch identifies the 
conflict in general terms like struggles for power or economic goods, between the elites and 
the masses, the centre and the periphery. Budyta-Budzyńska and Charles Tilly take a more 
limited approach by liming general conflicts to more specific wars and other traumatic 
experiences. In medieval times war induced organisation and state-building. Taxes needed to 
be collected to maintain a military force. War made states and states made war. Military 
conflicts confronted societies with hostile others and was a source of the feeling of common 
destiny. In more modern times war served as a tool for social engineering and mass 
mobilisation137. War was a great source for stories, myths, heroes and symbols. For instance 
the 1389 battle of Kosovo plays a major role in Serbian nation building, the Revolutionary 
War for Americans, the battle of Valmy for the French, Napoleonic wars for the French, 
Spanish Polish etc. As Budyta-Budzyńska states it is not only war but also major traumatic 
events that are important for nation building. The genocide of Armenians or Jews 
consolidated them as nations; World War II ended the formation of the Polish nation and 
started the formation of the Austrian one. The nation forming process was usually not a 
                                                          
136 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015, p. 111-112. The Polish 
and Austrian examples were not included in Hroch‟s analysis they are the addition of the author of this thesis. 
The Austrian example will be explained in more detail in the later chapters. See: Chapter 4.  
137 Budyta-Budzyńska M,. Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 83-84.  
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peaceful transition from one type society to another. The more traumatic the experience of 
war and hardships, the more consolidated the nation138.  
Emotions and identity after the modernisation processes tend to be almost only 
indicators of the existence of nations. The spread of national identity reached a mass scale but 
is dependent on individuals reaction to the national symbols that evoke the feeling of 
belonging to a nation. This category selected by Hroch seems to include elements of other 
ones (history is used to evoke emotions and solidify identity, not to mention conflicts). But 
the sociological approach towards the issue of nation and national identity validates Hrochs 
choice. Even within the psychological aspect Hroch finds primordial aspects in the natural 
instincts and human biology. Ethno-national behaviour is determined by biology and 
resembles the instinctive behaviour of certain animal species. The bio-chemical processes are 
independent of cultural circumstances and true for all human beings139. Another example 
would be the existence of stereotypes which serve a cognitive function of simplifying and 
categorizing information.  
There are also other factors that can contribute to nation-formation like religion. For 
modernists it was the national identity that replaced the role religion played in medieval and 
early-modern societies.  At the same time religion could play an important role in national 
identity formation during the modernisation processes. Budyta- Budzyńska names religion 
among the nation formative factors among the existence of state and its traditions, myth of 
common ancestry, language, war and trauma and institutionalisation of a social group. It is 
hard to omit the influence of Orthodox Christianity in the formation of the Russian national 
mind-set, or Hussite movement in Bohemia and Moravia or Reformation in Germany and 
England, Catholicism for Austria and Poland etc. Religious wars consolidated states like 
France. 
With most of the nation formation factors enumerated above there is still one left that 
needs to be examined in detail and in fact it is hard to imagine this process without it. This 
factor is nationalism.  
                                                          
138 Ibidem, p. 84. 
139 Ardrey R., The territorial imperative. New York 1966., Hamilton W., The genetical evolution of social 
behaviour, Journal of Theoretical biology 7 (1964).  
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1.6.3 Nationalism as a way of organising society 
Nationalism fortunately does not have a semantic history that is as long as with the 
case of the nation. It was firstly used in 1798140.  Not dissimilar with the term nation it also 
changed its meaning through the passage of time. It also has different meanings depending on 
the language used. In Polish nationalism has pejorative connotations and it‟s not synonymous 
with patriotism. The Polish case is peculiar because it distinguishes between the national idea 
(idea narodowa) and nationalism (nacjonalizm)141. Nationalism is viewed in Poland as 
militant and aggressive and the narodowy attitude is closer to patriotism. This not a new 
development and this semantic difference exists in the Polish political discourse for over a 
century now. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition nationalism is understood more neutrally as an 
idea promoting a sovereign statehood for a certain nation.  Similarly patriotism understood in 
Poland as the love of one‟s country (patria) in the Anglo-Saxon context is interchangeable 
with national pride. The French tradition nationalism was almost exchangeable with the word 
patriotism and was attributed with the Jacobins and the fight against anti-french forces. As 
Chlebowczyk points out the French used nationalism to indicate both the love for the country 
and nation but also as a manifest of destiny (la grande Nation). It was only in the second half 
of XIX century when nationalism changed its perspective from a left-wing to more right wing 
attachment to tradition. However the feeling of national exceptionality (sacro egoismo of 
Mazzini) remained despite the left to right shift142. 
There was little theoretical discussion about nationalism in the XIX century as it was 
regarded as a part of history of nations. There were some exceptions like the two Austrian 
social-democrats Otto Bauer and Karl Renner who witnessed raging nationalisms that ravaged 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire they happened to inhabit. However their work was not only 
analytical but more ideological as it served to propose a political solution to the problems of 
social-democracy in a multi-national Empire. Bauer wanted to organize nations not in 
territorial bodies but in association of persons disjoining the nation from the territory and 
                                                          
140 Budyta-Budzyńska on p. 188 gives the information that nationalism was first used in 1836 but the Miriam-
Webster dictionary contradicts this information and traces the first ever use of the word nationalism to 1798 and 
claims it was used in the sense: loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalism 
141 This is the result of the existence of the political movement of National-Democracy in the late XIX and first 
half of XX centuries that created this semantic discrepancy. Also a person who identifies with the national idea is 
a: narodowiec not a nationalist. The meaning is almost the same though.  
142 Chlebowczyk J., O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków 1983, p. 226.  
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understanding it as an interterritorial association of persons143. The Austrian branch of 
Marxism (also called Austro-Marxism) differed from more orthodox Marxists who believed 
nations to be a false expression of class identity. For Austro-Marxists nations were an existing 
reality. Nevertheless nationalism as a subject of analysis became more prominent in the 20ties 
and 20ties of the XX century, quite possibly because of the more urging situation in Europe 
and the rise of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. It was Carlton Hayes, an American historian 
who looked into nationalism in his fundamental work The Historical Evolution of 
Nationalism144. Hayes saw nationalism as the same process as tribalism that appeared already 
in antiquity – it was a small state nationalism, a feeling of loyalty. It is surprising how little 
the scientific discourse about nationalism changed since Hayes. Of course there are the 
breath-through works of Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson and they contributed to a 
significant shift towards constructivism. But now after the passage of time one cans witness 
the changes in the scientific discourse and the criticism of the modernist-constructivist 
approach become more and more frequent. Paul James found similarities between premodern 
societies and modern nations in his abstract communities model. Thomas Eriksen on the other 
hand focuses on the role of ethnicity (a primordial factor). For Eriksen anthropological 
research on ethnic groups leads to a conclusion that ethnic identities create nationalist 
movements given the circumstances (like a crisis/war etc). The constructivist ideas of nation-
formation are almost a mirrored image of anthropological theories of ethnies and ethnicities. 
Ethnic nationalism as well as modern nationalism creates the same feeling of belonging and a 
same type of identity. Nationalism creates a metaphorical kinship as opposed by real kinship 
of tribes. The result however is the same identity of belonging. 145. The modern nationalism 
that he witnessed was an ideology – the driving force for almost all recent events. Nationalism 
not only led to the fall of empires, it unified Germany and Italy and led to the independence of 
Greece, Poland, and Norway etc. For Hayes nationalism reshaped all other –isms to its liking. 
                                                          
143 Bauer O., The question of nationalities and social democracy, Minneapolis 2000, p. 222-224.  Interestingly 
Karl Renner, being a Marxist, presented a typical primordial approach. Once a certain degree of European 
development has been reached, the linguistic and cultural communities of peoples, having silently matured 
throughout the centuries. Emerge from the world of passive existence as peoples. They become conscious of 
themselves as a force with a historical destiny. They demand control over the state, as the highest available 
instrument of power, and strive for their political self-determination. The birthday of the political idea of the 
nation and the birth-year of this new consciousness, is 1798, the year of the French Revolution. Renner K., Staat 
und nation, Vienna 1899. p 89.  
144 Hayes C., The historical evolution of modern Nationalism, New York 1931. The whole text is in public 
domain and can be downloaded from 
https://ia801603.us.archive.org/4/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.13165/2015.13165.The-Historical-Evolution-Of-
Modern-Nationalism.pdf, Access, 05.01.2019. 
145 See: Eriksen T., Etniczność i nacjonalizm, Kraków 2013,  p 151-163. Also Karl Popper believed nationalism 
to be somewhat similar to tribalism.  See: Popper K., Społeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie. T.2, Warszawa 
2006 p. 63. 
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The industrial revolution was “nationalised”, used to promote the ideology despite its 
cosmopolitan premises. Nationalism transformed political ideologies like liberalism, Marxism 
or philosophies of Comte or Nietzsche and distorted them for nationalist purposes146. Another 
contribution to understanding of nationalism was the work of the Prague-born American 
philosopher and historian Hans Kohn and his work Idea of Nationalism147. While Hayes war 
rather critical of nationalism for Kohn was more balanced in his opinions. Firstly for Kohn 
nationalism was a state of mind strongly related to the nation state. He distinguished two 
types of nationalisms: Western, liberal, democratic and Eastern, irrational, mythological and 
authoritarian148. What is more important is the fact that he claimed that nations were the result 
of nationalism. Kohn also placed the source of nationalism in the times of Reformation (the 
early-modern period).  Hobsbawm would reject such claims but still give the processes of the 
time a name of proto-nationalism. In other words, they were similar but not modern enough.  
John Breuilly in his extensive introduction to Gellner‟s Nations and nationalism 
indicates that after the war nationalism became somewhat forgotten. It was the result of the 
naturalisation of the concept of nation, which in its meaning equalled society. Indeed the 
focus of anthropologists and sociologists shifted towards processes within societies (nations) 
not nations themselves. Only historians and political scientists working on diplomatic 
relations were interested in nationalisms. One example of this period would be Elie Kedourie 
who defined nationalism as a doctrine invented in Europe in the beginning of the XX 
century149. It was Ernst Gellner that revolutionised the scholarship dealing with nationalism. 
In Gellner‟s opinion it was the transformation from the agrarian society to the industrial 
society that replaced traditional cultures with their modern counterparts. The industrial 
revolution changed society and that society started to organise itself along the lines of a new 
idea of nationalism. For Gellner nationalism is primarily a principle which holds that the 
political and national unit should be congruent150. The publication of Gellner‟s work was the 
first sign of new times to come. Even the new wave of scholars like Hobsbawm still uses the 
very same meaning of nationalism that Gellner proposed151. However Gellner also identified 
nationalism with a sentiment and a movement that stemmed from this sentiment. Therefore 
                                                          
146 Ibidem, p. 288-289. 
147 Kohn H., Idea of Nationalism, New York 1946, p. 18-24. The whole text is in public domain and can be 
downloaded from https://ia801900.us.archive.org/3/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.190501/2015.190501.The-Idea-Of-
Nationalism.pdf 
148 Kohn used Germany. As the predominant example of Eastern nationalism.  
149 Kedourie E., Nationalism, Oxford 1993, p.1.  
150 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009,  p. 75.  
151 Hobsbawm E., Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990,  p. 9. 
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nationalism could not only be treated as an ideology. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska specified 
the short remark made by Gellner. Nationalism encompasses entities such as: a movement 
that is a part of nation-formation process, radical parties and movements, psychic stances 
(sentiments)152. Nationalism as a part of nation-building process fits into the Hroch‟s 
distinction of phases. It can be cultural, political and ideological. Since then research on 
nationalism, nations and national identity became so numerous that they are almost 
incomprehensible by a single person. Because of the huge impact of the II World War the 
discussion about nationalism is tainted with a bias and nationalism was treated as a solely 
negative ideology and moral judgement obscured the scientific approach153. While Karl 
Deutsch already tried to present nationalism as a neutral process it was Gellner who 
spearheaded neutrality as a basis for research about nationalism. Another way of dealing with 
the problem of moral judgement was acknowledging that nationalism is “Janus-faced” and 
has a good and bad side at the same time.  This approach was used by Hans Kohn and still is 
popular in use154. 
The history of nationalism, if we assume that the protonationalist period of Hobsbawm 
or the general point of view of Hayes will not be included, naturally frames it as a modern 
phenomenon. It started in the late XVIII century with two revolutions: American and French. 
For the first half of the XIX century nationalism was an inclusive and liberal doctrine. A 
nationalist of that time was a revolutionary who connected the devotion to ones fatherland 
with the suppression of various national groups in multinational empires. Nationalism was 
strongly connected with the idea of sovereignty and democracy. Romantic poets and leaders 
such as Byron, Mazzini, Michelet or Mickiewicz praised the international struggle for 
freedom “yours and ours”. Paradoxically the liberal nationalists were very international in 
their activities. Nationalism was also a modernising force and it does not matter if it was 
stemming from the industrial revolution and had to be a part of modernisation (Gellner) or 
used industrialisation as a tool of nation-building (Hayes)155. 
                                                          
152 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 194.  
Probably the most interesting case is when a nationalist party or movement are the basis for nation-formation and 
do create a nation. Then the symbols and aesthetics of the movement become national or even state symbols. 
153 This approach tends to be popular among Marxist and post-marxist scholars like Hobsbawm. 
154 Examples include: Thomas Eriksen and Tom Nairn.  Nairn T., Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, 1997., 
Eriksen T., p. Etniczność I nacjonalizm, Kraków 2013, p. 180.  
155 Also internationalist ideologies like communism put industrialisation into a central place. Industry was to 
create the new driving force in social change – the proletariat. For nationalists it was a tool in modernising their 
national societies. For more about the relation of modernisation and state-driven policies see: Leszczyński A., 
Skok w nowoczesność: polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 1943-1980, Warszawa 2013.  
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All of this changed in the second half of the XIX century. The transformation of 
nationalism made it a less liberal idea and more connected with Machtpolitik, the politics of 
strength. Nationalist ideas became intertwined with social Darwinism and national 
expansion156. Nationalism was more and more becoming synonymous with chauvinism157. 
The imperial politics of the III French Republic and Bismarck‟s Prussia and then unified 
Germany set an example. Much to the dismay of Hobsbawm even socialist movements of 
central Europe focused on fighting for national states158. The transformation of nationalism 
was partially caused by its innate characteristics. But also as the nationalist movements across 
Europe started to reach the Hroch‟s Phase C of mass mobilisation their inclusivity reached its 
limits. Now all of those nationalisms started to clash with each other and fighting for each 
scrap of land containing even a small group of people believed to be part of the nation. This 
mechanism became apparent after the end of the Great War and the establishment of several 
nation-states in Central Europe. Border wars such as the ones between Poland and Germany 
or Slovenia and Austria serve as good example159. Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska names the 
transition from liberal nationalism to integral nationalism, which most important trait in 
comparison with the older version is the focus on authority rather than democracy160. Budyta-
Bydzyńska only generalises the earlier typology of Kohn who distinguished the 
democratic/civic/Western (liberal) type of nationalism and the ethnic/Eastern (integral) type 
of nationalism. The problem with Kohn‟s dichotomy is its simplicity, for instance there are 
examples of ethnic nationalism in the West (Basques). Instead of the East-West divide the 
ethnic type of nationalism could be a function of replacement of institutions. If state 
institutions are present and available for the nationalist movement, then nationalism leans 
towards the civic type, if not, it leans towards the ethnic type. 
                                                          
156 The general agreement is that nationalism even from its liberal beginnings had the expansionist gene. 
Examples include the exceptionality of the French nation, the sacro egoismo of Mazzini and other. Almost each 
nation thought of itself as the chosen one and destined to play a certain role in the general history of mankind.  
Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska recalls the term nationalism being used in 1836 in a theological sense – for a 
nation to be chosen by God. Budyta-Budzyńska. p 188. Other problems arise with the concept of historical and 
non-historical nations. For instance Otto Bauer uses such a distinction and the liberal Mazzini differentiated 
nations worthy of having a nation state and limited their number to 11.  
157 Chlebowczyk, O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków 1983, p. 226. For more 
information about the processes of transformation of nationalism in specific nations see: Hobsbawm, Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990, p.101-130. 
158 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990, p. 125. A prime example of this process 
is the socialist movement of Poland. In Finland for instance the Socialist Party became de facto a national party.  
159 Poles and Germans were fighting for the region of Greater Poland and Silesia. The Austrian Slovenes wanted 
to join as much of Carinthia as possible to the southern Slav state. 
160 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 192. The term integral 
nationalism was coined by Charles Maurras, a French philosopher and supporter of authoritarian rather than 
democratic rule.  
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In the already used by Chlebowczyk case of French nationalism transformation the 
integral nationalism manifested in the support of monarchy as the best form of government 
for the nation. Usually this type of nationalism surfaced in the situation when a nation-state 
was already formed and democratic governments struggled with solving social problems. 
There is no one type of nationalism. The distinction between liberal and integral 
nationalism is just one example of many of different typologies. Gellner himself proposed a 
typology regarding the possession of power and availability of education (or lack thereof). 
But there cannot be a better pronounced dichotomy of nationalisms than the tale of the Empire 
of Megalomania and Ruritania that Gellner provided161. The nationalism of the Empire is a 
typical nationalism of the centre: led by the elites and state institutions and directed at national 
minorities. Examples of such nationalism include the English XIX century imperial 
nationalism or the nationalism in the Bismarck-united Germany. On the other end lies the 
nationalism of the periphery, which is usually connected with the of secession, irredentism 
and independence movements. Furthermore nationalism could be divided further into the 
nationalism of the majority and nationalism of the minority162. Nationalism of the majority 
usually concentrates on defending the status quo and privileges. It is against social change and 
blocks the cultural and political emancipation of minority groups, it favours assimilation of 
minorities163. On the other hand nationalism of the minority focuses on fighting everything 
that the nationalism of the dominant group stands for. It strives for sovereignty, emancipation 
and social change. It is also fervently against assimilation with the dominant group. Those 
two types may seem like contradiction but in fact they may transform one into another 
depending on the political situation of each of the groups. Once liberated the minority may 
become a majority in their own state and thus reorient its goals to the nationalism of the 
dominant group. The dominant group when losing its position may refer to the ways of the 
nationalism of minor groups with its focus on culture and history. Nationalism of the 
centre/periphery usually overlaps with the nationalism of the majority/minority but this rule is 
not universal. The dominant group may inhabit the periphery and be set against the ruling 
minority. Gellner goes even further in creating his typology and adds three variables: the 
                                                          
161 Gellner E.,Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009,  p. 147-153.  
162 Budyta-Budzyńksa M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 197. Chlebowczyk, 
Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p.33-35, 56-101. See also the chapter about the peripheries of dominant 
culture in: Kłoskowska A., Kultura narodowa u korzeni¸Warszawa 2005. p. 183-296 
163 Chlebowczyk divides the concept even further by creating phases of assimilation: from linguistic to cultural 
(civilisational), p. 60.  To read more about the intricacies of assimilative processes see Chlebowczyk, O prawie 
do bytu małych i młodych narodów, Warszawa-Kraków 1983 p. 56-101. 
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divide between the ruling and the ruled, the availability of mass education and cultural 
differentiation164.  The availability of mass education has to be understood as the capacity to 
participate and create higher culture. Also for model purposes Gellner limited the cultural 
differentiation to the existence of just two separate cultures. Interestingly the crucial 
discrepancy is the cultural differentiation, without it nationalism would not emerge165. The 
same situation occurs when there is no higher culture in written form, which Gellner identifies 
with premodern times.  Within this typology only three scenarios guarantee the appearance of 
nationalism. The first one is when the ruling class has access to education and the ruled is 
deprived of it (“Habsburg” nationalism), the second is when the ruled are educated and the 
ruling class is not (diaspora nationalism eg. Jews, Greeks, Armenians). The third one when all 
of the society has access to power and education (typical western nationalism).  
There are many other ways to differentiate types of nationalism which are not that 
relevant to the topic of this thesis but nevertheless they should be mentioned. For instance 
Hroch focuses only on nationalism as a European phenomenon but Anderson and Hobsbawm 
add colonial and post-colonial nationalism into the fray. Nationalism could be leftist, rightist, 
liberal, communist or postcommunist etc166. Hayes for instance, proposed five types of 
nationalism: humanitarian, jacobinic, traditional, liberal and integral167.  There is however one 
characteristic that must not be omitted and that is treating nationalism as an ideology. For 
instance Anderson believed that nationalism did not constitute a legitimate ideology. There is 
some truth in this statement as nationalism does not encompass many issues like the form of 
government, type of economy and its doctrine is prone to changes, there are little solid 
                                                          
164 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009, p. 191.  
165 The divergence in power possession could lead to social revolts but never (at least according to Gellner) 
within the framework of nationalism. Here lies possibly the biggest difference between Gellner and Marxists. 
For Marx and his followers just social tensions would create nations and at the same time ethnic tensions should 
create social tensions which will lead to the socialist revolution. Never has a social revolt within a culturally 
homogenous society created a revolution and never an ethnic revolt took the Marxist form of revolution. 
Hobsbwam mentioned the problem of socialist movements becoming de facto nationalist movements.  
166 For more information about the relations of communism and nationalism see: Zaremba M., Komunizm, 
legitymacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy koministycznej w Polsce, Warszawa 2001. In 
short Zaremba shows how Marxist and socialist legitimacy of communists in Poland was replaced by 
nationalism. Even the communist rulers of GDR tried to form a separate German nation from the West Germans. 
When communism fell in Central and Eastern Europe the symbolic space that was usually occupied by 
communist ideology was quickly overtaken by nationalisms. Sometimes, as was the case of Yugoslavia the 
cultural differentiation was “frozen” for the time of communist dominance only to erupt when the structures of 
power disappeared.  
167 Hayes C., The historical evolution of modern Nationalism, New York 1931. The whole text is in public 
domain and can be downloaded from 
https://ia801603.us.archive.org/4/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.13165/2015.13165.The-Historical-Evolution-Of-
Modern-Nationalism.pdf, Access 05.01.2019. Importantly for Hayes these versions of nationalism were placed 
in chronological order. So while those types of nationalism can coexist they are historically proven stages of 
development of nationalism.  
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foundations for nationalism. Also nationalism never produced any great thinker and has no 
canon of scriptures and books. Anderson believes that nationalism should be placed among 
phenomena like religion and not the ones like fascism or communism168. Quite paradoxically 
the underdevelopment of nationalism may be one of the sources of its universal success. 
Perhaps it was its particular nature and huge variability (every nation had its own nationalism) 
that contributed to the universal success. 
 For these considerations it does not matter if nationalism will be treated as “partial-
ideology” or a “full-ideology” because it functions as an ideology. Once again I will refer to 
the invaluable work of Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska, who merged the most common parts 
of nationalist doctrine trying to create an ideal-type. Not all of the elements of the doctrine 
need to appear in a certain nationalist ideology but it did appear in enough nationalisms that it 
is included on the list.  
Ideal type of the doctrine of nationalism:  
1. Nation is the greatest good 
2. A nation-state should be the international norm 
3. Sacro egoismo – national good is more important than personal good 
4. A person can only fully develop within the framework of a nation 
5. Nation is natural not a construct, worth more than the sum of its parts 
6. Nation is sovereign, the source of political power 
7. Belonging to a nation is a matter of birth not will 
8. Social reality can be divided into “our” and “other” 
9. A nation is unique 
10. National interest should be realised with all necessary means 
11. Nation is homogenous 
12. There is a hierarchy of nations 
13. Relations between nations are based on force not on brotherhood169 
One thing lacking in the list of the doctrine is the placement of nationalism on the so 
called political compass. It does not make sense to label nationalism left-wing or right-wing. 
                                                          
168 Anderson B., Imagined Comunities,  p. 5. Thomas Luckmann believes that nationalism is an „invisible 
religion” because it does not create new institutions but with great sucess uses the existing ones like schools, 
media, the military etc.  See: Luckmann T., Invisible religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. 
London 1970. 
169 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 201-205.  
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As stated before by Hobsbawm nationalism transformed the socialist movements in its image. 
Similar thing happened to conservatism. As an ideology conservatism is looking into the past 
and tries to preserve the best of it. At first glance nationalism seems to be a conservative 
ideology but one could not be more wrong. Because of the modernising potential of 
nationalism it is actually oriented towards the future. While it uses the past it is often I myths. 
In the most radical scenario nationalism actually destroys the premodern cultures and 
societies in order to create a mythical version of them. Nationalist ideology suffers from false 
consciousness – while defending folk culture and the traditional values, continuity and 
diversity it fabricates a new higher culture, helps to create mass and anonymous society. 
Nationalism as an ideology could then form its own contradiction170. Dead languages are 
resurrected; folk dialects are appropriated to be used as high language by the elites.  
Nationalism creates cultural avatars171. It cannot be treated as a version of conservatism 
either. That leaves out liberalism. It seems that liberalism and nationalism are quite 
contradictory: one is individualist and one is collectivist. Nationalism promotes solidarity 
between its members and tries to soothe class divisions, some of which were created by 
modernisation processes. Nationalist liberalism is a political ideology that actually came to 
life in Germany and in Austria. I have already analysed all the programs of the Austrian 
national-liberals and found a pattern. Liberal nationalism (or national liberalism) is a 
paradoxical idea that is contradictory and either liberal or national elements will overtake one 
another. On political plain it means tensions, divisions and break ups of parties and 
movements, which is exactly what happened in the Austrian case. Eventually it was 
nationalist collectivism and solidarity that overtook liberal aspect of the national-liberal 
party172. The innate collectivism of nationalism also creates a tendency of nationalism to lean 
towards statist and protectionist policies towards economy. That does not mean central-
planned economies of the former communist states but generally the role of state in economy 
and promotion of economical autarky are high among nationalist goals in economy.  
                                                          
170 Gellner E., Narody i nacjonalizm, Warszawa 2009, p. 144-147.  
171 Those passages from Gellner basically encompass Andersons idea of imagined communities. But unlike 
Andreson, Gellner points out that while the culture created by nationalism is somewhat artificial it is never 
arbitrary and always stems from existing preconditions.  
172 Andrzejewski P., Paradoks narodowego liberalizmu, Historia i idee Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 





If nationalism could be placed on the political compass it generally would be 
positioned somewhere on the top left quarter of the compass. That does not mean that there 
are no nationalist libertarians but rather that nationalism as a system of values has a tendency 
to shift towards authoritarian left174.  
There is undeniable connection between nationalism and modernisation. It does not 
matter if modernisation was the source of nationalism or quite otherwise that nationalism was 
the source of modernisation. History provides examples of both and I would rather see the 
relationship between the two as the ancient Chinese symbol of yin and yang, they cannot exist 
without one another and each half contains a part of the other. The question is similar to the 
famous which was first the hen or the egg dilemma. Nationalism however differs from 
modernisation in one important aspect: it had a changing political agenda. As an ideology it 
influenced the social order on various levels: from the economical to the political one. The 
first phase of liberal nationalism introduced the idea of sovereignty of nations and promoted 
equality and democratisation. It also proposed the demarcation between nations with ethnic, 
linguistic and religious borders. Different types of nationalism, depending on the 
                                                          
173 The Political Compass by no means is a scientific tool. It was created by a political journalist and uses 61 
questions to identify the subject‟s political views that are then projected on the economic left-right and 
axiological authoritarian and libertarian axis. The widespread success of the political compass shows its 
utilitarian application that could be used as a basic reference point for more sophisticated models. In my opinion 
it is sufficient for the attempt to place nationalism somewhere in the vast spectrum of left-right distinction. 
174 There are many examples of nationalist policies that favour strengthening state institutions and their influence 
over economy like recent Donald Trump‟s tariff wars, or the statist policies of the Polish Law and Justice party. 
The list however is older and longer: from first mercantilist policies of the British and French Empires, through 
industrialisation efforts of postcolonial states, or the Meiji period of modernisation in XIX century Japan. 
Socialist states also employed certain policies straight out of nationalist playbook. For example Adam 
Leszczyński points out that there are continuities between Polish nationalists of the pre-war period and 
communists after 1945. See: Leszczyński A., Skok w nowoczesność: polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych 
1943-1980, Warszawa 2013.,  
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circumstances of its appearance reshaped the social order by promoting agrarian or industrial 
policies. Nationalism was against old feudal estate society and leaned towards social 
solidarity and corporate organisation of society among the lines of types of employment and 
jobs rather than class. The goal of creating a nation state also led to tensions in mixed regions 
and radicalisation of minorities which in turn developed their own nationalist movements. 
Nationalism reshaped the structures of power – members of a nation (which may but not 
necessarily is be equal with citizens) are ruled directly by the institutions of the nation state. 
The legitimacy of power comes directly from the nation and not from metaphysical divine 
roots. Nationalism also elevated the importance of ethnicity and language to new levels, 
which in the most radical form the bond between national identity and ethnicity formed 
racism. After the first inclusive phase nationalism became exclusive. The exclusivity could 
take the positive form of patriotism but also the negative of xenophobia and chauvinism. As 
an ideology nationalism was also a great fuel for war justification. Yet despite all its flaws and 
all of its shortcomings as an ideology nationalism is quite possible the most successful idea in 
the history of mankind. Benedict Anderson named it the anomaly of nationalism. To other 
ideologies that lord Acton named as the biggest competition for nationalism (Mazzini): 
equality (Rousseau), communism (Babeuf), Anderson adds liberalism175. Anderson is 
surprised that in post-enlightenment liberal times that evoke individualism the vast 
proliferation of nationalist ideas based on tribalism, primordial loyalty and common ancestry 
should already be rooted out in favour of a modern society. Hroch adds the idea that liberal, 
capitalist economy should promote this individualisation of society176. Marxist socialism and 
communism were faced by the anomaly of nationalism that prevailed the prophesised coming 
of the communist end of history177. Nationalism has shown endurance that allowed it to 
dominate over other ideologies. It is so widespread that is taken as something natural, a 
regular occurrence. Nationalism has become banal. This ideology shapes the ways of thinking 
                                                          
175 Acton, There are three principal theories of this kind, impugning the present distribution of power, of 
property, and of territory, and attacking respectively the aristocracy, the middle class, and the sovereignty. They 
are the theories of equality, communism, and nationality. Though sprung from a common origin, opposing 
cognate evils, and connected by many links, they did not appear simultaneously. Rousseau proclaimed the first, 
Baboeuf the second, Mazzini the third; and the third is the most recent in its appearance, the most attractive at 
the present time, and the richest in promise of future power.  
See: Nationality, [in:] The Home and Foreign Review, London 1862. The whole text of the essay is available 
online: https://archive.org/stream/ra634742501londuoft#page/n9/mode/2up 
176 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015 95. For the weakness of 
liberalism when faced with nationalist ideas see also Andrzejewski P., Paradoks narodowego liberalism, 
Historia i idee Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Rocznik Polsko-Niemiecki 2014 nr 22. See more in the Chapter 
3.3 
177 Anderson B., Imagined communities, London, New York 2006, p. 3-5. Cambridge 1990, p 125. Interestingly 
Hobsbawms remarks of nationalism hijacking socialist movements did not obstruct Anderson from claiming that 
the age of nationalism is soon coming to an end (because it is so widespread in the world).  
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about the world, international affairs and civic relations. Its constantly reminding people of its 
existence through insignificant everyday symbols used in currencies, flags, sports etc. It 
emanates from encyclopaedias, schoolbooks and almanacs. Nationalism is hidden in plain 
sight in news reports, even those about the weather. Banal habits of everyday life reinforce 
nationalism which in turn also became banal178. Its banality is the most significant sign of 
success? So why did nationalism became so widespread, why did it became an obvious part of 
reality and most importantly why did it triumph over other ideologies of the XIX century and 
become the last ideology standing on the ring after the fall of other Grand Narratives179?  As 
Lord Acton wrote: There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation 
conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. […] 
Although, therefore, the theory of nationality is more absurd and more criminal than the 
theory of socialism, it has an important mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and 
therefore the end, of two forces which are the worst enemies of civil freedom, - the absolute 
monarchy and the revolution180. In a sense Lord Acton was right on the battlefield of 
ideologies or doctrines it was nationalism that emerged victorious trumping over both the 
monarchical regimes as well as socialism. Perhaps Józef Chlebowczyk is right in asserting 
that it is the existence of capitalism is crucial for nationalism. Capitalism is about competition 
and there is no safer haven from the hardships of free market economy than the nation, which 
corresponds with the natural aristoteleic need of a human being to be a social animal. 
Nationalism in the long term proved to be a solid warranty for the existence of democratic 
nation-states that are “natural” points of reference in a globalised world. Nationalism was the 
remedy to limit the alienation (Marx) or social entropy (Gellner) caused by modernisation 
processes. The apogee of nationalism, the nation state, proved to be both the guardian of civil 
liberties and at the same time the protection against the distortions of capitalism. That is a 
feature that was not achieved by socialism and liberalism as they focused only on one of the 
aspects. That is not to say that nationalism was without its problems and shortcomings, being 
the cause of conflicts, wars and horrid crimes like genocide. Yet despite those atrocities 
nationalism became a banal part of everyday life.  
                                                          
178 Billig M., Banal nationalism, London 2004, p. 6-9.  
179 Sierakowski S., The five lessons of populist rule, Project Syndicate, January 2 1017, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/lesson-of-populist-rule-in-poland-by-slawomir-sierakowski-2017-
01?barrier=accesspaylog 
180 Acton J., Nationality, [in:] The Home and Foreign Review, London 1862. The whole text of the essay is 
available online: https://archive.org/stream/ra634742501londuoft#page/n9/mode/2up. For the Polish reader the 
insights of Lord Acton about the role played by the Partitions of Poland in the emergence of nationalism can 
prove to be of utmost interest.  
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1.7 Closing comments 
 
The great success of the works of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm seemed to end 
the discussion about what nation is and how it was formed. The constructivist and modernist 
approach became so popular that it even proliferated to mass media. For instance in early 
2018 New York Times prepared an informative YouTube video How nations make up 
national identities that popularised the very arguments made by the constructivists181.  The 
daily argued that nations are in fact a myth. The four factors the editors enumerated were: 
mass mobility and language uniformisation, mass communication, modernisation of warfare 
and the decline of religion. Yet the developments of nation-formation theory showed that the 
constructivist turn was not so permanent, although I have to admit, it has an admirable charm. 
When studying the constructivist a little bit deeper one can find elements that contradict the 
idea that it was modernity that created modern nations (which is a tautology). Gellner 
admitted that the formation of nations was not an arbitrary process, which implies that there 
had to be certain pre-modern conditions that determined the outcome of universal 
modernisation processes. Hobsbawm needed to elaborate on proto-nationalism in the 
premodern era and Anderson was surprised by the vitality of nations. Anthony Smith, when 
he summarised the most important narratives concerning nations and their formation, chose to 
side with ethno-symbolism that was somewhat a conciliatory position between the primordial 
and modernist approach. Thomas Eriksen and Paul James with completely different 
approaches found enough similarities and continuities by examining either ethnic groups and 
the functioning of ethnicity as well as group formation in their abstraction. The culturalist 
approach of Antonina Kłoskowska shows that national cultures existed before modernisation 
and Miroslav Hroch had elaborated in great detail about the sources of nation formation of 
which only one was modernisation and the other two were primodern legacies of the past and 
ethnic ties. Perhaps Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska is right that all of the above approaches 
are not actually contradictory but complementary, just their focus is laid elsewhere. European 
nations were formed or formed themselves in different ways and there is no one set way to 
make a nation. Both Hroch and Józef Chlebowczyk presented intricate models that put nation-
formation in formal categories and models. In Western Europe it were capitalism and the 
centralised bureaucracies of the state that played the major role in nation formation. In Central 
and Eastern Europe it was not capitalism nor the state institutions that formed nations, it were 
                                                          




culture and language. While secularisation was a part of nation-formation in the West in the 
East religion was used as one of the fundaments of national culture etc. However one factor 
was similar for all models of nation formation: it were always the elites that spearheaded the 
process. For my purpose the results comparative approach of Hroch, Chlebowczyk and 
Budyta-Budzyńska is the only one that can bring a significant result. The process of Austrian 
nation formation in constructivist sense was already conducted by Peter Thaler so one of the 
things left is to confront that process with models on more meta-level, especially that all of 





























2.1 The role of history in nation formation 
 
Paraphrasing the famous quote of Eric Hobsbawm: Historians are to nation-formation 
what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to the heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw 
material for the market. Nations without a past are contradictions in terms. What makes a 
nation is the past, what justifies one nation against others is the past, and historians are the 
people who produce it182. The role of history was so crucial that at one point of the time one 
of the basic distinctions of nations was the opinion whether they were historical or non-
historical nations. Hegel wrote: In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state 
and preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation), has, strictly 
speaking, no history − like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which 
still exist in a condition of savagery183. Otto Bauer extended this view with the insight to the 
social structure. For him a historical nation had already developed social structure at the eve 
of the coming of capitalism184. Bauer saw peasant populations as non-historical nations. This 
view was connected with the Marxist understanding of nation as a bourgeois phenomenon; the 
class situation determined the development of nations. The idea of non-historic nations may 
seem silly now, as it is quite clear that even the peasant masses had their own history and 
practiced their own forms of memory. The folk cultures and vernaculars were elevated to the 
status of national high-culture thus proving the Marxist branch of nation theory wrong.  
The influence of history on nation formation could be understood twofold:  
1. The influence of the factual past on nation-formation 
2. The influence of historiography on nation-formation 
Constructivists such as Anderson or Gellner tend to focus only on the second 
understanding of the influence of history. It is to be understood as the result of the work of 
historians – in the terms of Jerzy Topolski – a construct, a narrative an invention. In this sense 
                                                          
182 Hobsbawm, E. , Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today, [in:] Anthropology Today 8(1), 1992 p. 3-8. 
Also Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska includes a nations own history (or at least the belief in having one) in one of 
the parts of the ideal type of a nation. 
183 Hegel F., Philosophy of mind, Oxford 2001,  p. 60. The whole text of the Philosophy of mind is available 
online: http://hegel.net/en/pdf/Hegel-Enc3.pdf, The idea of non-historical nations was transferred to Marx and 
Engels. Especially Engels was receptive and he even deemed some nations unworthy of existence.  
184 Bauer O., The question of nationalities and social democracy, Minneapolis 2000, p. 190-193,  
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history would just be a source of national mythology and a mean to achieve national 
mobilisation and prove legitimacy. But as Hroch points out this point of view is severely 
limited, as people do not come in contact with history just through text or the constructs of 
historians185. There is a whole other dimension of oral history passed in families through 
generation as well as the material remains of history (buildings, places of importance, 
battlefields etc). While I can agree with Hobsbawm famous statement that nations invent 
traditions it is really hard to invent actual history. Of course some elements of history will be 
emphasized, underlined and all the lights will be directed at them but the same time it is hard 
to omit the real events that happened. In some most radical examples major historical events 
can be overlooked, forgotten or sent to the unconscious – such as according to Andrzej Leder 
happened to the drastic change of the Polish society during the time of the II World War. He 
called it the “dreamt revolution” because the Polish, figuratively speaking, seemed to sleep 
through that change and remember only the horrors of occupation and the heroism of 
resistance186. While the general society is unaware of the process it does not mean that it did 
not happen, and in fact some scholars believe that it was the II World War that ended the 
process of formation of the modern Polish nation. Presumably the most important element of 
existing historical heritage is the state and its institutions. To some extent also religious 
institutions buildings could play a similar role as monuments of the past and signs of 
continuity. This is an obvious call back to the idea of historical nations which was validated 
by the existence of state. Nations like the French, Spanish, English, Dutch or Portuguese 
always had centralised institutions that formed the backbone of the state. Obviously there are 
differences between the aforementioned examples, like the role of (semi)autonomous regions 
but overall it was the state that was the source of identity. Great Britain composing of not only 
English but also Scots, Welsh and other minor groups created a distinct British national 
identity as opposed to centralised France that incorporated the populace of different French 
dialects into one nation. There are also the examples of Germany and Italy, which were 
fragmented into a myriad of state institutions but were driven together by culture. A special 
case of this was Poland which also exemplified what Hroch calls the unification nationalism, 
but when it comes to the role of history Poland would need to be assigned to a different 
category: a state that was lost. The state, when destroyed like in the case of Hungary or 
Poland left constant reminders of its existence. The history of a sovereign state, while many 
                                                          
185 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015 p. 39.  
186 Leder A., Prześniona rewolucja, Warszawa 2014. See also: Wapiński R., Polska i małe ojczyzny Polaków: z 
dziejów kształtowania się świadomości narodowej w XIX i XX wieku, Wrocław 1994; Wapiński R., Polska na 
styku kultur I narodów: w kręgu przeobrażeń narodowościowych i cywilizacyjnych, Gdańsk 2002.   
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times turned into myth by poets and historians of the romantic period usually left a material 
heritage in form of local institutions or administrative borders. Sometimes it was just one 
thing that was left was the name of a kingdom, such was the example of Norway or Bulgaria 
which called back upon the memory of states that ceased to exist in 1397 and 1018 
respectively. Yet, despite the long lack of independent statehood they have re-emerged as 
modern nations. It is surprising how many medieval kingships, dukedoms and principalities 
even if integrated into bigger organisms reappeared again during the modernisation process of 
the XIX and XX century. Perhaps this process did not stop yet and there are still groups in 
Europe that use the history of even partial sovereignty to legitimise their nationalist 
movements. Good example of this is the Breton nationalist movement that traces its historical 
heritage to the Duchy of Brittany that was integrated with the Kingdom of France in 1532. 
Another sound example is the Catalan nationalism that calls back the times of regional 
sovereignty from the IX to the XI century as well the autonomy in the Kingdom of Aragon187. 
Belarus is an interesting example of appropriating (and not without merit) the partial 
sovereignty of a multicultural and multi-ethnic Grand Duchy of Lithuania as its own state 
tradition. There are however several nations like Finns or Latvians that had no state to refer to 
in which case the nationalist movements recalled folk customs, architecture and the natural 
beauty of the land188.  
Whether the state survived or not determined the shape of historiography and as Hroch 
points out it also shaped the territoriality of written history189. In the case of state institutional 
continuity national history was the history of the state and the shape of the state determined 
what was considered to be national territory. This type of historiography had two important 
characteristics: the lack of a master narrative and it forced the inclusion of other ethnic groups 
into national history (Finns into Swedish, Lithuanians into Polish, Catalan into Spanish 
history etc.). The lack of the master narrative was fertile growth for politicised history and the 
usage of history by dominant competing political movements. When there was no remaining 
state and the traditions were discontinued history was used to legitimise the reconstruction of 
the fallen country. The best example of this situation was the Polish historiography in relation 
to the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita). Several other 
nationalities inhabited the Commonwealth such as Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and 
                                                          
187 The list of potential new nation-states in Europe is growing and almost in all cases there is a tradition of some 
form of statehood or independence. Examples are: Scotland, Wales, Flanders, Basque region, Galicia, Andalusia, 
Sardinia, Bavaria or Silesia.  
188 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015 p. 48. 
189 Ibidem p.177-178.  
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other. They all had laid claim to their own statehood thus complicating the national situation 
in the former lands of the Commonwealth. Lithuanians and Ukrainians do not refer to 
Rzeczpospolita as their state of origin but Belarusians do. The third case includes states, 
which institutions disappeared in the medieval era. In that case historiography could not easily 
refer to borders of an old state – the new desired sovereign country had to be imagined 
through appropriation of myths190. One such example is the Slovaks who not having much 
institutional history on their own recalled the Great Moravia of IX century. The last case 
leaves national movements that had no state and even no myths to fall back to. Historical 
argument was the weakest in those groups which tend to project their territory among ethnic 
lines. Legitimacy of a nation state could come from just the fact of struggle under foreign 
rule. 
The second understanding of history‟s influence over nation-formation is the role of 
historiography. Paradoxically also historiography could be regarded as a material remainder 
of the past. Medieval and early modern chronicles and other literary works about the deeds of 
the past exist as an actual object – a set of scrolls or a book and serves just by its existence as 
a legacy of the past. The narratives of those early chronicles served as a basis but also a 
limitation for nation-formation. While the historical tradition was later used for nationalist 
adaptations of history they did provide a set of narratives that were limited in scope. The 
chronicles usually concentrated on the story of monarchs and kingdoms but they also touched 
upon topics as: common origin and struggle with foreign invaders. With the passage of time 
the chronicles started to depict communities that were defined either ethnically or politically 
or both191. This evolution opened historiography to history of states, privileged classes and in 
some rare cases the story of the lower classes as well. The pre-modern history writings need 
to be treated as part of material heritage because they put the up-to-date rituals and customs in 
context. Perhaps it is this provision of context that is the most significant contribution of 
history in nation formation. This is especially true for the case when the continuity of the state 
was interrupted and history provided information about, but also preserved traditions.  
Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska among the factors that contribute to nation formation 
listed also the myth of common ancestry192. It is important to mention this because the content 
of the pre-modern historiography in many cases could be dividing into two categories: 
historiographical and mythological narratives. Some scholars even put the pre-modern 
                                                          
190 Budyda Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 74-76.  
191 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015, p. 53.  
192 Budyda Budzyńska p. Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p.74-76. 
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historiography straight to the myth category193. A fine example of this dichotomy is the 
Historia Polonica written by the bishop of Kraków Wincenty Kadłubek in the beginning of 
the XIII century. Kadłubek presented history of the ruling Piast dynasty but also mixed 
mythical stories trying to tie Poland with antiquity. A legendary king of Kraków – named 
Krak, was according to him a polonised version of the Latin Gracchus etc. In the premodern 
era Polish nobility applied the ideology of sarmatism which traced their origin from the 
ancient nomad people of Sarmatians. The Swedes believed that they came from the Goths and 
the French from Gauls. The last example had also a class undertone: the people were 
supposed to be descendants of Gauls but the hated aristocracy from a different tribe – the 
Franks. Germans related themselves to the ancient Germanii etc. The myth of common 
ancestry does not need to be true; it evokes emotions and a sense of “natural” or primordial 
belonging. Budyta-Budzyńska frames the myth as something universal for each nation but the 
truth is that depending on the situation in relation to the existence of state institutions nations 
could refer either to real, well established events in history rather than in myths. Some parts of 
national history are forgotten or chosen not to be remembered. Forgetting could also be a part 
of the process of mythologisation. To the myth of common ancestry Budyta-Budzyńska adds 
the myth of common destiny as the most important. The vision of the communist society or 
the myth of the Third Reich, which would last for a thousand years, is the most radical 
examples. To these types of myths Jerzy Topolski adds other categories: the historiographical 
and fundamental myths194. While the myth of ancestry and destiny could be treated as subjects 
of scientific investigation (for example the myth of the Revolution in French historiography) 
the other influence the way historiography is constructed and its narratives are written. The 
historiographical myths are divided into factual and theoretical and they appear in two ways. 
Firstly myths appear in the case where the historical narrative fills in the gaps left by the lack 
of sources or amplifies source-based information. Second case appears when a historian (or 
any other scholar for that matter) does not falsify his or her findings.  The fundamental myths 
could also be called metamyths as they reach the level of paradigms in which people think 
that are embedded into consciousness. They are the structures of thinking and Topolski names 
seven of them: the myth of evolution (or progress), revolution, sublimation, coherence, 
causality, activism and determinism. The myth of progress is a trademark of Enlightenment 
and the work of Condorcet Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human 
                                                          
193 Assman J., Kultureles Gädachtnis, Munich 1992, p. 78.  
194 Topolski Jerzy, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię, Warszawa 1998,  p. 208. 
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Mind195. The myth of evolution creates the problem of ahistorical evaluation of uneven 
development of different parts of the world and usually point at a goal of the evolution. One 
of these points could be the nation-forming process.  The myth of revolution creates the 
categorisation of what was before and after the revolution often using the revolutionary 
moment as a point of reference. In the “revolutionary” thinking the timeline is divided by the 
revolutionary moments and they organise the main narratives. The myth of sublime is the 
feeling of awe that contact with history and historiography creates in opposition to the “now” 
that can be experienced through senses. The past is a matter of imagination and is distorted 
because of the lack of sensory experiences. The French revolution or the British industrial 
revolution or Napoleonic wars were subjects to the sublime myth – instead of focusing on the 
factual process it was their significance that was stressed out. Another aspect of the sublime 
myth is ahistorical modernisation of terms – the nation is probably the best example. We 
know that the nation was not the same thing now and 400 years ago but it did not stop 
generations of historians from writing national histories like it was a fact. The myth of 
coherence is a tendency of historians to create coherent narratives. Perhaps it was Hayden 
White who described the influence of coherence on the historiographical narratives196. The 
myth of causality forces historians to look for the causes of every historical process thus 
making every historical event a factor that contributes to change of lack thereof. Causality 
tends to focus on universal rights of history rather than human action. It was predominant in 
the positivist era of historiography197. The opposite of causality is activism that attributes all 
the historical developments to human action. Paweł Jasienica, a renowned Polish historian 
explained Polish history with the focus on the leaders (kings) and their character and 
decisions and is a model example of applying the activist fundament of historical narrative198. 
The myth of determinism is basically a simplified version of the evolution myth and Topolski 
does not provide any reason for distinguishing therefore it will also be omitted here.  
                                                          
195 Some comment on progress – Herder etc.  
196 White H, Metahistory. For White history writing resembled four universal narratives: tragedy, romance (epic) 
comedy and satire. The tragic story tells a tale of self-identification that could only be acquired through 
suffering. On the contrary the romantic (epic) narrative allows self-identification through triumph (usually of 
good over evil). The comedy stresses out the inability of self-identification and settles with the acceptance of 
existence.  In satire paradoxically the self-identification comes not through triumph or pain but through 
conscious acceptance of the inability of self-identification. Hayden White connected historians and philosophers 
with his ideal types of narratives. For tragedy it were Tocqueville and Marx, for romance it were Michelet and 
Nietzsche, for comedy Ranke and Hegel, for satire Burckhard and Croce. Whites work is considered the 
introduction of the postmodern linguistic turn to historiography.  
197 Topolski J., Jak się pisze i rozumie historię, Warszawa 1998, p. 215. 
198 Paweł Jasienica published seveal books on Polish history from the  early medieval period  till 1795: Polska 
piastów (1960), Polska jagiellonów (1963), Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (three volumes 1967-1972). His 
books are still a popular read in Poland and were republished in 2007. Perhaps his popularity was boosted by a 
feature movie Różyczka from 2010 which was based loosely on Jasienica‟s life.  
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The process of mythologisation of national historiography could be attributed to the 
psychology of historians, their ideological influence, a tendency (conscious and subconscious) 
to manipulate or censorship199. However one of the most important factor is assuming the 
primordial paradigm (approach). The search for roots that are as old as possible was strongly 
connected with a primordial understanding of nations in pre-modern historiography. This trait 
was then carried on to the early historical writings of the XIXth century, especially of the 
romantic period. But it would be wrong to assert that with the coming of positivism and more 
scientific scrutiny regarding historiography this would change. Because of high ideological 
implications of history it was used and abused in the age of nationalisms and the primordial 
myths prevailed in the narratives. The older times the nation could trace its own history and it 
does not matter whether it was true or mythologised, the more legitimate were the claims 
made by nationalist movements. The most basic level of legitimations was the sole existence 
of the nation which was sanctified by history. Other levels of legitimation included territorial 
claims or claims of inclusion of certain social and ethnic groups into the nation or state.  
There were four stages of development of national history: pre-modern, romantic, 
positivist, revisionist (critical) historiography. The topic of premodern history writing was 
touched upon above. The constant professionalization of methodology and development of 
other supporting sciences like archaeology were contributing to the level of detail in 
historiography. The scientific developments did not however stop the instrumentalization of 
historiography. Because of growing scientific scrutiny it is hard to speak of historiography as 
an invention or myth creation. Creating fables and inventing stories and fictional heroes is 
generally rejected by historians200.  Historians because of the limitations of their discipline 
could not invent history and did not truly “invent” traditions in the Hobsbawm sense. 
Nationalism may have used only selected parts of historiography with a bigger or smaller 
national bias but it did not create the historical facts out of thin air. Despite all of dynamics 
between history and nation-formation the connection of historiography and (pre)national-
myths seem inseparable since the foundation of medieval European historiography. As stated 
before primordiality was a constant factor in history writing and this had several 
consequences. Most importantly if assuming that a nation had “always” existed it allowed the 
                                                          
199 Topolski J.,  Jak się pisze i rozumie historię, Warszawa 1998, p. 269. 
200 This statement does not mean that historiography was free of forgeries and fabrications. In the Polish case the 
infamous Kronika Prokosza from the late XVIII presented an alternative history of the Slavic and Sarmatian 
tribes in pre-polish territory. In 2016 it served as a main source for publishing a book about the so-called Turbo-
slavs despite the fact that Kronika Prokosza was already dissected and declared a forgery by notable XIX 
century historian Joachim Lelewel. While influential the pseudo-historical myth does not undermine the main 
narratives of public discourse on national history.  
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incorporation of ancient history and ancient myths into the national cultural repertoire. In 
quite a contradictory way the myth, while based on history allowed nations to transgress 
history. If a nation existed always that it gave it a sense of almost godlike permanence. 
Through the passing of generations, culture and customs and in some cases also the 
development of state and its institutions nation seemed to reach immortality. In that sense 
nationalism, backed by history, filled in the role that religion used to play in creating a feeling 
of belonging to a community. Perhaps because of the dominance of primordial historiography 
the existence of (national) myths is already a consistent pattern, a part of longue duree. A 
myth plays a symbolical role and evokes basic emotions. Despite being refuted by science 
(critical historiography) historical myths prevail. They can be disproven by science but not 
even then their influence could be suppressed. A myth could be only combated and replaced 
by another myth201. Jerzy Topolski presents a different approach. For the Polish historian the 
myth could either be contradicted by scientific findings but it also could be a part of science 
(at least until proven false)202. Science is always confronted with an unending process of 
mythologisation of itself, both on the factographic and theoretical levels.  
 Many myths that entered the national imagination and heroes that entered the national 
pantheon did happen, only their interpretation became mythologised. Decisive battles that 
broke the continuity of state existence like the battle of Kosovo in  1389 or battle of Mohi of 
1525 that put Serbia and Hungary under foreign rule of the Ottomans or Habsburgs. Other 
myths included revolts and movements that were interpreted as conducted in the name of the 
nation. Some of the best example include the Hussite wars of the early XV century the 
proclamation of the Polish Constitution of the 3rd May in 1971 and of course the French 
Revolution. The other side of myth includes heroic figures, usually military leaders the likes 
of Frederic Barbarossa for Germans, Gustav Vasa for the Swedes, Jan Sobieski for the Poles. 
The “Austrian” case of Eugene of Savoy who was not a national hero but rather the hero of 
the Habsburg dynasty is an exception and a symbol of failed nation-making. Heroes usually 
play the role of “integrators” – they are set as examples for whole communities203.  Perhaps it 
is why Eugene of Savoy whose role was the servant of the Habsburgs contributed only to the 
strengthening positive feelings towards the ruling dynasty and not to the nation.  
                                                          
201 Budyta-Budzyńska M., Socjologia narodu i konfliktów etnicznych, Warszawa 2010, p. 75. The distinction 
between mythos and logos is a matter of debate. One could accept the intertwined relation between the two, 
analyse it or even try to fight myths and purify logos from them.  Some believe that it is impossible to separate 
the two and only mythisotry is the only possibility. See: Heehs P., History and Theory¸1994, p 1-20.   
202 Topolski J, Jak się pisze i rozumie historię, Warszawa 1998, p. 206.  
203 Ibidem, p. 315. 
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To proceed further I would like to present Hroch‟s introduction to creating a typology 
of national history.  No one has yet been created but Miroslav Hroch created a detailed set of 
questions that when applied in a comparative study would create such typology.  
 
Hroch‟s “questionnaire” for national history:   
1. Definition of the nations ―own‖ history:  
a) Territorially, the national borders were defined by:  
 A pre-existing state – historical borders 
 The ethnicity of the inhabitants 
 Older regional units 
 
b) The internal structure of the national territory was perceived as:  
 National centre versus the provinces 
 Different historical and geographical regions 
 
c) Chronological dimensions 
 When did the nation start to exist 
 Where were its origins placed in time?  
 Where did its members come from? 
 Was there continuity or discontinuity of national history?  
 What were the moments of national integration and 
disintegration? 
 
d) The system of national values:  
 Why were some periods and events seen as the times of 
glory and others as times of decline? 
 Among the heroes who were representative of national 
values, which ones were regarded as positive and which ones as 
negative? 
 Was there a stable system of positive and negative 
values, seen as intrinsic in the nation‘s ―own‖ history? 
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 Unity and diversity within the concept of national 
history: 
-Master narratives 
-Alternatives and competing concepts 
 
2. National history in the European context: 
a) we and Europe: 
 How strong was the interest in non-national European history?  
 Did historical thinking encompass the idea of the general 
development of the entire continent? Of the whole of humanity? 
 What historical hetero-stereotypes of the other nations were 
there? 
 What was considered the most common type of mutual 
relationship with neighbours (war, trade, culture) in national history? 
 Which aspect of the nation‘s own history was seen as specific, 
and how frequently was it contrasted with the history of others? 
 
b) Reflections on uneven development:  
 Were comparisons drawn between national history and the 
general situation across the rest of the continent, or the history of certain 
nations? 
 Were certain countries (including the nation‘s onw) perceived 
as either more or less developed (underdeveloped), and were there 
attempts to understand and explain it? 
 
3. Social factors: 
 Who were the most influential authors of master-narratives? 
 What were their social background, profession, education, and 
political and cultural engagement? 
 Who were the addresses of national history? 





4. General problems and interdependencies:  
a) myth and reality in understanding national history:  
 What was the relevance of scientific argument in the search for 
the purpose of national history? 
 What was the status of historical truth as final criterion? 
b) National history and the process of nation forming: 
 National history as political and national argument 
 Increasing interdependence between politics and national 
history204 
To give some short and simplified examples of application of the first point of Hroch‟s 
questionnaire: in the Polish case the national borders were defined by the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. This idea was later challenged by the national movement, which preferred 
ethnic lines as demarcation of the state borders. In the case of Italy reconstruction of the 
Roman Empire was used as legitimacy for colonial invasions of Africa in order to reconstruct 
the concept of Mare nostrum. Also because of the geographical reach of the old Venice 
Republic the united Italy of the second half of the XIX century laid claim to Dalmatia, which 
is now a part of Croatia. In a similar way for some time the reach of the Roman Empire in 
Britain determined the limits of what was English history. This later changed to encompass 
the whole island and overseas regions etc. The Czech “father of the nation” historian 
Frantisek Palacky claimed the medieval lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia as Czech. 
Palacky is probably the most pronounced example of a single historians influence on the 
nation-formation process. In the Polish case it was the Polish Crownlands (Korona) which 
were considered the backbone of the national territory. The Germans with the divided 
structure of the Holy Roman Empire struggled to find the central region. The final conflict 
was resolved between Austria (Grossdeutsche Lösung) and Prussia (Kleindeutsche Lösung). 
On the other hand Finland was considered a periphery of the Swedish and then Russian 
centres. The chronological dimension varied depending in which stage of historiography 
development (romantic, positivist, critical) it was written. The ideological goal was always to 
go as far in history as possible. If any continuity was found like with the ancient Germanii 
and modern Germans then it was used. Even broken continuity could serve as source of 
                                                          
204 Hroch M., European Nations. Explaining their formation, London, New York 2015, p. 180-181. 
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legitimacy as was with the Greek claim of Constantinople as the Greeks regarded the 
Byzantine Empire as their own etc.  
2.2 A short construction of Austrian history 
 
The goal of this subchapter is not to write a cohesive and comprehensible history of 
Austria as this would be a futile attempt.  Instead I would like to propose a short narrative that 
will encompass processes and events that, the way I see it, are relevant to the Austrian nation-
formation or to me more precise, relevant to the Austrian historians. This endeavour creates 
some problems from the very beginning because one fundamental thing needs to be 
established, namely: what is Austria? Should the history of Austria limit itself just to the 
confines of the current borders of the II Republic or instead focus on the people that inhabit 
it? Austria for a long time of its history was a part of the Holy Roman Empire and this fact 
cannot be neglected. Is the history of Austria a part of German history or should it be treated 
separately? Should a history of Austria include the history of other nations that were part of 
the Habsburg Empire? To limit the scope of the historical narrative I will only address the 
Austrian issues of being interconnected with other states and nations when it will be necessary 
for Austiran nation building or was important for Austrian historians. Only a short 
recollection of basic facts could achieve this goal. A geographical limitation to the regions 
regarded as Austrian would contribute to clarity, other regions or states will be mentioned 
only when it is relevant to the main topic. I will focus on the ethnic composition of the 
peoples that inhabited the lands that constitute Austria today as well as on the events that led 
to the persistent duration of the regional and state borders205.  
The lands that form Austria nowadays saw human settlement in the Old Stone Age of 
the Lower Paleolithic Period. One of the oldest surviving remains of a human being were 
found on the Austrian-Italian border in 1991. The mummy, dating back as far as 5300 years 
(3300 B.C) was named Ötzi refering to the place of his discovery in Ötztal Alps. In 2013 a 
vast genetic research of more than 3700 men proved that Ötzi had 137 confirmed relatives 
living in South Tirol206. The mummy serves as one of the greatest sources for the knowledge 
of living conditions of the Bronze Age. Austria is also home to the city of Hallstatt, which 
gave tha name to one of the most known archeological cultures of the Iron Age. The proto-
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88 
 
European tribes inhabiting tha area were known as Illirians (Illyrioi in Greek) and were 
overrun by the Celts, which are generally connected to the Hallstatt culture. However the 
Eastern Hallstatt culture is also attributed to the Ilirians. The presence of the Hallstatt is dated 
from around the XII century to Vth century B.C.  At the beginning of the IV century B.C. the 
first name of the region appears in the Latin name of Noricum, which was first used to address 
a Celitic kingdom or tribal federation.  Noricum became the name of the province of the 
Roman Empire in the year 16 B.C. Firstly it had semi-autonomy to be later incorporated 
straight to the Roman Empire. Other provinces that partially overlapped with current Austrian 
territory were Raetia and Pannonia. The Danube provided a natural border from Germanic 
tribes of Marcomanni and Quadi. On that border a Roman fortification Castrum Vindobona 
was erected in the II century A.D, which was the foundation for the current Austrian capital – 
Vienna. Other important settlement from that period is Iuvavum, which later became 
Salzburg. In the late III century constant invasions from the Germanic tribe of Alemanni 
ravaged the province which loosened its connection to Rome. It was one of the first provinces 
to part from the Roman Empire when the invasion of the Huns and the period of Great 
Migration started. The political vacuum was filled in by various tribes who fought over the 
dominance of the region. The Langobardi were forced out to Italy in late VI century by 
invading Bavarians and Slavic tribes. Remains of Alemanni held to the westmost part of 
Austria. The Bavarians were dependent on the Franks and the Slavs were dependent on the 
Avars but both groups managed to became independed by the end of the VII century. A Slavic 
tribe of Karantani formed a principality in Eastern Alps, possibly giving the name to the later 
land of Carinthia207. While there were some remains of Christianity from the antique times the 
VII century saw missions sent by the Bavarian dukes, which led to establishement of the 
church in Salzburg. Because of the Avar threat the Slavs placed themselves under the 
protection of Bavarians, which lead to the spread of Bavarian missionaries. This political 
configuration did not last long as at the end of the VIII century Charlemagne firstly destroyed 
the independent rule of Bavarian dukes only to follow with the destruction of remains of 
Avars in 796 A.D. Under the Karolingian influence the terriotory was named the Avar March 
later renamed the Pannonian March and then the Southern March (marchia Austriae in Latin). 
The time was marked by increased Frankish and Barvarian settlement, especially in the 
territotiries of Styria and Caritnthia. The successful Magyar invasions were stopped by the 
decisev battle of Lechfeld in 955. In 976 Leopold Babenberg became the ruler (margrave) in 
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the lands reclaimed from the Magyars and expanded the possesions to Carniola (modern day 
Slovenia) and Styria. The same year Carinthia became an independent duchy within the Holy 
Roman Empire.  
In 996 in a letter from the Emperor Otto III to the Bishop of Freising the first ever 
recorded German name of Austria was written. [The regione vulgari vocabulo Ostarrichi 
(region called Ostarrichi in the common tongue) meant only a small part of land of what is 
now Lower Austria. There is some confusion because the Latin name Austria comes from the 
name of the southern direction and the German words come from the name of the eastern 
direction, nevertheless both terms Österreich and Austria are used till this day despite their 
etymological contradictions.  
The wars between the two dominant families of Wels and Hohenstaufen saw the 
Babenbergs on the side of the latter. In 1156 the emperor Frederick I Barbarossa in the treaty 
of Regensburg divided the lands to achieve peace.  Bavaria was given to the Henry III of the 
Welfs but the Babenbergs, as a matter of compromise, became sovereign rulers in Austria 
(here meaning Lower Austria) and their duties towards the Empire were reduced. The lands 
became a fief of the Bababenbergs and were elevated to the status of duchy.  All of the 
privileges were confirmed in the imperial document called Privilegium Minus. The 
Babenbergs continued their expansion with the inclusion of Styria in 1192 and some gains in 
Carniola. The consolidation of the lands through development of infrastructure and intense 
settlement was put to halt when the last Babenberg Frederic the Warlike was killed in a battle 
with the Hungarians in 1246 leaving no male heirs208. The fight for the Babenberg domain 
first saw victories of the king of Bohemia Otokar II of the house of Premysl. His advances 
were halted in the decisive battle of Dürnkrut in 1278 where he was killed by the army of his 
most prominent opponent Rudolf I Habsburg. Rudolf himself was coming from Swabia but 
through Austria the new Habsburg dynasty became one of the most influencial not only in the 
Holy Roman Empire but in all of Europe. The Empire was transformed into a quasi-
hereditary monarchy under Habsburg leadership. Although the emperor was elected and not 
determined by hereditary succession, the Habsburgs ruled the empire all but continuously 
between 1438 and 1806. Austria changed from periphery to core; Vienna turned into the 
imperial residence and a preeminent center of German cultural and political life. The 
                                                          




intellectual and administrative elite from many German territories flocked to Vienna in the 
service of the emperor and his cours: Austria had become the leading German state209.  
The Habsburgs expanded their territory in 1335 Carinthia and Carniola as well as Tirol 
in 1363. During the reign of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles IV who chose to develop 
Prague the duke of Austria Rudolf IV the Founder started the construction of a gothic 
cathedral of St. Stephen and founded the University of Vienna in 1365. It was Rudolf who 
forged a fake document called Privilegium Maius that was supposed to elevate Austria from 
duchy to Archduchy. While the document was regarded as fake by Charles the IV it took a 
hundred years for the Privilegium Maius to be used as claim for the Habsburgs to be elevated 
to the title of Archduke. It was Frederic III who became the Holy Roman Emperor and used 
his position to strengthen the Habsburg family both within the Austrian hereditary lands and 
in the Empire itself. It was also Frederic who had claims to the Hungarian lands which later 
allowed the Habsburgs to inherit the lands. Later territorial aqusitions included the city of 
Trieste and parts of Arlberg. In 1395 the Austrian lands were divived into three sections: of 
Niederösterreich (modern Lower and Upper Austria), Innerösterreich (Steiermark, Kärnten, 
Carniola) and Oberösterreich (Tirol and Arlberg). Maximilian Habsburg was another ruler to 
extend the influence of the Habsburgs through tactical marriages that gave the family 
hereditary rights in Spain. The saying Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube – 'Let others 
wage war: thou, happy Austria, marry came into full fruition in the XVI century210.  The 
sudden deaths of the Jagiellon rulers of Hugary and the Czech lands, as well as the end of the 
male line in Spain allowed the famous Emperor Charles the V to inherit lands that created a 
true empire on which the sun never sets. Through the geographic discoveries of the new world 
the Habsburgs gained control of Central Europe, Spain, south Italy, the Netherlands and huge 
parts of South and Central Americas. The Habsburg dynasty was later divided into the 
Spanish and Austrian lines. Through the dynastic expansion, the Germanic inhabitants of 
Eastern Alps became not only a vital part of the Holy Roman Empire but also a part of a new 
multi-ethnic and multi-lingual empire (or even a multi-national empire if one chooses to place 
the existence of nations in the XVI century). In a paradoxical way the strength of the 
Austrian-German population in this situation came from the connection to the Holy Roman 
Empire, and the strength of the Austrian dynasty in the Holy Roman Empire came from their 
gains in non-germanic lands like Bohemia and parts of Hungary. 
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It was through this expansion that put Austria in direct contact with the expanding 
Ottoman Empire of the Turks. In 1529 the Ottoman army besieged Vienna, albeit without 
success. In 1527 new central organs of the ruling dynasty‟s court were created – the 
Hofkanzlei (chancellery) Hofkammer (treasury) the Hofrat (council) leading to a step-by step 
centralisation of the state administration. The other conflict that defined the times was a 
religious one. The onset of Protestantism saw the growing influence of Lutherans, Calvinists 
and Anabaptists in the Austrian lands but it turned out that the Habsburgs became the 
champions of counter-reformation and managed to recatholicisize a majority of Austrian 
lands. Not without a cost. The Czech lands were devastated by the Thirty-Years War and the 
religious conflict gave rise to a northern protestant German state – Prussia. The devastation of 
the Czech lands created a vacuum that was filled in by politics of spreading Catholicism, a 
first attempt of creating a unifying culture which resulted in the creation of a myriad of 
baroque architectural masterpieces across the domain of the Habsburgs. At the same time the 
aftermath of the Thirty Years War – the peace of Westphalia changed the Holy Roman 
Empire into a loose association of states, which gained more sovereignty within the Empire.  
The last great Ottoman push into the European territory ended with the siege of 
Vienna in 1683, where the Turkish army was soundly defeated by a coalition army led by the 
Polish king John III Sobieski. The formation of the Holy League two years later started the 
Habsburg expansion into the Balkans. Austria became one of the great European powers and 
was drawn into a series of conflicts like the war of the Spanish, Austrian and Polish 
succession in the XVIII century. Another set of conflicts known as the three Silesian wars saw 
Austria defeated three times by the Prussian king Frederic the Great. The Silesian wars were 
the first signs of a growing Austro-Prussian conflict that was to be resolved only a hundred 
years later. By the acquisition of Silesia, a wealthy province, Prussia became one of the 
European great powers and extended its influence over the whole German states. Another 
geopolitical development of the Silesian wars was the fact that now it was Prussia that was 
more geographically connected to other German lands and Austria‟s focal points started to 
move outside of the German speaking realm.  
The second half of the XVIII century brought important reforms to the construction 
and functioning of the Austrian state. The two reformist rulers were Maria Theresa and her 
son Joseph II. The incessant warring of the Habsburgs on many fronts left the treasury in poor 
condition. This was especially true after the Seven Year‟s War. The reforms created a 
customs union consisting of the majority of Habsburg lands in order to promote the 
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development of trade. The traditional social estate structures were undermined by limiting the 
serfdom duties of the peasant population towards the landowners. But probably the most 
important improvement of Maria Theresa‟s reforms was the creation of a new school system 
that was compulsory and included the peasants. The creation of a codified legal system in the 
form of Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana of the year 1768 also deserves a mention. The 
reforms were continued by Maria Theresa‟s son Joseph II who further limited the serfdom of 
the peasants. He is mostly known for the expansion of state control over religious institutions, 
liquidation of monasteries and using the acquired church funds to expand the state school 
system. The religious reforms were also followed by the Patent of Toleration that allowed 
Protestants and Jews to be treated equally by law as the Catholics. In 1784 an important and 
yet overlooked change took place – German replaced Latin as the formal language of the 
institutions of the Habsburg domain. That included also lands that did not have a German 
speaking population.  
The XIX century was the scene of a slaw downfall of the Austrian status from a 
subject to object of history. The flames of the French revolution spread ideas of national 
revival that had a very minor response from the Austrians but a very strong one from 
Germans211. In 1804 Francis II Habsburg named himself the Emperor of Austria under the 
name Francis I. This decision was the answer to the ever growing threat of Napoleonic 
France, and in fact Francis‟ move predicted the fall of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 that 
was dissolved by Napoleon. Francis II got stripped of his imperial title and had to settle only 
with the smaller Austrian empire. Austria during that time was almost constantly at war and 
lost almost all of them, which led to the diminishing of the country‟s importance as well as 
was tied to territorial losses. The turmoil of the Napoleonic wars brought not only destruction 
of old political entities but also new ideas of nations and sovereignty. Even Austria was not 
free from the romantic wave of patriotic feelings. It was at that time that the patriotic hymn 
Österreich über Alles was written by Henrich Collin in 1809. A year before that the historian 
Josef Freiherr von Hormayr founded a journal that was to promote patriotic feelings. The 
problem was that Hormayr focused on the triumphs and heroes of the Empire and the dynasty. 
That was not enough to spark a national feeling. Despite the famous call of the diplomat 
Count Johann Philipp Stadion – Wir haben us als Nation konstituiert! (We have made 
ourselves into a nation), there was little to none response. In 1813 Emperor Francis made sure 
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to replace the words nation and fatherland with emperor from the military oath212. The 
Austrian idea was limited solely to the dynasty and national allegiance could only mean one 
thing – allegiance to the Habsburgs. 
 The eventual downfall of Napoleon, the Emperor of the French only further halted 
those new “national” developments. The Congress of Vienna was still held by the 
representatives of the ancient regime and not it were the dynastic powers of Europe making 
all the political choices. In one of the Congresses‟ decisions was the replacement of the 
deceased Holy Roman Empire by the loosely formed German Confederation in which it was 
Austria that had the leading role. Both Prussia and Austria were states that had territories with 
non-German populations that were not part of the Confederation. In 1834 Prussia formed a 
trade union of the German lands (Zollverein) that excluded Austria. The fact is that Austria‟s 
disinterest in the Zollverein was enhanced by the existence of Austria‟s own trade union and 
by some industry protection laws. It was a great example of institutional factors that pulled 
Austria away from the unification of Germany.  
Another limitation showed itself during the Spring of Nations. The Frankfurt 
Parliament of 1848 discussed the issue of a national unification of Germany that was based on 
ethnic borders. The Austrians did not want to have their lands divided into a German and non-
German parts. At the same time deputies of other German states were in favour of creating a 
German national state without the inclusion of other ethnic, linguistic and national groups. 
The Frankfurt Parliament turned to Prussia. Even if the events of the March Revolution did 
not produce any significant political outcomes – it was a symbol of Austria‟s slow demise in 
the German speaking realm. In fact it was Prussia that unified Germany. The tensions 
between the two states erupted in open war in 1866. After a swift defeat at Köninggrätz, the 
short seven-week conflict led to the establishment of unified Germany under Prussia and the 
rejection of Austria. Those events eventually broke the Austrian connection to the German 
speaking lands it had with the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation. The 
German speaking population of the Habsburg Empire became the most privileged minority in 
the state, but a minority nonetheless. By 1914 the Austrian-Germans were overrepresented in 
the administration of the western part of the Empire. They numbered only around 30% of the 
population, but 76% of civil servants, 56% in the ministries that coordinated the Dual 
Monarchy, 81% in the Finance ministry and 65% in the Foreign Ministry, which was 
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supposed to be more open to people of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds213. Austro-
Germans also had a privileged economic situation and held to at least 67% of capital214. The 
privileged situation was also clear in the way electoral system was devised.  For instance in 
the 1907 elections the German-speaking parties needed statistically 9575 votes to get one 
mandate in the parliament while the Poles 11082 votes and the Ruthenians 22785 votes etc215. 
The wound inflicted to Austria in 1866 proved to be fatal, as with the weakening of 
the Austrian state and its German elites – other national groups wanted more rights for 
themselves which led to the creation of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. A lost war 
should have provoked an anti-Prussian sentiment but because of the exceptionally good 
conduct of the Prussian troops that occupied Vienna for two months won favour with the 
Austrian middle and lower classes. In fact before 1866 anti-Prussian sentiment was prevalent 
in the Austrian society and after it turned into a favour. This was especially true during the 
Prusso-French war of 1870 when Austrian-Germans were cheering for Prussian victory216. 
The Habsburg monarchy needed more funds because of war expenditures which led to 
liberalisation of social life and democratisation. After the brief formation of the Reichstag in 
1848 and 1849 the Imperial Council (Reichsrat) was founded in 1861 and served as 
parliament with the House of Lords (Herrenhaus) and House of Deputies 
(Abgeordnetenhaus). While the deputies‟ constituencies were rooted in traditional divisions of 
lands the practice showed national (ethno-linguistic) divisions and factions in the Parliament. 
The Germans usually occupied one third of the seats217. Obviously there were also political 
divisions in the parliament along the left-right dichotomy218. The Socialist party was founded 
in 1889, then named Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs – SDAPÖ. In 1934 it 
changed the name to Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ and in 1991 to 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich. The socialists usually held a pan-German belief and 
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advocated unification with Germany. In 1891 the conservatives created a party called the 
Christlichsoziale Partei, which existed till 1934 and which was the precursor of the 1945 
Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). The conservatives were the group that spurred Austrian 
nationalism. However the idea was flawed as they did not consider Austrians to be a separate 
nation and they also advocated for unification with Germany. The only difference with the 
socialists was the idea that Austria should become a quasi-sovereign federal state of Germany 
and Austrians should retain their privileges, which they had in the Empire219. Those two 
political movements are one of the oldest and despite the persecution in the years 1938-1945 
one of the longest, continuously functioning parties in Europe.  
After the creation of Germany the leftover German population of Austria became 
prone to strong German nationalism. One of the vital points of that movement was further 
unification with the newly established Germany. This was true for both the monarchical 
period and prevailed to the establishment of the First Austrian Republic in 1918. It is 
important to point out that it were the 210 German deputies to the Reichsrat who assembled 
on the 21st of October 1918 and laid claim to create a new state of German-Austria (Republik 
Deutschösterreich), which was supposed to include all German-speaking lands of the former 
Empire like the Sudeten (which became part of Czechoslovakia).  The abdication of the last 
Habsburg Charles I on the 11th of November paved the way to the country declaring a 
Republic the next day, with Karl Renner as a provisional chancellor in charge220. The 
beginning of the provisional constitution of the short-lived Republic stated: 
 
 Article 1 
German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authority is derived from the 
people.  
Article 2 
German-Austria is a constituent part of the German Republic. Particular statutes 
determine the participation of German-Austria with the legislature and the administration of 
the German Republic as well as the extension of German laws and institutions into German-
                                                          






Despite the fact that Austria and Germany could not be unified, either because of the 
existence of two different dynasties (Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs) or by the decision of the 
Allied Powers after World War I, Karl Renner in 1920 still decided to write the anthem of the 
already non-existent German-Austrian Republic. The melody was created by Renner‟s 
acquaintance Wilhelm Kienzl. 
1. Deutschösterreich, du herrliches 
Land, wir lieben dich! 
Hoch von der Alm unterm Gletscherdom 
Stürzen die Wasser zum Donaustrom, 
Tränken im Hochland Hirten und Lämmer, 
Treiben am Absturz Mühlen und Hämmer, 
Grüßen viel Dörfer, viel Städte und ziehn  
Jauchzend zum Ziel, unserm einzigen Wien! 
Du herrliches Land, unser Heimatland, 
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.  
1. German-Austria, thou art 
wonderful, we love thee! 
High from the Alps' dome-like glaciers 
Waters rush to the Danube 
Where they water lambs and shepherds in the 
highlands, 
Drive mills and hammers at hillslopes and 
Greet many villages and towns, and run 
Joyously towards their destiny, our unique 
Vienna! 
Thou'rt a wonderful land, our native land, 
We love and protect thee.  
2. Deutschösterreich, du tüchtiges 
Volk, wir lieben dich! 
Hart ist dein Boden und karg dein Brot, 
Stark doch macht dich und klug die Not. 
Seelen, die gleich wie Berge beständig, 
Sinne, die gleich wie Wasser lebendig, 
Herzen so sonnig, mitteilsamer Gunst, 
Schaffen sich selber ihr Glück, ihre Kunst. 
Du tüchtiges Volk, unser Muttervolk, 
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.  
2. German-Austria, thy people is 
brave, we love thee! 
Thy soil is hard and meagre thy bread, 
But hardship makes thee strong and bright. 
Souls that are firm like mountains, 
Minds that are agile like water, 
Hearts so radiant, full of benevolence 
Create their own happiness and art. 
Thou brave people, our native people, 
We love and protect thee.  
3. Deutschösterreich, du treusinnig 
Volk, wir lieben dich! 
Dienende Treu schuf dir Not und Reu, 
Sei uns in Freiheit dir selber treu! 
Gibt es ein Schlachtfeld rings in den Reichen, 
Wo deiner Söhne Knochen nicht bleichen? 
Endlich brachst du die Ketten entzwei, 
Diene dir selber, sei dein! Sei frei! 
Du treusinnig Volk, unser Duldervolk, 
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.  
3. German-Austria, thy people is 
faithful, we love thee! 
Thy serving loyalty has brought you misery 
and remorse, 
Be now, in freedom, loyal to thyself! 
Is there a battlefield in our neighbouring 
countries 
Where the bones of thy sons do not bleach? 
Finally, thou hast broken thy chains, 
Serve thyself, only thyself! Be free! 
Thou faithful people, our bearing people, 
We love and protect thee.  
4. Deutschösterreich, du 4. German-Austria, federation of 
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Bergländerbund, wir lieben dich! 
Frei durch die Tat und vereint durch Wahl, 
Eins durch Geschick und durch Blut zumal. 
Einig auf ewig, Ostalpenlande! 
Treu unserm Volkstum, treu dem Verbande! 
Friede dem Freund, doch dem Feinde, der 
droht,  
Wehrhaften Trotz in Kampf und Not! 
Du Bergländerbund, unser Ostalpenbund, 
Wir lieben dich, wir schirmen dich.  
alpine lands, we love thee! 
Free through deed, united through election, 
One through fate and above all through 
blood. 
Forever united, countries in the eastern Alps! 
Loyal to our nation and loyal to the union! 
Peace to our friends but to all foes who 
menace us 
Defensive persistence in battle and misery! 
Federation of alpine lands, union of the 
eastern Alps, 
We love and protect thee222.  
 
 
The anthem never became validated officially it was used for official occasions. The 
first time it accompanied the ceremony of swearing in new army troops on July 15 1920 in 
Vienna. A possible explanation for this is the fact that the Allied powers forbade Austria not 
only to join Germany but to use the name German-Austria. Nevertheless the song was used on 
numerous state occasions and was in use at least till 1929223. Different compositions were 
discussed, including traditional melody of Haydn that later became the German national 
anthem but was rejected on the ground of being too grounded with the times of the monarchy. 
The new text stressed the importance of freedom and elections as well as the federal structure 
of the First Austrian Republic. The tensions between the conservatives and socialists 
prevented any melody and song to be chosen as a de iure anthem. That problem was resolved 
only in the 30‟ties with the ascent to power of the Christian democrats who reinstated the 
melody of Haydn with lyrics by Ottokar Kernstock. Because the melody was the same as the 
Deutschlandlied the public singing of the Austrian anthem always lead to confusion as people 
were singing different lyrics at the same time depending on their political views. The 
Kernstock anthem was valid during the Austro-fascist period till the Anschluss in 1938. Only 
after 1945 a new anthem was devised and a melody by Mozart replaced the old one composed 
by Haydn.  
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The dream of joining Germany was prevalent in the I Austrian Republic – the state 
that nobody wanted224. Every political party with the small exception of Habsburg royalists 
and communists had unification in Germany in its programmes. Even till 1921 local 
plebiscites were held and in all cases the population spoke in favour of unifying with 
Germany. Nothing exemplifies the need for unification with Germany than the existence of a 
Greater Germany People‟s Party (Großdeutsche Volkspartei) which amassed as much as 17% 
of the votes and being a part of right-winged governments within the coalition with the 
Christian-Democrats. Perhaps the best description of the popular mood of the time comes 
from the British Intelligence Department: We cannot exterminate the Austrian Germans; we 
cannot make them cease to feel Germans. They are bound to be somewhere. Nothing would be 
gained by compelling them to lead an existence separate from that of Germany. Such enforced 
separation would merely stimulate German nationalism, but could not prevent cooperation 
between the two branches nor their final reunion. Lastly, the inclusion of German Austria in 
Germany is not altogether disadvantageous from our point of view; it would restore the 
balance between the Catholic south and the Protestant north, and help to check Prussianism 
in Germany, even if both parties concerned wish it, has therefore be dismissed both on 
grounds of principle and expediency225. The thoughtfulness of this insight is surprising even 
for today‟s standards. Despite the British assessment, the French were very reluctant in 
strengthening Germany in any way and fiercely opposed the idea of unification.  
The I Austrian Republic suffered economically. Before 1918 the lands were 
interconnected with other parts of the Empire and after the end of the Great War they were 
Austria became a trunk of a tree with all its branches cut off. The country was sustained 
through substantial crediting from England and France but the coming of the Great 
Depression in 1929 only deepened Austria‟s economic problems. Aside from the internal 
problems and a growing conflict between conservatives and socialists a new destabilising 
factor appeared in 1933 in the form of the establishment of the Nazi Third Reich. Adolf Hitler 
pressured Austria politically and the Nazi party in Austria was gaining popularity, as well as 
the idea of the unification. At the same time the first signs of rejection of unification started to 
appear in the political elites of Austria. The socialists rejected the idea on the basis of 
animosity towards National-Socialism. In 1933 they wrote: If we want Austria to preserve its 
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independence from a fascist Germany, we do not desire this for the purpose of turning Austria 
lastingly from or against Germany, but for the purpose of letting Austria fulfil its mission for 
the whole German people. We want German-Austria to be a haven of refuge for German 
liberty, for German democracy, for the free development of German culture and literature, 
and especially for the German labour movement and German socialism, until the whole of 
Germany will be free again226. The socialist did not reject their traditional pan-germanist 
stance; they only did not want to be a part of a fascist state. Soon they saw themselves in one. 
The ruling Christian social party under Engelbert Dollfuss was forced by the Western Powers 
to reject joining the German customs union 1932 under the threat of the not receiving further 
loans. Finding himself more and more isolated Dollfuss turned to the Italian fascist dictator 
Benito Mussolini. Italy was to be the warrant of Austrian‟s independence and Austria in turn 
adopted the fascist model of the state. The Austro-fascist regime was introduced after a short 
four-day civil war that was won decisively by Dolfuss and his followers. The Corporate State 
of Austria (Ständestaat) was the last resort of defending Austria‟s limited sovereignty. The 
alliance with Mussolini proved to be farfetched and Dollfuss was assassinated in 1934.  Yet 
even the conservatives at the time felt that Austrian‟s were part of the German Kulturnation, 
they only tried to preserve their power within the framework of the Austrian state227. So 
despite the popular support for unification not everyone was happy when in March 1938 
German soldiers entered Austria. The annexation of Austria known under the German name 
Anschluss was accepted by the international community and was later legitimised by a 
plebiscite in which 99% of votes were cast in favour of unification. The region was renamed 
Ostmark, recalling one of the historical terms from the medieval times. The Austrian dream of 
unification would prove to become a nightmare soon enough. Or did it? Many Austrian-
Germans benefited from the Anschluss and made careers in the administration of the Third 
Reich. The Austrians also proved to be loyal soldiers and had the smallest desertion rates 
among all groups incorporated to the German army228. Austrians were also overrepresented in 
the higher positions of the Third Reich, especially the SS. Yet a substantial part of the 
                                                          
226 Österreichs staatliche Zukunft und die Sozialdemokratie, Arbeiter Zeitung, 13.05.1933, op.cit: Thatel P., The 
Ambivalence of Identity, West Lafayette 2000 p.71.  
227 Wodak R., p. 114. The ideology of the Corporate state was somewhat inconsequential. On the one hand the 
difference between catholic Austria and protestant Germany (or pagan Nazi Germany) was emphasised on the 
other hand regarded Austrians as cultural Germans. This paradoxical and ambivalent identity gave birth to the 
idea of Austria as better Germany. The term Österreich, das bessere Deutschland was later used in economic 
terms indicating higher standards of living in Austria in comparison to Germany. See also: Heiss G., Pan-
Germans, better Germans, Austrians: Austrian historian on national identity from the First to the Second 
Republic, [in:] German Studies Review 16, 1993, p. 421-422.  
228 Thaler P.,, The Ambivalence of Identity, West Lafayette 2000, p. 86-89.  
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Austrian population found itself on the rough edge of history. Aside from the Jewish 
population the groups targeted by the Nazi regime were the socialists, the Austro-fascists, and 
Catholics. The support for the war was high among the population but there was some meagre 
yet noticeable resistance. After the Anschluss around 200.000 former Austrian citizens 
emigrated and another 200.000 became victimised by the regime of which half was killed. Of 
100.000 Austrian Jews more than 65.000 perished in the Holocaust. Austria also suffered war 
losses totalling 250.000 killed in action and around 24.000 died due to the Allied bombings. 
The total number of deaths through terror policies and war is estimated at around 370.00 0.  
This number constitutes 5.56% of the prewar Austrian population (the Jewish casualties 
constitute around 30% of the population before the Anschluss). After the end of the II World 
War, Austria was re-established as a republic under joint occupation of USA, USSR, France 
and UK. The Allies remained in Austria till on 15th of May 1955 the so called State Treaty or 
the Treaty of Austrian Independence was signed. In fact the neutrality was stated later by the 
Austrian parliament on the 26th October 1955 when all the foreign troops left Austria.  Austria 
became a neutral state and all Allied troops withdrew from its borders. 26th October was 
chosen as a national celebration day and holiday for the II Austrian Republic. Austria 
managed to build a stable economic and political system in the following years with two 
major parties the Socialists (SPÖ) and the conservative People‟s Party (ÖVP) ruling either in 
the grand coalition or separately. In 1986 a scandal connected with the newly elected 
president Kurt Waldheim, who hid information about his service in the SS in the Balkans 
during the II World War, changed the discourse about the role of Austria in the war229. The 
alpine republic joined the European Union in 1995, forty years after becoming independent.  
 
The economic developments of Austria also need to be mentioned. The success of the Second 
Austrian Republic in the economic and social department is one of the reasons for the success 
of nation-building processes.  In 1951 George Hoffman named economic development of 
Austria as the basic perquisite for the survival of the independence of the country. Analysing 
the viability of the state through aspects like food supply, forest products, industries, raw 
material production, transportation and tourism are all factors that can contribute to the 
independence of Austria. He projects that Austria would be economically viable without US 
support in 1952. Hofmann also mentions one interesting fact: that the industrial output of 
                                                          
229 See more: Born H., Für die Richtigkeit Kurt Waldheim, Munich 1987, see also: Herzstein R., Waldhheim. The 
missing years, New York 1988. 
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Austria after the war was bigger than the output in 1937, even after the destruction caused by 
bombings and other military operations230. This is important because of the impact that 
industrialisation has on social structures and nation making. Austro-Hungary was fourth or 
fifth industrialised state in the world. The issue was that the majority of the industry was 
placed in the Czech lands or in the port areas of Trieste and Dalmatia. Only Styria as the only 
core Austrian land had seen some industrial activity. When the Empire fell almost all of the 
industry became part of different states. Only the investment in big industrial works during 
the Nazi era and the help from the Marshall Fund allowed the Austrian core lands to become 
modern and industrialised. The graph below shows the GDP growth in Austria. The growth of 
economy in the Second Austrian Republic was unprecedented and became one of the vital 
parts of the Austrian national identity – the growth, and the social policies that accompanied it 
became tools for national integration.  
 
 
                      Source: World Economics Data231 
 The political history of the Second Austrian Republic will be discussed in more 
detail in subchapter 2.3 as well as chapter 3 of this dissertation. Nevertheless a basic outline 
of the political history is necessary. Austrian democratic system was mandated by the Allied 
occupying forces, which allowed or did not allow certain parties to run in elections. With the 
                                                          
230 Hoffman G,. The Survival of an Independent Austria, [in:] Geographical Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 
1951), p. 606-621. 
231 https://www.worldeconomics.com/GrossDomesticProduct/Austria.gdp, Accessed: 01.10.2019.  
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failure of the Communist Party of Austria to secure any substantial vote the political system 
was established between two major parties: the conservative People‟s Party of Austria 
(Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP), the socialists (and later social-democrats)the socialist 
Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ). These two main parties dominated 
the political scene governing either in the so called grand coalition or separately. They were 
accompanied by the national-liberal „Third Camp” firstly the Union of Independents  
(Verband der Unabhenginen, VdU) which later transformed into the Freedom Party of Austria 
(Freiheti Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). It was not until the late 90ties when the liberal cam started 
to employ populist politics and break the duopoly of the two main actors on the Austrian 
political scene. The Austrian political system was based on consensus – which was most 
exemplified by the Proporzsystem – the system of proportionality. When one party was 
governing the positions in the administration were always distributed to include the other 
party as well. If one department in a ministry had a director from ÖVP than his or her vice-
director hat to be from SPÖ etc232. This system encouraged political participation and the 
party membership was unusually high in Austria. In the 60ties Austrian Parties had more 
members than its German counterparts. The table below presents the election results and 
turnout after 1945.  
 
Election year SPÖ KPÖ ÖVP VdU FPÖ Gre LiF BZÖ Turnout  
1945  44.6  5.4  49.8  -  -  -  -  -  94.0  
1949  38.7  5.1  44.0  11.7  -  -  -  -  96.8  
1953  42.1  5.3  41.3  11.0  -  -  -  -  95.8  
1956  43.0  4.4  46.0  -  6.5  -  -  -  95.3  
1959  44.8  3.3  44.2  -  7.7  -  -  -  94.2  
1962  44.0  3.0  45.4  -  7.0  -  -  -  93.8  
1966  42.6  0.4  48.3  -  5.4  -  -  -  93.8  
                                                          
232 This was most evident in the state controlled media where always two journalists from different parties or 
opposing views had to be present.  
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1970  48.4  1.0  44.7  -  5.5  -  -  -  91.8  
1971  50.0  1.4  43.1  -  5.5  -  -  -  92.4  
1975  50.4  1.2  42.9  -  5.4  -  -  -  92.9  
1979  51.0  1.0  41.9  -  6.1  -  -  -  92.2  
1983  47.6  0.7  43.2  -  5.0  -  -  -  92.6  
1986  43.1  0.7  41.3  -  9.7  4.8  -  -  90.5  
1990  42.8  0.5  32.1  -  16.6  4.8  -  -  86.1  
1994  34.9  0.3  27.7  -  22.5  7.3  6.0  -  81.9  
1995  38.1  0.3  28.3  -  21.9  4.8  5.5  -  86.0  
1999  33.2  0.5  26.9  -  26.9  7.4  3.6  -  80.4  
2002  36.5  0.6  42.3  -  10.0  9.5  1.0  -  84.3  
2006  35.3  1.0  34.3  -  11.0  11.1  -  4.1  78.5  
2008  29.3  0.8  26.0  -  17.5  10.4  2.1  10.7  78.8  
2013  26.8  1.0  24.0  -  20.5  12.4  -  3.5  74.9  
2017  26.9  0.8  31.5  -  26.0  3.9  -  -  80.0 
Source: Bundesministerium, Inneres233 
The political history of the Second Austrian Republic will be discussed in more detail 
in subchapter 2.3 as well as chapter 3 of this dissertation. Nevertheless a basic outline of the 
political history is necessary. Austrian democratic system was mandated by the Allied 
occupying forces, which allowed or did not allow certain parties to run in elections. With the 
failure of the Communist Party of Austria to secure any substantial vote the political system 
was established between two major parties: the conservative People‟s Party of Austria 
(Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP), the socialists (and later social-democrats)the socialist 
Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ). These two main parties dominated 
                                                          
233 All election results are available on the webpage of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior: 
https://bmi.gv.at/412/Nationalratswahlen/Historischer_Rueckblick.aspx, Accessed on 01.10.2019. 
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the political scene governing either in the so called grand coalition or separately. They were 
accompanied by the national-liberal „Third Camp” firstly the Union of Independents  
(Verband der Unabhenginen, VdU) which later transformed into the Freedom Party of Austria 
(Freiheti Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). It was not until the late 90ties when the liberal cam started 
to employ populist politics and break the duopoly of the two main actors on the Austrian 
political scene. The Austrian political system was based on consensus – which was most 
exemplified by the Proporzsystem – the system of proportionality. When one party was 
governing the positions in the administration were always distributed to include the other 
party as well. If one department in a ministry had a director from ÖVP than his or her vice-
director hat to be from SPÖ etc234. This system encouraged political participation and the 
party membership was unusually high in Austria. In the 60ties Austrian Parties had more 
members than its German counterparts. 
Before examining the historiography of the German nation the era since 1945 has to be 
examined in greater detail with the special focus on the idea of Austria as the first victim of 
Germany as well as the transitional justice processes that happened in the II Austrian 
Republic. 
 
2.3 Austrian case of transitional justice 
The downfall of the Third Reich created a new situation in the world. The national 
socialists responsible for barbaric atrocities were put to trial in Nurnberg and were accused of 
crimes against humanity such as genocide on the basis of legal terms that did not exist prior to 
those events. The Nurnberg trials and the policy pursued by the Allied forces in Germany set 
an example the first case of implementing what would later be known as transitional justice. 
Since then a number of countries that transitioned from an authoritarian system or dictatorship 
implemented to a various degree a policy of transitional justice. As Juan Mendez puts it: the 
pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the 
fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law 
and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human person. Yet it is also one of the 
hardest choices that any democracy has to make, if only because the effort to restore truth 
and justice where denial and impunity have reigned is frequently attacked as destabilizing 
                                                          
234 This was most evident in the state controlled media where always two journalists from different parties or 
opposing views had to be present.  
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and vindictive235. In this short passage Mendez points out several issues that arise when 
spoken about transitional justice. The first one would be the fact that this term is used almost 
exclusively to describe the process of democratization and establishment of the rule of law.  
One could argue that each regime change comes with a specific transitional justice. 
Obviously when speaking about a transition from democracy to an autocratic system it is hard 
to state that the establishment of a new justice system would have anything in common with 
justice. Nevertheless some mechanisms of transition could be similar. Since the focus of 
researchers‟ lies solely on the transitions to democratic systems it would be an interesting 
inquiry to launch a comparative study and broaden the young discipline of transitional justice 
research.  
The second issue raised by Mendez is the idea that transitional justice that happens as a result 
of a transformation into democracy has to be based on the rule of law and respect for human 
dignity and worth. This description however presents an ideal type of transitional justice and 
many processes that are included in it do not seem to do enough of justice. How so?  
Democracy is a political system that is formed by compromise and it is relatively inclusive, 
especially when compared with other regimes. Moreover it claims moral superiority over the 
past and presents itself as progress, as something better. Therefore the transitional justice 
implemented in a newly formed democratic regime serves as a founding myth of the 
establishment of the rule of law. At least in theory that is how it‟s supposed to be. In this 
chapter I would like to investigate the case of transitional justice in Austria which shows how 
the democratic system actually prevents justice from being carried out in favour of democratic 
inclusion.  
The biggest problem with transitional justice in democratic systems is that democracy 
needs to be inclusive. Victims need to live among their former perpetrators and the 
democratic logic treats them the same: as citizens who have equal rights. While this is an 
obvious groundwork of democracy it does infringe a common sense of justice. 
Poland saw two historical democracies: the nobles‟ democracy (demokracja szlachecka) and 
people‟s democracy (demokracja ludowa) in both cases the adjectives conveniently placed 
before the term democracy indicated that those systems were not in fact true democracies. In 
the first case of demokracja szlachecka it was only the nobility that possessed rights, in the 
second one it was a communist dictatorship. The so called “adjective democracy” is now a 
term to describe a democracy at a fault, an imperfect system. One could argue the same about 
                                                          
235 Mendez J, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, London 1997, p. 1-23. 
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justice. Transitional justice is actually an “adjective justice”. While aiming to do justice in 
times of transition it is quite the opposite: a compromise between the common need for 
integrity, law and punishment of crimes and between the democratic need to create a 
homogenous group of citizens. If the transitional justice would be too harsh on the perpetrator 
group their opposition could be too strong and therefore this process would prevent them from 
being included into the newly forming democratic regime. A good example of this would be 
the tough negotiations between the government of Columbia and the communist guerrilla 
FARC. Only after a broad amnesty was promised, FARC laid their arms in 2017. If the 
transitional justice would be too soft then it would cause resentment in the victims, as well as, 
the general public, which would find the new regime as flawed and would not be as loyal to 
the new state. Here I would provide the example of Poland where the politics of the “thick 
line” and a very soft approach towards former communist perpetrators caused a rise of radical 
right-winged movements236. Transitional justice emerged with the fall of the Third Reich or as 
it is called Nazi Germany. But Germany was not the only Nazi state. The case of the smaller 
German counterpart Austria is very often overlooked. More interestingly all the processes of 
transitional justice while being structurally similar to the bigger German example were not 
exactly the same and created different results. In order to fully describe the Austrian case it is 
necessary first to establish how implementation and execution of transitional justice looks like 
and then describe the historical process of transitional justice appliance in Austria.  
The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) names four most important 
ways or variations of transitional justice: 
 Criminal prosecutions for at least the most responsible for the most 
serious crimes 
 “Truth-seeking” (or fact-finding) processes into human rights violations 
by non-judicial bodies. These can be varied but often look not only at events, but their 
causes and impacts. 
 Reparations for human rights violations taking a variety of forms: 
individual, collective, material and symbolic 
                                                          
236 Of course this was not the only reason of the rise of radical right in Poland.  Some of those factors were 
economical. Nevertheless the right-winged extremists in Poland remain radically anti-communist. Similarly the 




 Reform of laws and institutions including the police, judiciary, military 
and military intelligence237 
I will use the framework of ICTJ in order to describe the Austrian case but in reverse 
order so the first topic addressed would be the reform. Before that however some historical 
background needs to be emphasised. The major difference between the post-war treatment of 
Austria and Germany was the fact that the major Allied forces in 1943 in Moscow declared 
Austria as the first victim of the Hitlerite aggression. The Moscow Declaration goes as 
follows: 
"The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America 
are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression, shall be 
liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by 
Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound 
by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-
established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian 
people themselves, as well as those neighbouring states which will be faced with similar 
problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting 
peace. Austria is reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for 
participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement 
account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation."238 
The declaration is crucial to understanding the politics in Austria in the years 1945-
1955. It is a contradictory document in itself. On the first hand it seems to be balanced and 
reasonable. It states that Austria is the first victim of Nazi Germany but does not forget the 
crimes committed by Austrians in the machinery of the Third Reich. But politically its focus 
is placed rather on the victimhood than being the perpetration which had a significant impact 
on the processes of transitional justice in Austria.  
Similarly to Germany Austria was divided into four occupation zones: Soviet, 
American, British and French. The capital city of Vienna suffered a similar fate with its 
immediate centre being used as an international zone for all Allied forces. Austria however 
did not suffer the fate of divide Germany though thanks to its geopolitical location. Unlike its 
                                                          
237 What is Transitional Justice?, https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice, Access: 16.05.2019. 
238 The full text of the Moscow Declaration can be found here: 
Moscow Declaration, October 1943, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html, Access: 16.05.2019.  
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Germany, the geography of Austria and Vienna prevented a partition in the German fashion. 
The situation of two German states did not replicate itself in the Austrian case. This situation 
developed in such a way as a result of the uncertain strategic planning of the Allied forces. 
Although the Moscow Declaration allowed Austria to form an independent state, the Allies 
behind the scenes held significant doubts about the viability of Austria as a separate entity. 
Austria's seeming inability to resist Hitler in 1938 validated the opinion that the post-
Versailles Treaty Austrian state was too small to keep out aggressors, but whose strategic 
location invited other powers to interfere in Austrian politics. Before the Yalta agreement 
Soviet and British/American influences were negotiated unofficially the list of countries did 
not contain Austria that received special treatment through the Moscow Declaration. It is clear 
that the Soviet foreign policy with regards to Austria was to keep their options open in the 
post-war order; the British on the other hand still occupied the mental state of the “Great 
game” and prepared various solutions for Austria. One of those was an attempt to re-establish 
something to fill in the void that appeared after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
British plans named it a Danubian confederacy. Another plan proposed a political union with 
Bavaria. Such development would strengthen Austria, weaken Germany and prevent a 
resurgence of Prussian militarism. The problem of German strength happened to be solved in 
a different manner: a division of the country in two uneven halves. The reality of the Cold war 
undermined the ambitious British plans. Not to mention the fact that the Soviets would never 
agree on giving up their influence in Central Europe for a stronger Austria. . The Soviet press 
denounced a confederation as a resurrection of the Habsburgs and one that unjustly rewarded 
Austria at the expense of the other victims of Nazi aggression. That does not mean that a 
scenario of divided Austria was also not discussed. Surprisingly the ones who proposed it 
were the Americans. The first years of the occupation made Austria into one of the important 
sites for the early Cold War, the Truman administration considered and proposed an East-
West division of Austria in 1947, but if fell in disfavour with the Soviets. This situation was a 
result of the electoral failures of the Austrian Communist Party. Not to mention the rather 
unfavourable attitude of the general Austrian population towards the Soviet occupying force. 
The Soviet army when liberating Austria from the Nazis committed numerous rapes and the 
looting of industry and infrastructure went beyond any reasonable limits in the Soviet 
occupation zone. The fear in Moscow was that settling the Austrian question on terms 
proposed by the West would only benefit the West and undercut Soviet security. The result 
was a stalemate in Austria until the negotiations for the State Treaty began after Stalin's death.  
The passing of the communist dictator was a game changer in the USSR, in the Ostblock and 
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also in Austria. The alpine republic was to be used as a bargaining chip in order to achieve 
détente with the West.  Renegotiation of the occupation was a huge opportunity to steer the 
USSR into a new direction in the Soviet relationship in Europe. Death of Stalin opened new 
diplomatic possibilities on of them being a complete neutralisation of Germany. For the 
Soviets such move would be beneficial. Not only they would gain a buffer zone between them 
and the West but also demilitarize a significant part of Europe. Austria had a potential to serve 
as a model for the bigger German solution. Moreover ending the occupation in Austria had 
other positive results for the Soviets. First of all they would get rid of cumbersome costs of 
the occupation. When the time of looting, which was limited to the immediate post-war time, 
finished then the USSR had to devote more and more resources to the occupation of Austria. 
At the same time Austria becoming neutral created geopolitical advantages. Not only would 
the NATO‟s forces retreat behind the easily defensible line of the Alps but creating a neutral 
Austria would disrupt transportation lines between to big NATO states: Germany and Italy. In 
case of open conflict retaking Vienna would be rather easy. The distance between the 
Austrian capital and Bratislava is a mere 40 kilometres of flatlands. The West would have to 
force their troops through the inaccessible Alps. As negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty 
began, the Soviets staked out a basic position that Austria was to not seek a military alliance 
with an outside power and explicitly forbid any unification with Germany. The geopolitics of 
central Europe created a diplomatic win-win situation for everybody including Austria and 
created the only scenario when the Soviet army retreated from once occupied territory.  
In 1955 the Allied forces and Austria signed the so called State Treaty. Austria 
became a neutral state and all of the occupying armies retreated. This move was a gamble for 
both East and West. It has to be said that Austrian diplomacy really managed to achieve as 
much as possible in that peculiar situation. What is most important for these considerations is 
the last moment of negotiation of the State Treaty. The Austrian gamble is best described by 
the journalist Hella Pick: On 14th of May 1955, the four Foreign Ministers, Dulles, Molotov, 
Pinay and Macmillan assembled in Vienna. Not since the Potsdam Conference in 1945 had 
the four wartime Allies found themselves in complete agreement over a major issue. They 
were unanimous in approving the Treaty text. By the end of October all their forces would 
have gone from Austrian soil. Only then would the Austrian parliament declare Austria‘s 
permanent neutrality. The four ministers beamed politely and nodded: next morning they 
would sign the Austrian State Treaty. Then it was the turn of the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Leopold Figl, to drop a potentially wrecking bombshell. He had one more request, that the 
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preamble to the Treaty repeated the 1943 Moscow Declaration‘s formula that Austria was 
Hitler‘s first victim, but had to bear its share of responsibility for its participation in the war 
on Hitler‘s side. Austria wanted this clause removed from the State Treaty. Figl argued that it 
would be unfair to burden Austria with guilt about past behaviour at the very moment of its 
relaunch as an independent nation. Austria‘s internal and external development would be 
handicapped by such a moral slur. With little pause for reflection, all four ministers agreed to 
Austria‘s request239. Of course the Austrians assumed that the most difficult partner to 
convince would be the Soviet representative – Molotov. USSR has always used the 
aforementioned part of the Moscow Declaration as leverage, a mean to extract economic 
tributes from Austria. At the time however bigger things were at stake. The State Treaty was 
to be presented by all sides as a great achievement of détente. Everything was already 
prepared including the text of the Treaty. The timing of the Austrian diplomacy was perfect. 
No one would squabble over one short passage in one short paragraph when such a big 
success was at stake. In this way Austria managed to avoid its responsibility for war atrocities 
for three decades. It is essential that this was allowed by the Allies and that they allowed this 
situation to happen. Firstly In the Moscow Declaration leaving an open door for Austria, and 
secondly during the State Treaty negotiations which were the moment to use the passage out 
of responsibilities. This created a nationwide amnesia that was supposed to last for thirty 
years till the so called “horrid year 1986”. In that fatal year two important political events 
happened in the alpine republic. The first, less significant, one was the rise of Jörg Haider, 
who took the leader position in the far right-winged party FPÖ. This development happened 
to be a turning point for the radical right in Austria which rose form a mere 5% in popularity 
to almost 30%. The second event was of much bigger importance and changed the political 
memory of Austrians. The Waldheim affair marked a turning point in the Second Republic. In 
1986, the former General Secretary to the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, ran as a candidate 
for the office of the President of the Austrian Federal Republic. Shortly after winning the 
election information came out that he was a part of a unit that committed crimes against 
humanity in the Greek city of Saloniki by deporting the entire Jewish population. He was also 
involved in war crimes in the Balkans. The diplomatic response was strong and Waldheim 
became persona non grata in almost every country in the world. Austria had to confront its 
past and abandon the role of being solely a victim. This development had also an impact on 
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acknowledging at least some basic responsibility for the atrocities committed during World 
War II.  
The rule of law was quickly re-established as the country had a whole legal system of 
the 1st Republic with the famous constitution written by Hans Kelsen and enacted in 1920 
(with some minor amendments in 1929). The legal systems that were used in Austria during 
the fascist regime of Dolfuß and Schuschnigg as well as the Nazi legislation were completely 
revoked. After 1945 some interesting legislative changes were introduced and they were an 
answer to the unprecedented crimes committed by the Nazis during the II World War. This 
brings us directly to the topic of criminal prosecutions and the denazification of Austria. 
The issue of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime are well known. The world‟s 
response to them was the creation of a new term: genocide and some the perpetrators were 
retroactively prosecuted in the Nurnberg Trials. Interestingly the denazification courts in 
Austria started to operate even sooner than the court in Nurnberg. The defendants were 
accused on the basis of two legal acts: The War Crimes Act (Constitutional Law of June 26, 
1945) that introduced a number of offenses that were either formerly non-existent in the 
Austrian judicial code (such as the violation of human dignity or denunciation) or had to be 
f(Constitutional Law of February 17, 1947). According to this act former National Socialists 
were divided into two groups, namely: those who were involved in war crimes (and other 
related illegal activities) and those who were required to atone for their actions and make 
reparations (i.e. incriminated and lesser offenders)240. How did these courts work in practice? 
Prof. Winfried Garscha has described them in detail: The People‘s Courts were presided over 
by two professional judges and three lay assessors. […] After the liberation of Austria in May 
1945 People‘s Trials were held only in the Soviet occupied zone. The first such trial took 
place in August in 1945 – three months before the Nuremberg Trials. The accused were 
former stormtroopers suspected shooting Hungarian Jews in Engerau, a village near 
Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. The Western Allies in their respective occupation zones 
did not allow the establishment of People‘s Courts before March–April 1946. Thereafter four 
People‘s Courts existed in Austria – Vienna for the Soviet zone, Graz for the British zone, 
Linz for the American zone and Innsbruck for the French zone241. There were 536,660 people 
                                                          
240All the findings are available on the official governmental webpage of the denazification process 
http://www.entnazifizierung.at/denazification-in-austria/, Access, 10.01.2019, 
http://www.nachkriegsjustiz.at/prozesse/volksg/index.php, Acces 10.01.2019.  
241 This information is held on the governmental portal for the archive of resistance in Austria during 
https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf, p. 5, Access, 10.01.2019.  
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registered in Austria as Nazis. 18.3% of these individuals were “illegal party-goers,” or 
people who had belonged to the NSDAP even before the “Anschluss” in 1938, a time when 
the party was prohibited in Austria242. The Austrian People‘s Courts launched preliminary 
proceedings against almost 137,000 individuals suspected of crimes that fell under the Nazi 
Prohibition Law or the War Crimes Law, 108,000 out of them by early 1948. More than 
28,000 people were brought to trial, 23,000 got a verdict, 13,607 individuals were sentenced. 
30 death sentences were actually executed out of 43, two of the criminals sentenced to die 
committed suicide before they could be hanged. 27 criminals were sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Sentences in the upper range (that is maximum penalty or imprisonment of 
more than ten years) were imposed on 350 defendants243. This list does not contain all of the 
Nazi criminals prosecuted after the war. Some perpetrators were tried in Nurnberg and a small 
number of them were extradited to other European countries to be tried in the places where 
they have committed their crimes. 
Unfortunately a sentence in the People‟s Courts did not mean that the perpetrators 
were properly punished. Out of the 350 criminals with upper range sentences only seven were 
still imprisoned in 1955. Most of them were pardoned. The second problem to be found here 
is the small number of convictions in regard with the number of people put to trial. In many 
cases politicians, ministers or even members of the clergy intervened in order to lower the 
sentences or in favour of abandonment of prosecution. The most important factor in the 
clemency of the Austrian state towards former Nazis was the fact that their civic rights were 
revoked only until 1949. After that they could vote and run for offices which in the 
democratic reality meant that they were an important pool of voters that every party wanted to 
scoop from. In 1955 in the year of Austria regaining independence at a cost of neutrality the 
People‟s Courts were shut down. 4.700 cases were still pending at the time and were 
transferred to regular courts. This however was not the end of the story of the prosecution of 
Nazis in Austria. A special police department for Nazi crimes was established. This 
department added about 1000 cases to the previous 4.700 pending ones. The results of the 
work of this department were less than meagre. Only 39 people were put to trial and of those 
less than a half – 18 were sentenced.   
After the prosecution of perpetrators the truth-seeking is one of the most important 
parts of transitional justice. While the prosecution serves to punish the perpetrators and serve 
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243 https://www.doew.at/cms/download/40g3m/en_second%20republic.pdf p. 5 
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at least a flimsy feeling of justice the truth-seeking is a process that goes much deeper. It is a 
slow and meticulous process often conducted by scholars of the highest level. The goal of 
truth-seeking is to enumerate all of the crimes committed and through acknowledgement 
empower the victims symbolically and in some cases propose a restitution and compensation 
based on the findings of the truth-seeking commissions. In the Austrian case it was the 
Historikerkommission (Historical Commission) was created in 1998 and it was set up to 
examine Austria's role in the expropriation of Jewish assets during the period of Ostmark. It 
worked over the span of five years and concluded in 2003 and more than 150 researchers took 
part in the investigations in the archives. Those scholars had to look in depth into the status of 
property of more than 200.000 Austrian Jews and around 10.000 Roma and Sinti. As one of 
the members of the Historikerkommission Robert Knight wrote: The precise permit given by 
the government in 1998 was to investigate 'the expropriation of property in the period of Nazi 
rule (1938-1945), restitution and compensation in the Second Austrian republic and attendant 
welfare issues'. This may seem narrow in its focus on property issues, but in fact it affected 
nearly all aspects of Nazi rule and Austrian society. Last but not least, it was also concerned 
with the image and legitimacy of post-war Austria itself, as a collective victim of a foreign 
(German-Nazi) occupation244. Robert Knight points out the broader importance of the 
Historikerkommission. What seems to be missing from the point of Austrian interest were the 
Austrian victims of Nazism. Why were they omitted by the government who set the 
Historikerkommission up? To answer this question one must look back at the Austrian 
postwar history yet again. Because of the idea of Austria as the first victim of German 
aggression it was the Austrian victims that received the most attention. Number of persecuted 
Austrians was established at around 200.000245. Among those 200.000 were conservative and 
socialist politicians, priests and members of resistance. Not only the Austrian suffering was 
emphasized but also intensively commemorated. One example would be an inclusion of letters 
of Austrian Konzentrazionslager inmates or resistance fighters memoirs in the schoolbooks 
for history classes. Needlessly to say the Jewish victims were not included in this official state 
narrative. It was only the Waldheim affair of the year 1986 that proved to be a breaking 
point. The depiction of the victims of the Holocaust in history textbooks became a standard in 
                                                          
244 Knight R., Austria and Nazism: Owning up the past, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/genocide/austria_nazism_01.shtml, Access, 10.01.2019. For more seeÖ 
Knight R., Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945-1952 über die Entschädigung der 
Juden, Frankfurt am Main 1988.  
245 The exact numbers are hard to establish. Austria had used a similar mechanism as Poland in the same period 
to more-less equal the number of Polish and Jewish victims. In Poland the number of victims was said to be 6 
million with 3 million for both Jewish and Polish victims. The Austrian calculations similarly stated that there 
were around 400.000 victims of the Second World War divided into two halves: the Austrian and the Jewish one.  
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a similar fashion to the German counterpart. The difference was that the Austrian 
acknowledgement of its Jewish victims came 30 years later then in Germany.  
On international level Austria was either too small - in international terms - to matter, 
or it was seen as an enclave of tranquillity and good order (and 'permanent neutrality' 
between east and west), which ought to be cultivated246. It would not be an overstatement to 
say that the Waldheim Affair was more significant for Austria externally than internally. The 
eyes of the whole world were pointed at the Alpine Republic. The international context also 
shifted and time was ripe for the creation of a truth-seeking commission. The international 
climate was also changing through the 1980s and 90s, as a new 'politics of sensibility' 
developed. A number of disputes over paintings (such as those by Gustav Klimt) revealed 
their dubious provenance, and thus brought the issue of the expropriation of the property of 
Jews to a wider public, and the war record of neighbouring Switzerland also came under 
scrutiny. In response - after some inept initial reactions - the Swiss set up the independent 
Bergier Commission to investigate their own country's approach to the Third Reich. And last 
but not least, 'class actions' on behalf of holocaust victims and forced labourers were started 
in the US, with the aim of getting compensation and wage payments. Apparently it was the 
pressure from the USA that was crucial in forming the Historikerkommission in 1998. In an 
interesting turn of events politics have overtaken the slow research process. Even before the 
commission presented the vast results of its work and agreement was reached between the 
governments of Austria and the USA in January 2001. The result of this settlement two issues 
were resolved: compensation for forced labourers and Jewish victims. Most importantly the 
settlement included a redress for the loss of rental property (59,000 Vienna flats) that was 
supposed to be paid out of the Austrian National Fund. A General Settlement Fund was 
established to provide compensation in ten different categories of losses: 
 Liquidated businesses including licenses and other business assets 
 Real estate, insofar as it was not restituted on grounds of Part 2 of the 
General Settlement Fund Law 
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 Movable assets, insofar as property losses of this description had not 
already been compensated by the National Fund 
 Insurance policies 
 Occupational and educational losses 
 Other losses and damages247 
 
It was ironic that the deadline for applications for reparations from the General Settlement 
Fund was set to early 2003. This was the exact moment when the Historikerkommission 
published the results of its work. One could argue that it was not a coincidence and that the 
findings of the commission that could be used as a base of restitution now were published to 
late to serve any other purpose than just truth-seeking. In a sense the commission failed to 
achieve one of its goals and did not allow any victims or the legal successors of the victims to 
receive redress. Despite those limitations and problems a total of  20. 702 applications were 
filed and The General Settlement Fund had to process and evaluate around 160,000 individual 
claims in the different categories. The greatest number of claims was asserted in the 
categories "liquidated businesses" and "occupational and educational losses", which had 
previously not been dealt with by any sufficient restitution measures. In total, 210 million US 
Dollar was available for these payments248. 
As for the commission of historians it would once again it make sense to refer to 
Robert Knight to summarise the results of the work of the Historikerkomission: The 
commission's findings run to 14,000 pages, including 53 individual reports and one volume of 
conclusions. This amount of research cannot be easily summarised. But broadly speaking it 
shows the involvement of Austrian individuals, groups and institutions in all facets of 
expropriation of assets from the Jewish community in the Nazi years; from daylight robbery 
to more subtle forms of expropriation in the name of economic rationality. It also shows how 
numerous individual Austrians and institutions - from Vienna's Dorotheum auction house to 
the state (federal, regional and local) - gained as a result of these activities. The commission 
described how a machinery was established in Austria in the first post war decade, to provide 
restitution to the economic victims of the Nazis. And how some survivors had had some 
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success in getting it. For example the owners of businesses that had not been liquidated (these 
were in the minority, and were generally the larger firms) had quite a good chance. It also 
helped if the claim involved real estate. Most moveable property simply disappeared and - 
apart from identifiable works of art - will presumably never be found249 
Every case of implementation of transitional justice is exceptional as the situation of 
particular countries is different. Even though the example of Austria shares close 
resemblances to Germany it is a completely different story. Very much like Germany Austria 
was forced to reform its state system by the victorious Allies. However Unlike Germany 
Austria returned to its own prewar constitution. Also in comparison to other non-european 
countries Austria had a very long tradition of parliamentarism and democracy which 
influenced the reconstruction of the alpine republic. The reform was also the easiest part for 
Austria to implement during the transitional justice period. 
Things were not so easy when it came to persecutions of the perpetrators. While some 
of the most prominent Nazis were put to trial in Nurnberg they were included there as 
Germans. At the same time Austria received a much lighter treatment from the Allies than 
Germany. It was perceived as the first victim of the Nazi aggression and later the Austrian 
diplomacy made huge efforts to avoid being held responsible for the wartime crimes. Only a 
very small number of perpetrators were sentenced – in a rather symbolic manner. While some 
of the former Nazis faced troubles in the II Austrian Republic (like the prohibition of work in 
certain places) these limitations were soon lifted. All in all it is possible to say without much 
exaggeration that the prosecution of former Nazis in Austria was not successful and that 
Austria used the opportunities given by the Allies to shield them. Especially after 1949 when 
the former Nazis were allowed to vote again and proved to be a substantial part of the 
electorate. This situation was a seed that grew and in time became more and more problematic 
for Austria.  
The truth seeking process came very late to be of any significance to the remaining 
living Jewish victims. While the findings of the highly professional Historikerkomission are 
very detailed and show an in-depth research the impact of those findings is very limited. 
Because of the political deals that were quickly made before the Historikerkomission work 
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could have any influence the reparation process was rather hampered. While Austria 
eventually did pay some reparations it was done so late, more than 50 years after the end of 
the II World War, to have any real impact.  
In general it could be said that Austria had implemented transitional justice only 
because of pressure from abroad and to uphold its positive image that was given to this 
country by chance by the Allies. As in many cases transitional justice proved to be of limited 
importance and held a symbolical dimension. The transitional justice processes were not 
substantial for the new nation making of the II Austrian republic where the focus was put on 
the Austrian and not Jewish victims of the war and Nazi crimes. As the comparative study of 
implementation of transitional justice in various countries around the globe edited by James 
McAdams shows this is a case more often than not. Transitional justice leaves a deep feeling 
of injustice among the victims but at the same time serves as a feeble but necessary base for 
reunification of society during a system change. The Austrian case proves than despite its 
flaws transitional justice is necessary even if it is too little and too late.  
2.4 Historiography of the Austrian nation 
 
2.4.1 Austrian historiography before 1938 – lack of nation formation 
 
The Austrian pre-modern historiography does not really exist. Austria was considered 
a part of German territories which is shown for example in the richly illustrated Hartman 
Schedel‟s Nurnberg Chronicle also called as Weltchronik250. The work was famous for its 
cityscapes. The view of Vienna is using the old Latin name of Pannonia. Similarly the 
Lexicon of Johann Hübner of 1709 also includes the Austrian lands into the broader 
Germania251. Both German and foreign world chronicles or world histories have always 
included Austria to the realm of Germany and Vienna was named as the biggest and most 
important German city. The first use of the term Austrian nation comes with the medieval 
natio at the universities. The university was created in 1365 and included a geographical 
Austrian nation, which extended also to what is now Italy.  Other Germans were divided into 
Rheinisch and Saxon nationes252. The German self-identification is one of the persistent 
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factors of the German-speaking population of Austrian. The XIX century saw a brief rise of 
some form of Austrian consciousness but within the German nation. Neither the dissolution of 
the Holy Roman Empire, the failed revolutions of 1848, nor even the defeat in 1866 stopped 
the German population of Austria from rejecting their German identification. In fact XIX 
century only saw the rise of German and not Austrian nationalism. There were some attempts 
made by historians like Josef Freiherr von Hormayr or Josef Alexander Freiherr von Helfert 
who both wanted to see the Austrian nation as a political one. The attempts of transferring 
Western ideas of the nation to the Austrian reality were doomed and gave little fruit253. 
Instead of creating a historiography that inspired patriotic feelings and emphasising Austrian 
history the historians firstly focused on the development and perfectioning the methodology 
and then they turned to the German-Austrian or the Grossdeutsch point of view.  
 In 1913 Richard Kralik published Österreischiche Geschichte he was one of the 
precursors of the historiography that marked the I Austrian Republic. Kralik decided to shift 
the focus of German historiography to Austria and put it in the centre of the narrative. 
 Of course the successful unification of Germany by Prussia led to the creation of Prusso-
centric historical narratives. This situation also left the Austrian-German historians with the 
feeling of rejection which they tried to cope with especially after the fall of the Empire254. 
After 1918 the pan-German spirit was still prevalent, especially among scholars 
working on universities. For instance the historian Ernst Winter had problems with obtaining 
his habilitation because he was considered not Germanist enough in his writings255. Most 
narratives of historians focused not on facilitating on nation-formation but rather on the 
importance of (Austrian) Germans and their mission in central Europe within the Habsburg 
Empire256. The Austrian mission in the East was a permutation of German identity. A catholic 
monk and historian Hugo Hantsch wrote: We would have to turn the whole history of the Holy 
Roman Empire and the Habsburgs on its head if we were to deny the community that unites us 
with the whole German people. Austria is, even in the narrow and diminished state in which it 
was preserved by the Treaty of St. Germain, shield and core of the Reich, if we think about 
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cultural riches and tasks in Central Europe257. Peter Thaler frames this approach as Austro-
Germanist (putting Austria within the broader German framework). Most historians of the 
inter war period fall into this category. Hantsch, because of his strong affiliation to 
Catholicism stressed the importance of this faith to Austrian history.  
The Habsburg Empire only prospered when they fought of either the Turks or the Protestant 
armies. Despite his anti-Nazi point of view and a strong sentiment towards the Habsburg 
Empire Hantsch was in fact, a typical Austro-Germanist. He was an advocate for the 
sovereignty for Austria because only in that the Catholic heritage could be preserved. It goes 
without saying that this view was similar if not equal to that of the Austro-fascist regime 
which also leaned heavily on Catholicism. In his work Hantsch wanted to present the Austrian 
contributions to the overall German civilisation. Despite the international character of the 
Habsburg Empire Hantsch saw it as a mean to spread the German culture to the east. In ethnic 
terms he wrote: Much foreign blood flows in the veins of the people in Austria but the 
population of small towns remains what it always was, and the large mass of native peasantry 
stays free of any racial mixing. German blood is stronger than foreign blood and, within a 
short time, is able to assimilate the foreign elements .The country remains German and the 
German way soon flows more widely throughout the whole of the Danube-Vltava territory258. 
While presenting the German character of Austria Hantsch‟ s main goal was to emphasise the 
importance of Austria for Germany. Despite being rejected from the unified state of 1871 
Austria still had a Germanic civilizational role to play and should not be rejected from the 
German „family”. Yes the role of Austria was different than Germany‟s but it was just a 
variation, a different aspect of Germannes (Deutschtum) that could be seen in the history of 
Austria. In other words the main goal of the narrative was to boost the importance of Austria 
in German history. While being on its geographical periphery Austria was supposed to be the 
core of German civilisation259.  
The most prominent Austrian historian of the period Heinrich von Srbik presented a 
similar, albeit slightly magnified, view on the role of Austria in German history. Srbik was a 
supporter of the Anschluss and joined the NSDAP. He was also the head of the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences (named Academy of Sciences in Vienna during the times of Ostmark). 
In his own words that he delivered in a lecture in Berlin in 1936 Srbik spoke: I have directed 
you toward the goal that I had staked out form myself. Austria in German history; this was 
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not meant to be mere self-praise of the Austro-Germans, albeit my words may at times 
involuntarily have sounded that way. A wider and more rewarding concept stood before my 
eyes, however incomplete its realization might have been: a presentation of the Austrian 
share in universal German history and an attempt to promote the historic affiliation between 
the south-eastern Germans and the Germans in Germany in this historiographical manner260. 
In his monumental work Deutsche Einheit (German Unity) Srbik wanted not only 
emphasise the role of Austria in German history but to show that Austria was the leader of all 
German states. This was an intellectual protest against the exclusion of Austria in German 
historiography after 1866 – the so called kleindeutsch historiography. In his pangermanic 
writings he tried to convince that there is a common German history and that Austria is a part 
of it, because there is only one German nation that lived in various states261. With that 
understanding comes the problem of the non-germanic inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire 
Srbik tries to convince that for the most of Austrian history its population was de facto 
German, at least till the reign of Maximilian I. All of Austrian culture showed its deep 
connection to Deutschtum. Examples include for instance the germanisation policy conducted 
by Joseph II. The biggest tragedy for the German nation was the fighting between Austria and 
Prussia. While Srbik believed Frederic the Great and Maria Teresa were great German 
leaders, their wars only led to the loss of German blood and created divisions in the one 
German nation (Volk). Only the Great War brought Germany and Austria together in common 
struggle262.  
Other historians followed Srbiks narrations or expanded it in several aspects. Some of 
them contributed their texts to an edited volume by Srbik and Josef Nadler. Heinrich 
Kretschmayr and Wilhelm Bauer argued that despite the eastern location Austria played a 
pivotal role in the development of Germannes. The Habsburg marital expansion into the East 
served the interest of all Germans, especially because it united the isolated pockets of German 
settlers living in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Because of the borderline character of 
Austria, the German identity was stronger than in the geographical core of the Holy Roman 
Empire263. It is important to stress out that Josef Nadler himself a literary historian argued that 
                                                          
260 Srbik von H., Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte, Munich 1936, p. 77. This is a collection of three 
lectures that Srbik delivered in Germany. Quote translated by Thaler P., The Ambivalence of Identity, West 
Lafayette 2000p. 76.  
261 Ibidem, p. 7. 
262 Ibidem, p. 33-37, 49-50, 76.  
263 All texts come from an edited volume: Srbik von H., Nadler J., Österreich. Erbe und Sendung in Deutschen 
Raum, Salzburg, Lepzig 1934, p. 88-87, 369. The titles of the essays are: Kretschmayr H., Der Aufstieg des 
Hauses Österreich; Bauer O., Das Deutschtum der Deutsch-Österreicher. The argument about the borderline 
strengtening the German identity is validated by the example of Carinthia that saw tensions between the German 
121 
 
despite the Catholic influence of Austrian culture the reforms of the time of enlightenment of 
Maria Teresa and Josef II led to re-germanisation of Austrian culture and marked the return to 
cultural roots. In fact for Nadler Austria and its capital Vienna presented the most influential 
centre of German culture, especially in regard to music and literature. Nadler was also eager 
to point out the ethnic roots of Austrians coming from the Bavarian tribes. Any contact with 
other races (Slav, Hungarian, etc) was too limited to influence the German character of 
Austrians ethnicity264. 
At the end of the historiographical spectrum laid the clear Germanist approach 
represented by Heinrich Friedjung in his work Der Kampf um die Vorherschaft in 
Deutschland. His book was a love letter to Bismarck‟s policy of German unification265. While 
the Austrianist authors tried to balance the importance of Austrian and Prussian politicians 
Friedjung joined the mainstream German historiography.  
As seen by all the examples above the intellectual contribution of Austrian historians 
prior to the Anschluss did not create a solid footing for the process of nation formation. The 
main focus of their work was to emphasise the role of Austria in German history. This was 
caused by the trauma of rejection after 1866 and 1871 from the unified German state as well 
as by the trauma of the fall of the Habsburg Empire. The disappearance of the dynastic realm 
historians tried to find a substitute and resolved to fill the emptiness with pan-german ideas. 
Austrian historians did not want their country and rejected the way that the region was 
organised after the Great War. It did not matter if they were opposed to the Nazi regime or 
supported it266. As the examples of Hantsch and Srbik showed they both shared an idea of 
unification with Germany – only dissimilarities to be found in the details. In a paradoxical 
way the Austrian identity of that time meant being a part of Germany. Only in unity with the 
whole nation could Austria present its unique civilizational contributions to the world. For 
sure the Austrian history had to be treated as a part of a broader German history and its only 
distinction was in the point of view of the narrative. Austrian-German historians wanted to 
write the history of Germany seen through the lenses of the Austrian state.  
The historiography of the I Austrian Republic was highly prone to mythologization. 
Events were interpreted in such a way that they would fit the pangerman metanarrative. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
speaking population and the Slovenian minority. The year 1920 saw a small scale border conflict between the 
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ideological influence of the time is evident. Nation was defined by the historical borders of 
the Holy Roman Empire and traces of continuity of the premodern understanding of 
Germania, as exemplified in the late medieval and early modern lexicons and descriptions of 
the world, were prevalent and have to be treated as a persistent factor. The ethnicity of the 
inhabitants of Austria was proven to be German, especially by Srbik who pointed out that in 
the Austrian provinces there was little or close to none mixing of ethnicities. The main 
struggle in of the Austrian-German historiography is in fact showing the biggest emphasis on 
the point 1. e) of Hrochs “questionnaire”: the struggle between the centre and the provinces. 
Austria claimed to be the civilizational centre of Germania despite its peripheral geo-political 
location. It was the change of the centre to Prussia that sparked the intellectual reaction of 
Austrian historians. There was an agreement that Austrians were ethnically German coming 
from the Bavarian tribes and if there were any other racial mixtures (Slavic or Hungarian 
influences) they were downplayed. The history of Germans was continuous albeit tragically 
divided by the fighting within one nation but of two states: Prussia and Austria. The 
unification of Germany was not completed in Austrian eyes. But even the Silesian wars were 
sometimes interpreted as a way of coming of the nation together as it created room for 
Austrian reforms and modernisation also meant Germanisation. As for national heroes: 
Austrian historians had a whole share of Habsburg rulers and politicians. Metternich was seen 
as someone who slowed down the unification process. An interesting trait of the Austrian-
German historiography is trying to equal the admiration to Prussian kings and politicians with 
their Austrian counterparts. The only competing concepts regarded only the level of 
underlining Austrian uniqueness within German civilizational realm. The European influence 
of the Austrian Empire was seen as an extension of German civilizational mission to 
humanity. Austrian historical narratives, while being conducted with high scientific standards 
did not put those standards as a mean in itself. The main focus was put on trying to convince 
the German counterparts of the value of Austrian contributions to German history. In fact it 
seems that the targeted audience of Austrian historiography were not really the citizens of the 
Austrian Republic but rather German historians. The trauma of separation caused the creation 
of the myth of Austria as better Germany267. That is why Heinrich von Srbik presented his 
work in Berlin in a series of lectures. While the historiography might have supported the 
argument of the Austro-fascist regime for the raison de etre of the Austrian state, the example 
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of Srbik shows that he was eager to work under the Nazi regime as well. His successor in the 
University of Vienna Hantsch was not really far ideologically but only resisted the Nazis on 
the basis of his Catholic faith. It was not the historical argument that proved to be essential 
but the political activism of historians that determined their future positions and careers. In 
short, the historians and historiography of the I Austrian Republic did not provide sufficient 
intellectual resources that are needed to creation of a nation. Paraphrasing the words of Ernst 
Hanisch: After 1918 what did the Austrians think, what identity did they have? The history 
books showed only empty pages to their question268. And yet history changed. The history 
books written after 1945 had a perfectly tailored answer to that question.  
 
2.4.2 Legitimising the status quo - Austrian historiography after 1945 
 
In 1945 Austrian historiography found itself very much in the moment of a new 
beginning. While politically it was the second year-zero (Jahr-null) in the last 30 years , for 
the historians 1945 was truly the moment of reset. The historiography of the First Republic 
shows developed connections to what came before them but the postwar Austrian 
historiography is an entirely different story.  This was the time when political action preceded 
the intellectual work necessary for nation-formation. In fact it would take three decades for 
major monographs and narratives about the Austrian nation to be written. It seems that in the 
regard of the Second Austrian Republic history was too late and did not catch up with the 
present. Because it was the political world that delivered the new interpretations of history it 
is no surprise that history was very much distorted. Anton Pelinka calls it falsification of 
reality269. For Pelinka the founding fathers of the Second Republic were straight up lying and 
creating self-deception on a national level. The politicization of history was so strong that 
politicians recounted, written, recorded and made history. It is no surprise then that 
contributions to the history of Austrian nation actually came from abroad and not only from 
Austrians like Felix Kreissler (though writing in French!) but also coming from other nations 
like William Bluhm.  
The small group of Austrian historians were almost all representatives of the Austrian-
German or even only German approaches to Austrian history till 1945 but they followed the 
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political leaders. At the beginning historians took the role of journalist and held their 
discussion in the press. In November 1945 Akademische Rundschau was established and 
promoted Austrian autonomy and stressed the importance of nationhood270. A month before 
another periodical Turm: Monatschrift für österreischiche Kultur advocated the departure 
from kleindeutsch Prussian Treitschke historiography.271 The most heated discussions were 
carried in the press of political parties though. Despite the turn towards Austrianism there still 
were strong remnants of older Germanist approaches. Taras Borodajkewycz, an avid Nazi, 
worked as a historian on the University of Vienna until a scandal forced him into retirement in 
1971.  In 1955 Borodajkewycz wrote that without Germany Austrian history remains 
incoherent and meaningless272. In response Adam Wandruszka in 1956 wrote that there is no 
need to write about the Austrian-German relations because everything had already been said 
about this and that the close bonds of Austrian with German history are just as securely 
established as is the unique development of Austria, especially since 1866273.  
The 60ties brought a qualitative change with the publishing of more scientific 
monographs and edited volumes. They were highly ideological and tried to project the 
Austrian nation back in time for about 1000 years – to the symbolical beginning of Austrian 
history. In the book of Genesis Adam gives names to the creatures he encounters thus creating 
the beginning of the bond between humans and animals. When a child is born one of the first 
actions to take is to name it. So the obvious date for the symbolical birth of the Austrian 
nation was 996 – when the name Ostarrichi was used. The symbolical strength of a name is 
hard to overlook. Even decades later an academic workbook for students of German language 
prepared in the Wrocław University by Lucjan Puchalski opens with the German translation 
of the Latin document that mentioned Ostarrichi274. Despite the fact that the Austrian nation 
was just beginning to take shape, historians proposed a very primordial understanding of the 
nation. Alexander Novotny wrote: For millions of years the Earth was circling the Sun – and 
on one knew! For centuries an Austrian nation has existed; first dormant and finally-
particularly after 1945 – the Austrians realised that they are a nation275. Despite Austrians 
forming a political community and perhaps a political nation it was anachronistically and 
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retroactively put into a perspective of the thousand years. As Fellner jokingly said instead of 
projecting a thousand year Reich to the future, Austrian historians projected the Austrian 
nations a thousand years into the past276. In this spirit Albert Massiczek wanted to create 
historical foundations for Austrian state consciousness. He tried another trick by projecting 
the term “Austrian nation” to the past. Massiczek wrote: Incidentally, it should be observed 
that the concept of an Austrian nation: is no mere invention of the Second Republic, but can 
be documented as early as 1368 at the University of Vienna for students from the Habsburg 
domains277. The term nation did mean something completely different in the medieval ages, as 
did the term Austria. The sole existence of the name proved the existence of the Austrian 
nation ages before 1945. In this sense the first wave of Austrian historiography resembles the 
search for mythical origins of other European nations only that in the Austrian case the origins 
are historical facts but are subject to mythologisation.  
The early 70ties bring the introduction of foreign or partially foreign authors to the 
fray. Felix Kreissler and Karl Stadler were Austrian emigrants escaping the Nazi regieme. On 
the other hand William Bluhm and Peter Katzenstein represent American scholars. Karl 
Stadler, a member of the Austrian Communist Party who emigrated to the UK in 1938, 
contributed to the Oxford series Nations of the modern world with a tome about Austria. He 
presented a history of the Austrian First and Second Republic and introduced the topic of 
national identity278. Because of his negative experiences in Austria he was critical of both 
fascist and Nazi regimes and focused on the persecution of Socialists and the functioning of 
Nazi courts in Ostmark. However it was not Stadler but another emigrant Kreissler who was 
even more hostile towards Germany. Interestingly, while Stadler‟s book was in English, 
Kreissler‟s work was first published in French La prise de conscience de la nation 
Autrichienne, 1938-1945-1978 as he was working at the University of Rouen at the time. 
Kreissler, who escaped to France, had been caught by the Gestapo because of his involvement 
in the French resistance. Eventually he was transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp 
under false identity. His work had a clear goal: to radically destroy the legend of the German-
Austrian or even of the Austrian as the ―better‖ German, and the portrayal of the growth and 
consolidation of the Austrian nation. This process requires the final eradication of pan-
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German ideology279. Both Stadler and Kreissler saw their personal resistance against the Nazi 
regime as opposition to a more generally understood Germandom (Detuschtum). The 
existence of the Austrian nation was a measure against the re-emergence of German Nazism.   
Kreissler‟s book focuses solely on this experience and its timeframe is also limited – form 
February 1938 till the Aktualität of the 1980‟ties.  Before the Anschluss the nation was 
sleeping or hiding in a national subconscious. Only the brightest of spirits – poets and writers 
could see through the veil and conceptualise an Austrian nation280. In Kreissler‟s view the 
nation was woken up by the shock of the Anschluss281. His focus is on the groups of 
opposition against the German Nazis, most notably the conservatives and communists. 
Kreissler is also the proponent of the Konzentrazionslager experience – where leaders of 
different ideological camps had time to not only discuss the future of an independent and 
democratic Austria but also develop a genuine feeling of brotherhood282. The high point of 
Kreissler‟s narrative is the “liberation” of 1945 – when a wave of spontaneous Austrian 
patriotism took the streets. The book is cantered on three chapters from 1938 till September 
1939, the time of the Second World War (1939-1945) and the time of the Austrian nation – 
1945 till the chancellorship of Bruno Kreisky. In a survey conducted among politicians of 
major Austrian parties Kreissler finds that they believe that most of Austrians were against the 
Anschluss in 1938 and that Hitler was sure that during the plebiscite from 60-80% of 
Austrians would choose independence283. Not only is such survey was conducted only on a 
group of 80 people and is not representative at all, its findings are treated as obvious and with 
little commentary. They serve as arguments. With the annexation of Austria by the Third 
Reich came the first disappointments in Austria. The pan-German dream was slowly turning 
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into a nightmare. Firstly the Austrian administration was destroyed and replaced by Nazi 
officials and then came the terror284. The result was the appearance of the first reflexions 
about the Austrian nation. The most important role was played by the Christian-socialists, 
former Austrofascists, Catholics and emigrants to the West285. The first anti-German reflex 
had an anti-Prussian face. He treats Prussia as the opposite of Austria. Prussia was a made-up 
country with little natural beauty, Austria was a grown up, historical state with magnificent 
natural scenery. The social tissue of Prussia was not developed and had shown little cultural 
life, Prussian elites were homogenous, the Austrian were heterogeneous. The masses in 
Prussia were a disciplined and prone to limitless authority (of the army and social 
democracy!), the Austrian masses were independent and prone to limitless individuality. The 
Prussian individual used to be liberal but because of the lack of roots he turned “bismarckian” 
with little though about the past. The Austrian is of traditional attitude that was solid and 
stable throughout the ages.  The Prussian man is strict, the Austrian is ironic.  The Prussian 
man is direct; the Austrian is an actor etc… etc286. Kreissler continues to enumerate the 
disappointments of Austrians under the German rule. Even some Austrian National-Socialists 
were expressing disappointed287. Austrian culture was devastated by the Nazi politics of 
repression, many writes were murdered or sent to concentration camps, the traditional 
Austrian intelligentsia, was specially targeted which led to the decay of Austrian culture 
during the years of 1938-1945.  Both the Opera and the music schools were subject to 
ideology and their quality dropped immediately. All of this led to the growing rejection of the 
Nazi-rule: the elites discussed the concept of an independent Austrian nation more and more, 
and the masses showed some passive resistance, especially towards the war effort. This is 
summarised by a short poem from 1941:  
 
Wir wollen keinen Krieg, 
Wir brauchen keinen Sieg,  
Wir wollen unser freies Österreich 
und freuen uns auf die Hitlerleich288. 
                                                          
284 Ibidem, p. 92. 
285 Ibidem, p. 107. 
286 Ibidem, p. 119-120. Kreissler uses the text written by Hugo von Hofmannsthal from 1917 to show the 
continuities and persistence of the anti-Prussian attitude of the Austrians.  
287 Ibidem, p. 149.  
288 Ibidem, p. 214. The poem was found in the documents of the justice system of Ostmark, as someone was 
charged for the use of these words.  
128 
 
The longer the war lasted the bigger the opposition grew in Austria. Even the 
traditionally reluctant towards the idea of the Austrian nation the Socialists also hopped on the 
bandwagon. The Moscow declaration of 1943 was a major factor to strengthen the Austrianist 
ideas among the elites. The Austrian Freedom‟s Front was established in October of 1942 and 
this enhanced the rather meagre acts of sabotage. The nearing of the wars end brought deeper 
conceptualisation of the Austrian nation – images of Himi Vindobonensis or Homo Alpinus of 
mixed German (more precisely Bajuwar) and Slovenian ethnicity. The German language of 
Austrians was rejected and named only a lingua franca that had nothing to do with the 
German nationalism289. The last chapter shows the history of the birth of the second Republic, 
the formation of first party programmes and solutions of everyday problems of the postwar 
years which is then followed by the description of discussion of Austrian intellectuals about 
the Austrian nation formation. The discourse of that time was a forge for the formation of the 
concept of Austrian nation – what was its role and destiny in the world? Some voices 
emphasised the legacy of the Habsburg Empire – with Vienna becoming an open city and the 
centre of European spirituality290. Other liberal legacies of the Empire should be the 
acceptance of the racial mixture in Austria as well as acceptance of the idea of a multilingual 
nation (with special attention to minorities like the Slovenes etc.).  The results of the 
discussion could be summarised as goes: there is no „mothernation” for the Austrian nation; it 
is neither German nor other. There is no Austrian nation without democracy, its own culture 
and without economic unity. There is no Austrian nation without the equality of its citizens, 
especially the minorities. There is no Austrian nation where racism, chauvinism, anti-
Semitism, and false historical identity could flourish. Finally there is no Austrian nation 
without the state independence, sovereignty and active neutrality291. Alongside these concepts 
several myths and concepts marched right into the Austrian national imaginarium. Any 
attempt at calling Austria German is the first step to loose independence. The Austrian nation 
appeared later than the most of European nations and this process is not yet finished, but the 
formation of the Austrian nation must not happen through the means of nationalism, as history 
had shown it leads to suffering. The Austrian patriotism has to be humanistic in its core and 
spirit. With this comes the rejection of war and protection of neutrality. And last but not the 
least – without the contributions of the Austrian resistance fighters there would be no creation 
of the Second Republic after the liberation by the Allies; they should be treated as martyrs for 
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the Austrian cause292. With positive images came also concepts that needed to be rejected and 
these are: the ideology of the race of masters, the expansion of nations, the authoritarian 
leadership, violence against political opponents, militarisation of the youth, the weakening of 
parliamentary democracy, positive attitude towards military goals of Germany during the II 
World War, romantic visions of Germany and finally anti-Semitism and the idea of 
Anschluss293. 
The late 70ties were witness to the publishing of first concise Austrian histories that 
included the times of the Austrian Republic. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik published the 
limited: Österreich: Die Zweite Republik in 1972294. Erich Zöllner‟s Geschichte Österreichs was 
published in 1979. Zöllner‟s concept is interesting because it projects the existence of Austria 
into the times where it was not possible as if the sole existence of the geographical land 
already marked the existence of Austria. He starts his history with the Illirian and Celtic 
settlement but then follows with the chapter Austria in the times of the Romans295. His whole 
history is based on the premise of geographical limits of the Austrian Republic that are 
projected back in time, even in his foreword Zöllner emphasises the importance of geography, 
thus giving him an excuse for the limitations of his Austrian history. All historical processes 
lead to the formation of Austrian lands, especially the years 976-1246 when the bulk of the 
Austrian lands was shaped through dynastic policies and conquests. There is no mention of 
German history it is only a story of one county – Austria. Another history of the Austrian 
Republic, an edited volume by Heinrich Benedikt was published in 1977296.  What is valuable 
in this book is not the history of the First and Second Austrian Republic and the political 
developments that occurred then and there but the very last chapter named: The historical 
continuities of the Austrian states and their European function. The firth thesis that appears in 
this chapter is the continuous (ununterbrochen) existence of the Austrian state (sic!)297. 
Austria is supposed to play a solid and unchangeable role in European history – as the heart of 
Europe. The start of the Austrian statehood is the year 803 – the creation of the Awar Mark. 
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Because of the special position of Austria it always played a role of the divisor as well as 
bridge builder. The anomaly of 1938 only showed the necessity of Austrian existence for the 
European order298. Austria was not willingly annexed in 1938 but occupied (besetzt).  The 
thousand year Austrian nation still has its historical mission to fulfil – to maintain European 
peace and freedom299. This concept of thousand year old Austria was repeated in the three 
volumes of Tausend Jahre Österreich edited by Walter Pollak300. The history of Austria starts 
on the 21 of July 976, writes Pollak.  
The American authors Bluhm and Katzenstein presented something completely 
different. Their point of view was based outside the Austrian discussion and they both have 
contributed with substantial works that expanded the discussion. Both of them start their 
narratives relatively late. They do not seek the beginning of the Austrian nation in the early 
medieval period and are not interested in mythmaking. Bluhm starts his narrative during the 
Napoleonic wars in 1808 and Katzenstein starts with the aftermath of the said conflicts in 
1815. Despite not being influenced by constructivism in historiography they both quote Karl 
Deutsch as their theoretical inspiration. Bluhm also mentions Kohn, and his idea of eastern 
backward nationalism. The prehistory of the Austrian nation is limited to the XIX century. 
Bluhm enumerates the rare instances of Austrian national identity shining through history. 
The starting point 1808 is the date of Hormayrs mentioning of the Austrian nation.  In 1809 a 
military hymn is devised by Heinrich Collin – Österreich über alles301. It is clear that Bluhm 
wanted to write an intellectual history, or the history of mentality. His conclusions are that the 
attempts made to facilitate the national feeling among Austrians were ill devised or found no 
soil to grow on. The examples from the time of the Empire were described in the previous 
subchapter. Even in the First Republic the attempts were doomed to fail. Bluhm mentions the 
case of the poet Anton Wildgans who devised the ideal type of the „Austrian man”  (Der 
österreischiche Mensch). The Austrian man was supposed to be a true heir of the fallen 
Empire, a well-spoken gentleman, who knows many languages, a polyglot that builds bridges 
between nations302. This concept not only was flawed because it tried to lean on a non-
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existing polity of the Habsburg Empire but also treated being Austrian as a version of being a 
(better) German. Bluhm names all those failures as the time of the politics of disintegration 
and contrasts them with the politics of integration of the Second Austrian Republic. In fact the 
short period of the 25 years between 1945 and 1970 constitute the core of the narrative. 
Bluhm shows the opportunism but also rational policy making of the Austrian political elite 
that slowly trickles down to the general public and leads to the establishment of the Austrian 
nation. It was the first time that the existence of the Austrian nation was framed as a 
completely modern phenomenon which happened only after 1945. William Bluhm does not 
engage the Austrianist historiography; he focuses almost solely on the role of political elites 
and not historians. He could not be blamed for this omission and the most engaging 
intellectual work conducted by historians were not yet finished and published. Nevertheless 
his book challenges the primordial Austrianist historiography from constructivist positions 
and comes to completely different conclusions.   
Peter Katzenstein uncovers new perspectives by applying a very peculiar point of 
view. His interest is the unification and fragmentation of states. Examples include Germany 
and Italy as well as the break ups of Sweden-Norway and England-Ireland. For Katzenstein 
Austria and Germany serve solely as a fascinating case study. While Switzerland was a part of 
the Holy Roman Empire for some time its division predated the modern times and required an 
analysis of a too long time span. The case of East and West Germany was on the other hand 
too short and not established well enough303. Katzenstein embarked on a mission to find 
systemic pressures and counter-pressures to state integration and disintegration.  The Austrian 
political autonomy is for the American scholar a persistent factor of Austrian history. He 
traces the factors contributing to this state in the behaviour of elites and their relation to the 
economy. For instance the Austrian-German elites had no incentive to be unified with 
Germany, while their Prussian counterparts were limited by functioning just in the Prussian 
state. Austrian-German elites had many options of social-mobility and economic development 
within the realm of the Habsburg empire. To achieve such status the Prussian elites pushed 
towards creating a bigger state. The disproportion of economic interests of both elites had a 
huge impact on development. Austrians were imperial and not industrial because they did not 
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need industry to uphold their status, the Prussians on the other hand were industrial but not 
imperial, for them industrialisation brought more economic and social rewards304.  The 
political and economic rewards of integration or disintegration are what drives the elites of 
states towards unification or autonomy. Only a state of crisis could force the elites (or 
counterelites) for integration with another state and equally the wellbeing of the elite 
strengthens the drive for autonomy and remaining disjoined. By using this approach 
Katzenstein rejects cultural arguments. Two states could be culturally homogenous but 
without the rewards of integration – it will not happen305.  The author then follows with 
presenting methaphorical “patterns” of integration and disintegration in chronological order. 
The aristocratic pattern (1815-1848) was the time of political cooperation of Austrian and 
German elites in suppressing liberal movements but in other spheres there was isolation. The 
movement of the masses was small but the time witnessed migration of elites from 
“Germany” to Austria. The conflict pattern (1834-1870) was the opposite of the previous one. 
There was a developing economic and social interdependence (especially concerning the 
emigration of Austrian masses to Germany) yet the politics of elites who were warring over 
the domination of the German realm prevented any unification. The following hierarchical 
pattern (1870-1918) led to the growing dependence of one subject (Austria) to the other 
(Germany).  The dependence weakened Austria internally and sparked international conflicts 
as well. This was the moment when integration was halted by the elites but was desired by the 
masses whose economic and symbolical positions were inversely proportional to their 
confinement within the Austrian state. The apogee of this process was the voluntaristic 
pattern (1918-1938) where both the elites and masses desired integration both in Germany 
and Austria. The structural pattern (1938-1945) showed in fact that the Austrian elites 
managed to obtain privileged positions within the unified polity of the Third Reich. Only the 
quest for European dominance and the defeat in the Second World War stopped full 
integration. The result was the formation of the pluralistic pattern (1945-1970) where despite 
cultural ties the elites had neither political nor economic incentives for integration306. The 
detailed study conducted by Katzenstein shows that the counterpressures and political 
autonomy were more often the result than copressures to political integration. The way 
Austria as a polity was shaped made the elites rewarded more by the autonomy of their 
country. Even during the crisis years that led to the Anschluss the elites only resorted to that 
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strategy because it was the only way to secure their internal position307. Katzenstein sees the 
disintegration or fragmentation as the dominant trend which is not limited to the case of 
Austria and Germany. In fact it is the dominant trend as seen by the history of culturally 
homogenous areas like Scandinavia or the Anglo-Saxon realm (UK, USA, Canada, South 
Africa, Australia, New Zealand). There are deep historical and structural patterns that create 
resistance to integration or political unification. Katzenstein even lists the project of European 
unification as doomed because of the patterns he described – the partners will remain 
disjoined.  
The 80tie saw the apogee of the discussion about the Austrian nation. In 1981 the 
massive work of Friedrich Heer Der Kapmf um die österreichische Identität was published. 
The work is a fascinating read and an intellectual delight, Full of personal stories and richly 
ornamented with quotes the books is a deep excavation of mental or psychological history. 
While Heer writes about identity he uses the term because of its flexibility, he still 
interchanges the existence of national identity with the existence of the nation308. In that way 
Heer is the continuator of the work of his Austrian predecessors in the II Austrian Republic. 
Heer makes it clear that he rejects the German understanding of Austria in the very first pages 
of his book. He deliberates on the ethnic composition of the lands of the Bundesrepublik 
Österreich and equates them with the same lands in prehistoric times. Calling back on the 
Illiryian and Celtic herithage Heer concludes that the Roman province of Noricum had to be 
Celtic because the Romans could not distinguish between different tribes very well, especially 
between German and Celtic ones309. Pushing it even further Heer equates the name Noricum 
with Österreich. Noir (nor) in Celtic languages was supposed to mean East and rig equates 
with Reich (realm), Noricum equals Ostreich310.  Even during the Roman period the Celtic 
kings were allowed to rule for some time as governors – thus laying ground for autonomy. 
Both the Celts and Romans left a heritage of appreciation of culture and poetry – a trait of the 
Austrians till this day. The first “German” tribes appeared in the V-VI century in the form of 
Franken and Bajuwaren. The Ostmark of Charlemagne could not be German because the king 
himself was not German. Heer continues to combat the perception of the Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation as a myth. Even Vienna the undisputed capital of the Austrian lands 
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was not entirely German but a place of mixture of ethnicities. Jews, Czechs, Hungarians were 
invited to study in the Vienna University. In the conflict between the Slavic Premysl II 
Ottokar and Rudolf Habsburg (ein Schwabe) the Austrian elites were in favour of Premysl and 
were coldhearted towards the German new coming dynasty311. But it was under the 
Habsburgs that the genuine Austrian identity was born during the reign of Rudolf IV the 
Founder (der Stifter) in the years 1358-1365. Not only did he include Tirol into his realm of 
power, but started the reconstruction of the symbolic cathedral of St. Stephen and founded 
dozens of new cities across the land and the Vienna University (hence the nickname). Heer 
defends the infamous false document Privilegium Maius, which despite being fake and 
compares it to another known forgery the so called donation of Constantine. The process of 
the birth of the Austrian identity was finished with the formation of a special type of dialect: 
Österreichisch-Teutsch (since 1340)312. The “German German” language is a thing of the 
reformation and Protestantism and not of the Catholic Austria.  
The history of the formation of Austrian identity is a story of many tragedies. 
Friedrich Heer belives that of all of them, the biggest one is the “great tragedy of 
Protestantism”. Since the XVI century the lands of Austria were home to at least two 
(sometimes three or four) political religions, to two nations and two (three or four) cultures. 
The Austrian identity lived in constant crisis for the last several hundreds of years. Heer 
identifies the Austrian (premodern) identity with the Catholic faith and its material 
manifestation in the baroque. The rest could be ascribed to the camp of the Austrian enemies. 
The list of enemies is long: Czech Protestantism, west European enlightenment and the 
German-Prussian spiritual culture. Austria in Heer‟s vision is a citadel under constant siege. 
The other European nations despite their tragic histories and being torn apart by other 
countries like Poland or being under foreign rule for thousands of years like the Balkan 
nations retained their identities. For Heer Austria was “invaded” by different ideas that broke 
the structure of Austrian identity and all of them almost exclusively came from the outside313.  
The politicised religions in forms of reformation and counterreformation broke the 
Austrian lands apart into two cultures or two civilisations even. One believed in the salvation 
through the German language, the language of Luther. Faith in the salvation through 
evangelical Germany, the liberator from the enslavement of Rome and the House of Austria. 
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The other faith, the faith in the Austrian nation did not vocalize well: Catholic muteness, 
Catholic poverty of language and the peasant difficulty to express in written form, obscured 
the often overlooked state of affairs: there is an anonymous Austrian nationality, which only 
in the hardest of times was articulated with words314. This sentence is perhaps the best 
summary of Heer‟s work. His titanic work went into finding even the smallest glimpses of 
Austrian identity in history, from letters, through poems to speeches. At the same time Austria 
is the ultimate victim of foreign intrusions which draws parallels to the obvious Anschluss – 
the ultimate act of violation of Austria and the narrative end of Heer‟s book.  
The birthplace of all those tragedies lies in Bohemia. This is where in the flames of the 
Hussitic wars not only Protestantism but also nationalism were born. Bohemia was the core of 
both Czech and German nationalism315. Ale hate against Austria also stemmed from Bohemia 
– for instance Heinrich von Treitschke was the descendant of Czech husstic emigrants that left 
the country after the battle of White Mountain in 1620316. The hate of the Czechs towards 
Habsburgs became a constant trend.  The tragedy of the Austrian identity happened when 
Bohemia and Moravia became part of the Habsburg lands after 1526. There was on one but 
two nations within the state, not one but two religions, not one but two civilisations.  
However the conflict between the two camps was won by the Habsburgs that managed 
to consolidate power and started to build a uniform culture based on Catholicism and baroque. 
The expression of Habsburg power became so strongly attributed these two elements that 
there is no surprise that the Czechs and Slovaks destroyed the column of Holy Mary in 1918 
in Prague as a symbol of Austrian power and that the Austrian social democrats, who were 
sceptical about religion were so inclined to follow the pan-german ideology. Nevertheless the 
existence of the Böhmische Konfession broke the state into two and drew Austria into 
conflicts of not only local magnitude. It were the tensions in Bohemia that started the bloody 
Thirty-years‟ war of 1618-1648. Despite this conflict and the constant Ottoman threat the 
foundation of the Austrian identity were laid and were ready to carry a more sophisticated 
structure of the Austrian nation. None of that came to fruition because of the next tragedy that 
began to haunt Austria – enlightenment.  
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Maria Theresa and Joseph II – two of the most revered rulers of Austria are foe Heer no more 
than the biggest destroyers of Austria317. While Joseph II had in mind to create an Austrian 
nation and to nullify what came before him. The new beginning meant an end to the only true 
expression of Austrian identity. The new beginning was supported by the German language 
and germanisation policies, by the ideas of Enlightenment which were hostile to the religious 
and Catholic heritage of Austria. In extenso they were also hostile to the Austrian national 
identity. Its development has been terminated by putting everything upside down. The 
emergent premodern nation became the victim of modernisation processes but this 
development does not stop Heer from finding more and more examples of Austrian identity 
that became more and more vocalised in the XIX century. Poets like Hormayr and politicians 
like Phillip Stadion are examples of propaganda of the Napoleonic wars. This might obscure 
the fact that it was no nation that wanted to have its own state but a state that wanted its own 
nation318. This is highly misleading as the state institutions at the time propagated the idea of 
unity under the Habsburg dynasty rather than national ideas. In Germany this type of policy 
was viewed as anti-German319.  These processes became intensified with the development of 
the national movements of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Italians etc. The fatal role of the 
minorities (especially the Czechs and Hungarians) was clear in the revolutions of 1848. The 
Hungarians were in open rebellion but in terms of identity the Germanised Czechs posed a 
bigger problem. For instance during the Frankfurter Parliament, a Anton Springer a Czech 
and a Kulturdeutsche proposed to create an Austrian state nation that would consist of Slavic 
races but in spirit it would be completely Germanised320.  Nothing came out of these 
deliberations and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the leadership in the Germanic 
realm ended yet with another tragedy for Austria. The battle of Köninggratz unified a state but 
destroyed a nation. From this battle stemmed the catastrophes of 1918, 1938 and 1945.The 
tragedy of the Austrian identity became the tragedy of the whole European continent. The 
clear demarcation from Germany came with the idea that Austrians should only identify 
themselves as Austrians not Germans but this proved impossible. The stronger the rejection 
from the Prusso-Germany, the stronger the pan-german sentiment in Austria. The social 
democrats of the time became the apostles of the German faith321. The Austrian identity could 
be traced in certain groups of the traditional camps – conservatives (blacks) and Habsburgist 
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royalists (black-yellows). The second group lost its raison de etre with the fall of the dynasty 
in 1918 and transformation into the Republic. The tragedy was that it was a Republic without 
any republicans – the conservative camp was responsible for the destruction of the democratic 
system and introduction of the Austro-fascist regime which Heer calls the “new 
counterreformation”322. The Nazi influence in the First Austrian Republic is attributed to the 
Sudetendeutschen or Germans from Bohemia – they were not Austrians they were Germans of 
the borderlands, writes Heer323. To support this idea the historian reminds the reader that the 
German Party that operated in Austria started in 1904 in the lands of Bohemia.  Their 
members also recruited from the Austrian protestant population. The Austrian identity of the 
First Republic could be seen in the conservative camp of the Christian-social Party and later 
in the Austro-fascits Fatherland Front. But still this identity was anonymous with very little 
intellectual support and background. It did not know if it is better to rely on the “yellow-
black” Habsburg and imperial traditions or to build a new “black” future. Even Catholicism 
which was one of the ideological backbones of the Austro-fascist regime was full of bishops 
that propagated unification with Germany.  
The book ends with the comparison of two Austrian lives: of Adolf Hitler and Kurt 
Schuschnigg. He traces the expressions of Austriannes in their political career. For instance 
Heer mentiones that an “old-Austrian” was reawaken in Hitler on several occasions – like the 
talks with Otto Skorzeny, or when plans for Balkan invasion were made which evoked the 
history of Austrian possession of those lands324.  Heer‟s idea is that even the destroyer of the 
Austrian statehood had shown some glimpsed of Austrian identity that proved the viability of 
that idea. Schuschnigg on the other hand was a subconscious heir of the Habsburgs. His 
words: Firstly I am a German, then an Austrian and thirdly a legitimist, were a paraphrase of 
a similar phrase spoken by Franz Josef in 1889: above all we are German, then Austrian, and 
in the third line we are the Habsburgs…325 With the Anschluss ended the chapter of old 
Austrian-catholic identity. At the same time Schuschnigg was too weak to defend Austria. 
Joseph Roth the famous writer and a colleague of Schuschnigg said: this Alpine man, who 
does not understand nothing from Austria, will betray Austria, because he would not like 
Germans to shoot Germans326. 
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The tale of the Second Republic is a new beginning and an era that Friedrich Heer 
avoided to describe leaving a gaping hole in his deliberations on Austrian identity. The 
narrative that Heer has created is the swansong of the Austrianist historiography. The struggle 
for the Austrian identity is a collection of all the important works by Austrian historians put 
together in an attractive and passionate story. The historical narrative is primordial to the core. 
Not only Heer tries to link the times of the antiquity (or before) to modern phenomena he 
believes that there is a more meta-level civilizational connection between the Ilirans and 
Celts. Heer often jumps between different centuries trying to show the connections and 
persistent factors in the history of the Austrian nation and Austrian identity. The history of the 
Austrian identity is framed in primordial terms but at the same time Heer belives that a nation 
is a cultural phenomenon which relies on the consciousness of its members – it is a type of 
political faith. In Heer‟s narrative the Austrian nation is supposed to appear in the early 
modern period but his development was suppressed by external influence as well as by 
internal actors who embraced the foreign influences. The main point of his narrative is also 
highly questionable. Casting Protestantism, enlightenment and Prussian aggression 
incorporated into the figure of Bismarck do not hold their ground when put under scientific 
scrutiny. First of all it is hard to believe that an Austrian nation existed in the XVI century and 
there is little to no evidence. Furthermore I would argue that the truth is actually the opposite 
of what Heer postulates. It was not the inheritance of Bohemia in 1526 that prevented the 
emergence of the Austrian nation but it is the factor that contributed mostly to its emergence. 
Without the Austrian imperial expansion, either dynastic or military into the non-German 
lands there would be no institutional framework, no institutional exoskeleton that would 
support the birth and development of a genuine Austrian identity and therefore the Austrian 
nation. The multiethnicty of the Habsburg lands prevented the unification with Germany and 
led to straight rejection in the Frankfurter Parliament in 1848. Also the fact that his book does 
not contain the description of the Austrian identity after 1945 is a huge flaw. Having written 
the book in the 1980‟ties Heer had plenty social studies regarding the Austrian identity at 
hand. The fact that Heer was a devout catholic and an opponent of the National Socialism, 
being prosecuted and arrested on several occasions as well as fighting in resistance groups 
really shows in his book. The true Austrian identity in his opinion is limited to the catholic, 
Habsburgist Austria. On several occasions Heer mentions that Austria is a multi-voiced entity, 
but he does so only to confront it with the simple and barbaric Germany. Germany would 
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never understand us… as Rudolf Habsburg once said327.  The religious influence is also 
traceable in the vocabulary and the way he frames certain issues. Political views are seen as 
confessions, one believes in the faith of the German-nation, or like Otto Bauer is the apostle 
of the German faith etc. Being a part of the nation, or having an identity is a matter of 
“national faith”. Protestantism in Heers view is the bane of civilisation it was the start of the 
doubtful progress from humanity, through nationality¸ to bestiality328. Austrian identity is cast 
as a permanent victim of historical developments, which had to correspond well with the idea 
of Austria as the first victim of the Nazi aggression. However things were to change soon. 
Friedrich Heer‟s book has undeniable Austrian charm to it and marks the both the pinnacle of 
Austrianist historiography as well as its end. Only three years later in 1984 Ernst Brückmuller 
published the first edition of his constructivist analysis Nation Österreich329. The publishing 
of Brückmuller‟s work heralded a new era for Austrian historiography in a similar way that 
the Waldheim Affair of 1986 changed the political discourse in Austria.  In many ways 
Nation Österreich is a constructivist mirrored reflection of Der Kampf um die 
österreischuchce Identität. The influence of constructivists like Deutsch and Hobsbawm are 
clear in Brückmuller‟s book as he structures his narrative around the nation-building. There is 
much more space devoted to the role of myths, stereotypes and historical phenomena that 
form nations. The crucial is the role of the state and Brückmuller highlights the history of the 
formation of the Austrian state and the inclusion of particular regions. The historical 
processes that transformed the ethnos into a nation are reformation, the development of new 
means of communication, enlightenment and secularisation. The rise of Protestantism is not a 
bane for Brückmuller, like it was for Heer, instead it is one of the boosters of nation 
formation. Reformation replaced traditional identity carriers – namely the Catholic Church 
and transfers those formative competences to the ruler or state. Brückmuller goes even as far 
as saying that the modern nation could only form firstly in the protestant countries330. 
Catholicism is a force that prevents modern nation formation. In catholic societies only 
secularisation would enable the creation of modern nations, as the example of France shows. 
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Unlike his predecessors Brückmuller differentiates the meaning of nation, he does not dismiss 
the idea that there were nations already in existence before the XIX century; they only had a 
different meaning and ethnic or regional limitations. Aside for the sociological part of the 
book that deals with surveys among the population regarding their identity or relations to 
other nations as well as national symbols and heroes the historical narrative follows the “from 
ethnic to national” identity trope. The local identity is still relevant for modern Austrians and 
in some cases it could be understood as the variation of national identity. With the rejection of 
Germannes of 1945 one the gap in identity was filled in by a placeholder of regionalism. In 
that case regionalism needs to be regarded as an expression of a broader Austrian identity. For 
Brückmuller the regional identity is one of the most persistent characteristics of self-
identification331. The local identity has been the main identification pattern in Austria, which 
being a mountainous region. Only the development of state apparatus brought the separated 
localities on the path to modern nation and that is why the policies of the Habsburg rulers 
regarding state building are of as much importance as the nation formation processes. The 
amassing of power by the Habsburgs meant also state building332. The declining influence of 
local barons and estates meant the monopolisation of security and protection as well as tax 
policies. The road to absolutist monarchy led to the creation of ever-growing central 
administration. The slow growth of capitalism since the XVI century also strengthened the 
role of the central administration. In the beginning of the XVIII century the central court 
(Hof) counted 2175 personnel333. It is the court that is perhaps the most thought provoking 
concept presented in Nation Österreich. Brückmuller proposes the idea of the existence of a 
premodern version of the Austrian nation in the form of the „court nation“ (Hofratsnation). 
The court nation consisted predominantly of the elites coming from clerical, military, 
aristocratic and eventually from burgers and city bourgeoisie334. It was not a homogenous 
group; it was only united in their function for the state and dynasty. Brückmuller only shows 
the expression of the existence of this nation in literature and poetry but does not put this 
concept in any theoretical point of reference. The Hofratsnation has to be categorised as a 
premodern political nation and could be compared to the aristocratic nation of the Polish I 
Republic (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). In both cases the nation was meant politically 
not ethnically and was built of people of different ethnicities. They used a common tongue 
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(Latin or German).  There was also clear class distinction, more in the Polish case than the 
Austrian. The elites were also more privileged but this factor was less and less important in 
Austro-Hungary, which saw some democratisation processes.  The Hofratsnation was also 
slightly more modern than the aristocratic nation of the Commonwealth. It had to be 
understood as a society of clerks and soldiers, who all in all belonged to the Kaiser. In 
comparison to the Polish aristocratic nation, the Hofratsnation was open to some parts of 
burgher elite. The court nation was also not very numerous, it could count at maximum 
200.000 people in an empire of 50 million people335. It was very limited by class and numbers 
and did not find any ways to become a mass movement. While there were examples of old 
Austrian patriotism of the members of Hofratsnation it did not develop into a mass 
phenomenon. There was no k.u.k patriotismus but a lot of more and more radical pan-German 
sentiment336. 
Brückmuller blames the monarchy for not modernising the nation formation processes. 
Till the late XVIII century the state was modernising itself in a way that served proper nation 
formation but since then this stopped and the social mobility became limited despite a certain 
liberalisation of civic rights337. Looking from a different perspective Brückmuller actually 
confirms the thesis of Heer that it was the time of enlightenment that damaged the formation 
process of the Austrian nation but the reason is quite dissimilar if not the opposite. Heer 
believed it was enlightenment that undid the achievements of the dynasty in building a nation 
and Brückmuller highlights the lacks in modernisation. Because of the ossified social 
structures and overrepresentation of aristocracy on high positions (even aristocrats of different 
ethnicity than German, like the government led by Kazimierz Badeni of mixed Polish-Italian 
descent). The parliament (Reichsrat) had too few prerogatives to play a role in political 
integration. The politics of Austro-Hungarian imperialism contributed to national 
disintegration rather than integration and alienated all the national groups within the empire 
with the exception of Germans. Adding the relative slow modernisation of economy and 
social structures to the equation only brought the result of a fiasco in forming an Austrian 
nation. The only moment, during the Napoleonic period, that created some Austrian 
sentiment, so thoroughly, described by Heer, but the fire faded as quickly and it was ignited. 
Because of the mixed composition of the Austrian monarchy it was linguistic nationalism that 
                                                          
335 This is just an estimate not grounded in sources. It is important to mention though that Miroslav Hroch 
connects the viability of a nation with the number of its members. The number of 0.5 million people he mentions 
is arbitrary but backed by empirical and comparative data.  
336 Ibidem, p. 374. 
337 Ibidem, p. 269. 
142 
 
became the dominant form and obviously the German speaking population felt as a part of a 
bigger German speaking population. Brückmuller continues to show an abbreviated story of 
nation formation of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Italians, Croats, Serbs, Slovenians, Slovaks, 
Romanians, Ruthenians and Jews. As for the Germans, Brückmuller frames their nation 
formation as a dual process – or in fact two separate German nation formation processes. 
While there were some Austro-patriots they were mostly members of the Hofratsnation, most 
of the German speaking population falls into the category of Austrian-Germans. The other 
formation process created the alternative of Reichsdeutsche. The distinction was so strong that 
many, including Heirnich von Treitsche or Theodor Mommsen were speaking against the 
integration of Austrian-Germans into the II German Reich338. Nevertheless, functioning in 
two different state organisms created two nation formation models for the Germans. Yet the 
formation in Austria was based on the same sources as in Germany. Austrian-Germans were 
still moulded by Weimar classics like Goethe, Herder and Schiller. The schools of Austria 
taught the history of the German Reich339. 
 Modernisation and development of capitalism only strengthened the pan-German 
longings of the Austrian-German bourgeoisie. The revolutionary streams of the XIX century 
steered the German speaking burghers towards integration with Germany as being a part of a 
bigger economic entity would benefit them and allow social mobilisation upwards – a trend 
that was limited in the Austrian(-Hungarian) monarchy. The growing national tensions in the 
Habsburg realm only reinforced the German national feeling and radicalised the German 
nationalism – this radicalisation became most evident after the fall of the Austrian Empire in 
the I Republic. The erosion of the pan-Germanism only came during the times of Ostmark and 
the II World War340. Brückmuller ends this part of narrative with the conclusion that despite 
an existence of a cultural affiliation towards Germannes in the Austrian population they do 
identify as Austrians and not Germans.  
The narrative constructed by Brückmuller bears clear and significant influences of 
constructivism and Hobsbawm in particular. The role of the state institutions and the elites is 
paramount, as well as the influence of revolutions and mythbuilding. The Austrian case, he 
argues is specific because of the weakness and failures of aristocracy in the regions and their 
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numerous deaths in the Thirty Years War, led Austria to the model of absolute monarchy and 
growth of central administration341. These developments led to the formation of the 
Hofratsnation. The modern nation formation process in the XIX century was limited because 
of slow development of industrialisation as well as no revolutionary incentives. The romantic 
visions of national construction of the Napoleonic period represented by count Stadion  were 
thwarted by the conservative era of Metternich. Also since 1848 the step by step liberalisation 
in the Habsburg Empire led to politicisation of conflict in the forms of political parties rather 
than to revolutionary movements. The long continuities of the Habsburg rule were not 
favourable of the creation of modern “invented traditions”.  Austria did not have to invent its 
traditions till because there were real traditions in place and they were not really supporting 
the formation of the Austrian nation. The invention of traditions was also rather slow in the I 
Austrian Republic. Only after 1945 the state embarked on a mission to form new traditions, 
mostly because it had to.  
All the “traditional” nation forming institutions like celebration days, army and 
schools revolved around the idea of the monarchy342. The main celebration day till 1916 was 
the birthday of the Kaiser, the army was not fighting for the homeland or the nation but for the 
Kaiser and the schools did not teach about Austria but about monarchy and about German 
culture. It is clear that no Austrian nation formation process could appear in those 
circumstances and Brückmuller indeed uses the term Austrian Germans to describe the 
German speaking population of Austria. Nevertheless Brückmuller is not really free from the 
dreams of his Austrianist predecessors. Albeit from a new, constructivist and very modern 
perspective Brückmuller does also what Heer did before him. He is trying to find the Austrian 
identity in the literary works and events of the past and even surpasses Heer in this endeavour 
as he manages to find an Austrian nation before 1918! The so called “court nation” is indeed 
an interesting projection of primodrialist dreams into the constructivist reality. Almost by no 
definition would the Hofratsnation be qualified as a nation. It might have been a community 
of common destiny, but had no common history, ethnic background or even a common 
language (despite using German in formal occasions). Just by looking on examples of non-
German clerks of the empire like Kazimierz Badeni it is clear that his Polish identification 
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was stronger as the Austrian one343. Should the Hofratsnation be limited to just the ethnic 
Germans within the administration? The concept, while thought provoking, is an attempt to 
name a certain reality that appeared in the discourses of the time. But would the European 
clerks residing in Brussels be called a European nation? The idea is highly disputable if not 
refutable. There is also a significant lack of continuity of the Hofratsnation in the First 
Republic. There was no Hof anymore and this nation had to seek refuge in European 
cosmopolitanism (the vision of “postaristocratic” Austrian man), regionalism or pan-
Germanism. Brückmuller‟s narrative actually repeats the main idea of Friedrich Heer – there 
are many broken continuities in Austrian identity and nation formation that unabled the 
Austrian nation to actually form during the period of modernisation, during XIX and early XX 
centuries.  
In 1984 a German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann published his two essays: The 
track of Austria in German history and Three States, Two Nations, One People? In the first 
case Edrmann presents eleven points of intertwining of German and Austrian histories. The 
history of Austria starts with the German colonisation, the Celtic, Illyrian and Slavic 
populations of these terrains were overrun by the German settlers344.   The court of the 
Babenbergs played an important role in German culture, here NIbelungenlied was written, it 
was also the place of the poet Walter von der Vogelwiede. Austria, as Erdmann understands it 
was the  south-eastern part of the German realm. The Privilegium Minus did not in fact allow 
Austria to depart from the Holy Roman Empire – just changed its status within it. The 
religious strife that broke the German lands into two were in fact wars of princes and dukes 
and the peace of Augsburg of 1555 was a German achievement of human rights way before 
the French Revolution. Another religious war – against the Islamic Turks led to the creation 
of the legend of Prinz Eugen , a talented general of the time. Despite fighting in the Balkans 
on the “Austrian” southern front, he was regarded as a hero of all Germans.  The songs of the 
Prince Eugene, the noble knight, were truly, Germanic folk (people‟s) songs. His actions were 
regarded as the bulwark of Germany, not just Austria. In all Austrian wars many Germans 
from different regions served as the imperial army345.  Also culturally the “unique” Austrian 
baroque was indeed a part of a broader cultural trend that, with regional differences, could 
have been observed in all of Germany. The wars of Silesia between Prussia and Germany did 
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not stop the convergence of the two states – many reforms of the times of Enlightenment that 
were introduced in Austria, were inspired by their Prussian counterpart.  Erdmann challenges 
the concept of Heer that the Enlightenment completely destroyed the “Austrian psyche”, 
which was embodied in the culture of baroque. In fact the time of reforms was a general 
tendency in the whole German realm and it replaced the previous sensual baroque with new 
trends. It was a development of culture and civilisation not a destruction of one. In fact the 
reforms of Maria Theresa and Josef II are regarded as a highlight of not only Austrian but 
German civilisation. Even after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire by Napoleon, the 
Habsburgs continued to use its symbols as coat of arms etc. The Napoleonic wars united the 
rivals – Prussia and Austria with a common enemy. Our case is the case of Germany. With 
Austria Germany was independent and happy, only through Austrian‘s help can Germany 
both of them so spoke Archduke Charles Habsburg, Duke of Tetschen346. It is no coincidence 
that Erdmann quotes a member of the Habsburg dynasty. In fact he does this on several 
occasions. Kaiser Franz Joseph said: I am above all an Austrian, but decidedly German347. 
Erdmann does it to counter the quote of Rudolf Habsburg (Germany would never understand 
us…) so strongly emphasised in the works of Friedrich Heer. By doing so Erdmann counters 
the mirages of the young Kronprinz Rudolf and reminds the reader that most Habsburgs had 
also a German identity. The goal of Erdmann is to uncover the forgotten German legacy of the 
Habsburgs – the dynasty was not just solely and Austrian phenomenon. Not only the 
Habsburgs expressed their affiliation with Germany or German culture, the Austrian poets and 
writers like Grillparzer or Hugo von Hofmansthal could be used as examples. Erdmann 
continues to point out the clear desires of the population of the First Austrian Republic to be a 
part of Germany. The conflict between the Austrofascist Federal state and Nazi Germany has 
to be understood as a political one. The very fact that two similar developments occurred in 
1933 and 1934 in Germany and Austria show their likeness rather than differences. Even 
Schuschnigg himself had a vision of Austria as federal state of Germany – with many traits of 
sovereignty but leaving the foreign and military affairs to the government in Berlin348. The 
affiliation to Germany does not end there, after the Anschluss there were more members of 
the NSDAP per capita coming from Austria than from Germany. Erdmann is also kind 
enough to remind the Austrian of the forgotten part of the Moscow Declaration that Austria 
had to share its burden for the crimes committed during the fight on the side of Nazi 
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Germany. He then continues to ridicule the concept of the Austrian nation that appeared after 
1945. The appearance of nations in Europe carries positive memories about great, heroic 
deeds like regaining independence (Selbstbefreiung) from foreign powers, wars that were 
won, successful revolution; as well as perspectives for a dream of a common task for the 
future349. Not only are Austrians identical to the citizens of West-Germany but they have also 
developed as similar state patriotism – Verfassungpatriotismus in case of Germany or the 
neutrality and State Treaty celebrations by the Second Austrian Republic. Both Austrians and 
Germans have a strong regional identity that often surpasses the national one. Even the elites 
of Austria – the likes of Bruno Kreisky do not think of the national identity of Austrians as 
something important (there again Kreisky was an Austrian socialist, coming from a party that 
reluctantly joined the “austrianist bandwagon”).  
Erdmann concludes his argument by dissecting three arguments raised by Austrianist 
to justify the existence of the Austrian nation. Firstly the argument that Austrian history 
should be treated as the Swiss one and not be included into broader German history. 
Switzerland broke its state relations with the Holy Roman Empire the late medieval period 
and since then never sought any reintegration to the German realm. On the contrary Austria‟s 
partition from the German realm was a result of a fight for the hegemony within it not an 
attempt from Austria to be separated. There was little German nationalism in Switzerland in 
the XIX century in comparison to Austria and later Austria and Germany shared similar fates 
during both World Wars. The second argument is a comparative one and tries to juxtapose 
Austria and the Anglo-Saxon nations. While stemming from the same root the Britons, 
Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders constitute different nations – like supposedly 
Austrians and Germans. Erdmann argues that all those states from in fact the Commonwealth 
of Nations and still have the British queen as their titular sovereign. The third argument goes 
as follows: the existence of many German states is the historical norm, not the times of 1938-
1945 when all the lands were united under one rule. Erdmann wrote his book before the 
unification of Germany so the three German states are the: Federal Republic of Germany, 
Democratic Republic of Germany and Austria. Even if Austria forms a separate state it still is 
a part of German history, very much how Saxon, Hessian or Prussian histories are a fraction 
of a bigger German whole. Austrian politicians and historians are hostile towards the idea of 
being part of Germany very much how the kleindeutsch historians like Treitschke used to be 
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negatively addressing Austria. Erdmann concludes that perhaps there is no Austrian nation but 
only an Austrian state identity. If one has to speak about the Kulturnation than there is only 
one and it is German350. Austrians would not truly understand who they are if they do not look 
into the German history, as well as Germans could not understand themselves fully if they 
have omitted Austria. 
Obviously the book that Erdmann presented problems for Austrian historians and its 
publishing led to a small Historikerstreit – an argument in-between historians.  The outrage in 
Austria was immense and among the angered voices the strongest one belonged to Gerard 
Stourz. Other historians have to be mentioned as well: Georg Schmidt, Erika Weinzierl (the 
author of the first history of the II Austrian Republic) and Moritz Csaky. The reaction was 
deeply emotional and showed not only that the veil of Austrian identity was very thin and 
fragile but also that a scholarly dispute could touch the very identity of the historians. The 
discussion that followed was definitely not sine ira et studio. Eirka Weinzierl said that she 
belongs to the group of Austrians, for whom, the year 1945, the liberation of Austria, was the 
most important and most positive political event of their lives. I dedicate myself to the 
Austrian nation351. The call to reintroduce Austrian history as a part of German history for the 
Austrianist authors recalled the times of German nationalism, Nazism and looked like an 
intellectual Anschluss. For her the moment when Austrian history ceased to be a component 
of German counterpart was 1866 and the expulsion of Austria from the German 
Confederation. She also called the military camaraderie of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 
unholy352. Moriz Csaky discredited the Germannes of Austria by downplaying the issue of 
language and elevating Slavic and Italian influences. Language is by no means fundamental 
for people and a nation – so we were taught not only by modern linguistics and sociology, but 
also by the daily consciousness of the overwhelming part of the population in this country, 
whose representatives feel more at home in Trieste, Prague or Zagreb than in Kiel or 
Hamburg, precisely where German is spoken353. Csaky‟s argument raises several topics at 
once. It evokes the old Habsburg legacy of a multi-ethnic empire and juxtaposes the „north” 
as a real of different civilisation. Csaky expresses what Anton Pelinka calls the fantasy or the 
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dream of Austrian Mitteleuropa354. Pelinka was sceptical of Austria‟s role in the region both 
regarding the past as well as the present. Austria did not create a central European entity 
because it did not share the democratization processes equally among the non-german 
population of the Empire. And in the current times Austria has to be regarded more as a 
Western country rather than central-european. Gerard Stourzh argued that the idea of the three 
German states is rooted in the hitlerite vision of Grossdeutschland – it is the starting point and 
the three German states are just mere successor states (like with the division of Alexander the 
Great Empire into three Hellenistic successor states). The fact is that the unification under the 
Nazi boot did nothing but destroyed the unity within the nation and led to the separation of 
Austrians. Erdmann himself stated that the plurality of the German statehood was the norm 
and unity was the exception so his argument is a logical fallacy. Stourzh also points out that 
Erdmann uses the state and cultural nation terms and distinctions quite arbitrarily regarding 
the split of West and East Germany. He also points out that Erdmann never really challenged 
the idea of the existence of the Austrian nation355. The failure of the I Austrian Republic and 
the desire of joining with Germany have to be understood as a failure of the transformation 
from an Empire to a Republic. The fact that there is a distinct Austrian identity means that 
there had to be some foundations in history that served as reference points. Erdmann‟s 
concept of dreigeteilte Germany is a misappropriation356. Schmidt went even further and 
thought that the connection that Erdmann tried to establish was simply a way to make Austria 
responsible for the horrors of the II World War357. Austria was not a part of German 
community of fate.  
There were also voices of support to Erdmann, most notably from Fritz Fellner who 
found Erdmann‟s contribution rather liberating and a return to German pluralism. German 
history was, in Fellner‟s opinion, limited to the German nation state formed in 1871 which 
hindered the development of other perspectives like the regional one or any comparative study 
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for that matter358. The fall of the Third Reich instead of being a liberating moment for 
historical science led Austria to the abuse of its autonomy and spurred Austrian close-
mindedness and chauvinism. Erdmann opened up the discussion that could lead back to the 
more „federalised” history – pluralistic and diverse. Fellner did not have a problem with 
understanding Austrians as a part of a broader German identity – in fact only when compared 
with it Austria could show its uniqueness.  
Another German contribution to the Austrian discussion came from the prot city of 
Hamburg. In the years 1995-1999 the Institute for Social Research in Hamburg prepared an 
exhibition named Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944 (The war of 
annihilation. Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944). The exhibion‟s goal was to show the 
fact that the army of the Third Reich did not just conduct regular military operations but it 
was also a part of the murderous machine that led to the deaths of millions of Jews, POWs 
and civilians359. The connection between military actions and genocide deconstructed the 
narrative of “unblemished” Wehrmacht. In many German and Austrian narratives the two 
topics were presented separately and the crimes were attributed to the SS. The exhibition 
showed the world of the perpetrators that was not limited to the leaders but included the 
masses of soldiers: a whole spectrum of German and Austrian society. War of annihilation 
was shown in twenty eight German and six Austrian cities between 1995 and 1999 and was 
seen by more than a million visitors Anna Wolff-Powęska noticed that the most important 
result of that exhibition was the confrontation with one‟s self-image. It was like seeing a 
family portrait, a multi-generational experience360. The Austrian society was shocked much 
more than its German counterpart. All in all it were the Austrians who not only had an 
overrepresentation in the Waffen SS but also the Wehrmacht units that comprised of Austrian 
recruits had the lowest numbers of desertions361. The reactions to the exhibition were wide 
from approval to fierce critique. The biggest dissonance was created by the stories told by the 
families to their children that differed from what was presented.  
The political parties had different reactions to the Wehrmacht exhibition, ÖVP did not 
support it, SPÖ showed timid support, the Greens endoresd the idea and FPÖ openly criticised 
it. Jörg Haider spoke that the exhibition presents the generation of grandfathers and 
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grandmothers as criminals and he would become the champion of the Wehrmacht generation 
and support it‟s good name362. The media were positive about the exhibition but the letters 
sent to the editorial were not. Many wrote to defend members of their own families. There 
was a broad disavowal of guilt363. There was little place for arguments and the discussion was 
emotional. It used clichés with little to none empathy towards the victims of war of 
extermination. At the same time many people who served in Wehrmacht decided to write their 
memories down testifying about the crimes that this army has committed. It took 50 years 
since the end of the war to start coming to terms with the terrible legacy of the past in the 
Austrian population.  
Both the Historikerstreit and the Wehrmacht exhibition did not make a giant 
contribution to the discussion about the Austrian nation it was mainly emotional and 
psychological. When the argument settled down and new tendency emerged and efforts were 
made to escape the ties of Austrianist historiography (it was never not totally free from its 
influences though). Scholars like Anton Pelinka continued to radically reject the narratives 
formed by historiography calling them opportunistic lies and deceptions364. Pelinka dissected 
the ideas of Austria being a part of Germany or being a part of Central Europe. Both he rejects 
and sees the process of the unification of Europe as a possibility for Austrians to finally come 
to terms with the problems of their past and their identity. In united Europe – the Austrian 
identity could become a synthesis of what once constituted the quarrel among historians365. 
 Younger generations even propose rejecting the 1000 year old Austrian history when 
speaking about the Austrian identity and nation. Building of Austrian nation has almost 
automatically developed over these last five decades, I would suggest that we should not 
hinder its further growth by referring too often and too much to Austria‘s 1000 years of 
history, which for such a long time have failed to create a truly Austrian identity366. 
The question of the Austrian national identity cannot be answered – because it always needs 
to be asked again and again it is in constant statu nascendi.  
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2.5. Closing comments 
 
The historiography of the Second Austrian Republic shows a radical change to what came 
before it. Historians took part in a heated debate that directly influenced the nation-formation 
processes. However it took three long decades for Austrian historians to start publishing 
books and monographs devoted to the history of the reborn country and newly born nation. 
The first history of the Second Republic was published in 1972367.  Austrians got their point 
of reference to the Second Republic and not the already non-existent imperial Habsburg state. 
The change of perspective was immense. No longer were the Austrian historians looking at 
Germany as the framework for Austrian history. In fact it was the Austrian lands that served 
as the ultimate definition of territorial reach of Austrian history.  History was no longer 
defined by the pre-existing empire but was written from the point of view of the small alpine 
republic. The ethnicity played a major role in the beginnings of historical narratives. 
Influences of Illyrians, Celts, Slavs, and Magyars were emphasised over the rather obvious 
Germanic ethnic dominance. History was written in a way that focused on the growing of 
sovereignty of Austria that was only fully achieved in the Second Republic – the embodiment 
of the thousand year‟s long march towards an independent state. The story of unification of 
various Austrian lands under different dynasties served a similar purpose – to show the end 
effect. Austrian historiography became teleological to the core.  
 Austria stopped being viewed as the periphery of the German world and was looked 
upon as a centre of a new entity. Since it was the history of the land that came into focus the 
chronological dimension of Austrian historiography was expanded and reached more to the 
past. The pre-germanic tales of different tribes, and the Roman presence in the shape of the 
provinces of Noricum and Raetia was equally important as the later Germanic settlement. 
While the prehistory of Austria was of significance the signs of individuality only appeared 
after the Germanic tribes settled in the Alps – the historical Ostarrichi served as mythical 
claim to (independent) statehood. The approach towards nation for the most part was 
primordial – the formation of Austrian nation was believed to be influenced by the tribes of 
antiquity, which already assumes continuity. What once constituted a bulk of German history 
was purged of the German context and presented solely and exclusively from the Austrian 
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perspective. The wars with Turkey – were an Austrian and not German affair, same goes for 
the works of culture (music especially).  
In this dominance of primordial narrative William Bluhm was the odd one out. While 
starting his narrative in 1808 he de facto points at 1945 as the starting point of conducting a 
policy of national integration (in comparison with the disintegration of society in previous 
eras). The works of Bluhm and Bruckmüller constitute a constructivist turn but not without its 
limitations. The bashing of the Austrianist historiography became the norm – both Anton 
Pelinka and later Peter Thaler rejected the primordialist visions and focused on moder nation 
making similarly to what Bluhm had done almost three decades before them. While the 
primordialists tried to emphasise continuity Heer delivered a paradox – Austria‟s continuity 
were its multiple discontinuities. It was a way in which the primordial point of view tried to 
tackle the issue of the non-emergence of the Austrian nation before 1945. The constructivist 
had no such problems – with the exception of Bruckmüller they stated that there was no 
Austrian nation before the II World War. The case of Ernst Bruckmüller is interesting because 
while using constructivist tools he still could not abandon the task of placing the Austrian 
nation as much in the past as his theoretical framework allowed him to. Nevertheless 
Bruckmüller sought for the symbolism and myths that were linked to past events of the 
medieval and early-modern period that formed the canon of Austrian imaginary. Interestingly 
though he himself quotes social surveys that always point to the alpine landscapes as the most 
prominent Austrian image368. Nature topples history. In many cases the material heritage of 
the past that carries symbolic or mythic potential could not be used in the Austrian case. First 
of all most of the heritage is connected with the times of the monarchy and the modern state is 
a Republic. For instance the crown of St. Stephen is a symbol of Hungarian continuity, the so 
called Crown of Chrobry, a Polish symbol was looted by the Prussians in 1795 and molten 
into coins. In 2003 a replica of that crown was made with the use of the gold from the coins, 
so it contains parts of the original crown. The royal insignia of the Holy Roman Emperors 
which are stored in Wien do not serve any of those purposes. Similarly for national heroes – 
Austrians usually point at musicians like Mozart or Strauss, the first ruler that comes to mind 
is Maria Theresa, because of her reforms369. She is followed by a modern politician – dr Karl 
Renner who is used as a symbolic figure of the “founding father” of the republic (he even has 
the privilege of being the father of not one but two republics). The focus on art and partially 
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education shows the strong rejection of “Germani (Prussian)” values. Friedrich Heer praised 
the love of poetry of the “Celtic ancestors” of Austrians in comparison to militaristic Germans 
from the north. While Heer emphasised the times of the counterreformation and military 
success against the Ottomans and framed them as the “golden age” of Austrian history it is the 
liberal era of Franz Joseph that serves as an example against the primitive and barbaric 
German politics of the late XIX century. The historiography of the Second Republic also 
frames the period after 1955 as the new golden age – the most prosperous time for the 
inhabitants of Austria in the entirety of its history370.  
The rejection of Germannes is probably the most important feature of Austrianist 
historiography. Friedrich Heer‟s and Felix Kreissler‟s works are perfect examples of 
complementary books that focus meticulously on finding as any expressions of Austrian 
identity as possible. Quite conveniently Heer‟s books ends at the very moment when 
Kreissler‟s starts its narrative (the year 1938).  Only the second half of the 80‟ties brought the 
discussion and allowed a small part of Austrian historians accept their affiliation to the 
broader German culture. While prevalent for the first forty years of the Second Republic, the 
rejection of Germannes became weaker and weaker as the time distance from the horrors of 
the II World War became larger and larger. Nevertheless the anti-German stance occurred 
during the vital moments of nation-formation and has to be regarded as one of the most 
important factors. Austrian historiography made a geographical demarcation from Germany 
and focused only on the history of the lands that form the Second Austrian Republic. The 
historiography is completely Austrian focused with a clear narrative of reaching the Second 
Republic as the pinnacle of Austrian fate and its ultimate goal. What used to be German is 
appropriated to be Austrian. While the mixed ethnic heritage is mentioned and became almost 
a ritual for the Austrianist historian there is little to none efforts to actually focus on the non-
German history of Austrian lands. The Celtic, Slavic or Magyar population of Austria is 
absent from the narratives that focus on the rulers, and dynasties (most notably the 
Habsburgs). The historians‟ objective was to emphasise the continuity of Austrian history and 
frame the Anschluss as an anomaly. Interestingly enough an Austrian historian Benedikt and 
the American Katzenstein  and German Erdmann treat the Anschluss as an anomaly but on 
different grounds. Benedikt believes in the continuity of the Austrian statehood, Katzenstein 
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shows that being disjoined is a result of internal factors of Austrian society and economy and 
Erdmann treats Austria as another German state, having in mind that through most of German 
history it was always divided by a myriad of states. 
 Quite surprisingly the issue that combines most of the Austrian historians that 
completely disagree on other issues like Heer, Zöllner and Pelinka is the belief that the 
common destiny of Austrians lies in Europe – that Austria has some special civilizational 
mission or that Austrian identity will be expressed through a broader European identity. This 
however could be just a version of a postcolonial complex of the colonists for their Central-
European „space of colonisation”. This idea has just been transformed into the Austrian 
burden of civilising Europe371. The high level of emotion and ideology in Austrian 
historiography spurred radical reactions and critique, including the voices to abandon 
Austrian historiography entirely. When the generation of historians that were directly victims 
of the Anschluss and the Nazi regime gave way to the newer ones the focus on Austrian 
identity and Austrian nation weakened and became less and less relevant. The topic of 
Austrian identity became more prominent among political scientists and sociologists like 
Pelinka, Rathkolb or Wodak, and they focused more on the politics of the Second Republic 
and the present identity rather than historical.  
While historians and historiography do play an important role in nation formation their 
influence is in fact limited. In the Austrian case it is the politics of the state and the state 
(political) elites that bear the palm. Historians play a vital role in creating national imaginary 
– such as pinpointing the geographical and temporal limits to the country and nation, without 
public policy though the influence of historians would be much weaker. Therefore it is crucial 
to investigate the state policies of nation making.  
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3.1 Political elites  
 
While a nation cannot exist without its members being aware of their nationality, the 
forming of the nation cannot take place without specific activates of groups and 
individuals372. In such way Hroch tries to dismiss the abstract influence of nationalism in 
nation making. It is always certain actors and groups that promote certain ideas and attitudes. 
As seen in the previous chapter historians are one such group that speaks in the name of the 
nation. Yet the influence of those scholars is limited and the focus must shift to the people 
(actors) in power. By that I do not mean the government perspective advocated by 
Hobsbawm. While in most cases of Western countries the nations were “state-nations” that 
were constructed in synergy with the institutions of the state it is not always the case. In the 
first chapter of this thesis I have pointed out that the understanding of the nation was limited 
to the elites, who more often than not were also the deponents of political power.  From 
aristocracy of Germany speaking lands, Hungary and Poland to the gentry and bourgeoisie of 
England and France the elites were the driving force in nation-formation. The Austrian case is 
similar in many ways to the French one as it is an example of a state-nation. Yet the Austrian 
nation building took part in the times of lack of or limited sovereignty (1938-1955) only to 
reach the state nation level in later years.  The transformation into modern nation has to be 
placed with the fall of the monarchy and establishment of the I Austrian Republic. The 
problem is of course that at the time even if the elites showed some degree of Austrian 
national consciousness they did not create substantial nation building processes. When the 
elites themselves doubted the viability of both Austria and the Austrian nation the Hroch‟s 
phase B and C could not come into fruition. Almost all theoretical preconditions for the 
creation of a nation did not occur in the Austrian case before 1945. The prewar elites of the 
first Austrian Republic did not believe that they were Austrians. Almost all political parties 
wanted to reunite with Germany (with the exception of the Habsburg imperialists and the 
international communists). Historians like Heinrich von Srbik or Hugo Hantsch wrote about 
Austria as a German state373. Even the Austro-fascists like Dolfuss believed that they 
belonged to the German nation of culture. There was no Austrian national movement. 
Political activity focused either on Pangermanism or Paneuropeanism. The German language 
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was treated as a cultural connection to Germany and the legacy of the Habsburg was treated 
as part of German history. The ethnic roots were understood as German. The Habsburg 
Empire has not created its own Austrian identity. The state administration was loyal to the 
dynasty and not to the state, not to mention the nation. There was no will to be Austrian. At 
the same time the mere existence of a state is already a perquisite for nation formation. 
Despite the fact that the Austrian national consciousness had little popular support and the 
government did not priories nation-building policies the state did undertake some actions that 
could be classified as such. As Zygmunt Bauman wrote: The state is eager to use the 
authority of the nation, in order to support the requirement of loyalty. At the same time 
nations tend to from themselves into states in order to use the state power of obligation to 
promote unity374. 
The other issue that has to be mentioned is the geographical location of Austria. The 
country is surrounded by states that in their majority applied the cultural model of nation-
making (without the support of the state). The main reason for that is the fact they were part 
of multinational empires, with Austria being the prime example. This distorted the Austrian 
nation making process balancing it between the cultural and state models. In the I Austrian 
Republic there was a state but there was a nation, and both the general populace and the 
majority of the elites worked against the “natural state agenda of nation making” towards 
integration with Germany. Only after 1945 when the geopolitical factors and international 
policy formed and independent Austria that was viable the state-nation building process could 
come into fruition.  
Without doubt that Austrian nation making even in the first Republic and even more 
so in the second was led by the members of the independent professional class. While there 
was some interdependency and interweaving with (former) aristocracy the political leaders 
recruited from upper-middle and middle classes.  Quite interestingly the people who operated 
in the I Austrian Republic were also active in the II. The best example is dr Karl Renner who 
is considered the founding father of both Republics and a statesman of two eras. 
The First Republic was ridden with political conflict and high tensions, a short civil war 
included. The Second could not be different. The same people that were at each other throats 
before 1938 only several years later achieved an unprecedented and rarely found consensus.  
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3.2 The parties of Consensus – ÖVP and SPÖ 
 
            The politicians of ÖVP and SPÖ belong to political entities that count as one of the 
oldest in Europe.  The conservative party can trace its roots from the Christlichsoziale Partei 
Österreichs- CS that was founded in 1893 and the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei 
Österreichs – SDAPÖ stated operating even earlier in 1889. To understand the genesis of the 
consensus one has to look at the turbulent times from 1934 to 1945. The first victims of the 
times were the socialists who were persecuted by the Austrofascist regime. In turn the 
Austrofascist who recruited mostly from the conservative camp found themselves on the 
rougher side after the Anschluss in 1938. During the time both the Austrian conservatives and 
social democrats were persecuted. While the political elites of the I Austrian Republic 
suffered the general population was expressing enthusiasm that was genuine and 
spontaneous375. The discontent among the masses stated to grow only after the Stalingrad 
battle in 1943 and the defeat of the Axis forces. After the II World War the myth of Austria as 
a victim was created and the Anschluss was the primary act of aggression. The crimes and 
victims of the Austrofascist were forgotten or downplayed. The conservatives presented this 
regime as the last defence against the German aggression. While the socialist camp held 
different views on that matter it did not express major concerns as both fell victims to the 
Nazis. The so called “common concentration camp experience” was supposed to form the 
basis of consensus after the War. A text from the witness of history of the Dachau 
concentration camp Rudolf Kalmar recounts: Now we stood in the square, tired, hungry and 
mocked in the striped uniforms, and felt for the first time the entire staggering ridiculousness 
of our onward appearance. Ministers and state secretaries next to Austrian workers, high 
military officers and bureaucrats of the administration next to young Communists, men of all 
world views, all professions and classes. In the following years of indescribable suffering, we 
put everything divisive aside and sought out the true source of unity: humanity: whether we 
were poor or rich, great names or unknown people, had this or that profession, were 
Catholics or atheists, middle class or Socialists, revolutionaries or conservatives, Austrians 
or Germans, Dutch or French, Italians or Belgians, Luxemburgers or Greeks376. As many of 
his fellow inmates Kalmar was persistent in declaring Austrian nationality throughout his stay 
in the camp377. Kalmar‟s memories are a perfect example of establishing a myth of unity that 
transgresses class, ancestry and political views – a typical example of abstract national unity 
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that appeared under harsh circumstances (to recall Budyta-Budzyńska framework of crisis as 
a catalyst for the creation of national identity). 
The rebirth of Austria under the auspices of the Allied Powers was treated as Stunde 
Null  - the zero hour, a new beginning when all the bad deeds of the past are forgotten. During 
the Ii World War both the socialists and the conservatives had various plans for the future of 
Austria, remaining a part of Germany was considered by both sides378. Karl Hans Sailer a 
socialist journalist of the Arbeiter Zeitung wrote in 1942: There can be no doubt that Austria 
is German soil. Every attempt to magnify the difference between the Austrians and the other 
Germans to the point of talking of a separate Austrian nation has proven to be mere low 
grade agent‘s work379. The traditional pan-Germanism of the Austrian socialists was still 
prevalent. Among the conservatives many scenarios were analysed including creating a 
separate South-German state comprising of Austria and Bavaria or creating a Danube-
Confederation in the fashion of the fallen empire. This was all in vain as the decision was not 
to be made by Austrians but rather by the Allied Powers – who decided to create an 
independent Austria. That does not mean that Austrian political elites did not play a role in the 
establishment of the new state. Using his popularity and recognition as a symbolic figure Karl 
Renner managed, as a fellow socialist, to maintain positive relations with the Soviets. As the 
Red Army entered Ostmark Renner made a declaration of independence in the name of the 
nation. In this declaration, as president of the last freely elected democratic government, and 
by virtue of the authority I had recieved thereby from the Austrian people itself, I wanted ot 
call upon the country to declare its independence and to return to the democratic constitution 
of the republic380. In Vienna the conservatives now operating under the sign of the People‟s 
Party, Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) were included in the process of independence 
declaration and on 27th of April 1945 the socialists, conservatives and communists declared 
the Anschluss null and void. Unlike Korea or Germany, Austria was lucky to avoid being 
partitioned by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and a provisional government was 
established. It claimed power (under supervision of the Allies) over the whole territory of 
Austria – the integrity of the state was maintained even if it was difficult to travel between 
various occupation zones.  
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Another lucky coincidence was the fact that both in the socialist and conservative 
camps it were the moderates that took leadership. In the case of socialists Karl Renner and 
Adolf Schärf were considered the right-wing of the leftist party as well as Leopold Figl, Felix 
Hurdes and Lois Weinberger and Julius Raab were the left-wing of their right–winged party. 
This development made cooperation much easier. The rebranding of the conservative camp 
helped to disavow the Austrofascist past. The declaration of independence on behalf of the 
People‟s Party was signed by Leopold Kunschak, an experienced politician from the second 
row, but one of the few who opposed the dismantling of the state institutions by the 
Austrofascist regime in 1934. Even though it were the socialists who took the initiative in re-
establishing the state it were the conservatives that proved to be crucial in Austrian nation-
building. As mentioned before the socialist camp did not have many traditions and pan-
German thinking was not exceptional even after 1945. The conservatives on the other hand 
stressed the continuities in Austrian history and treated it as a separate cultural entity. The 
very first program of the ÖVP emphasised the heritage of those political groups which always 
stood on the ground of the Austrian tradition and independence. It also regarded the systemic 
cultivation of the Austrian spirit with sharpest emphasis on the autonomous Austrian cultural 
system, rooted in the Christian-occidental ideals which we have received from our 
forefathers381. The goal of the ÖVP was clear – to build an Austrian nation and the formation 
of a string and proud Austrian political and cultural consciousness382. The socialist party made 
no such claims only stressing the need to maintain sovereignty, interestingly tough it were the 
socialists who first advocated the neutrality of Austria – one of the hallmarks of Austrian 
national identity.  
In November 1945 it was the conservatives that won the first free elections with an 
absolute majority. Leopold Figl – the first chancellor of the II Austrian Republic invited the 
socialists to co-govern. It was a beautiful symbol of post-war unity and a stark contrast to the 
tensions of the years 1918-1938. This gesture was also the beginning of consensual politics 
and the beginning of a long story of the big „black-red” coalitions that lasted till 1966 and was 
renewed many times later. An informal system of party checks and balances was introduced 
(the so called Proporz System) and member of both parties were assigned jobs in state 
agendas in such a way that the members of one party were looking at the hands of their 
political competitors. The political integration was so successful that in 1965 there were more 
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members of political parties in Austria than in Germany383. While the socialists focused on 
economic policy of nationalisation of big industries (many of which were established by the 
Nazi regime during the times of the Ostmark) the conservatives took hold of education.  
In order to present the sentiments among the members of the victorious People‟s Party 
it will prove useful to quote the article of Alfred Missong, a Catholic journalist and one of the 
founders of the renewed ÖVP.  He wrote for the conservative Österreichische Monatshefte: In 
the first weeks and months after the liberation of our homeland from the German yoke, we 
experienced a wave of patriotic enthusiasm, as it could hardly have been recorded before in 
the eventful history of Austria. From the passionate protest against the German oppressor, 
who could now emerge elementary, grew a pure, clear and strong commitment to Austria, in 
which all sections of the population regardless of their partisan orientation participated. […] 
In this introduction Missong creates the myth of common resistance against the Germans 
during the occupation. But why did the Austrias do this, were they not German themselves? 
Missong continues: Certainly it is correct that the Austrians adopted the Bavarian dialect of 
the German language, but over the centuries they have changed this language profoundly not 
inconsiderable and so only adapted to their nature. An internal necessity, for instance blood, 
of choosing the German language as the means of popular communication in no way existed; 
for, according to his blood composition, the Austrian people at that time was a very colourful 
mixture of Illyrian and Celtic, Roman, Slavic, Magyar and Germanic elements. [...] Here 
Missong highlights the ethnic difference between Austrians and Germans – as the primary 
source of dissimilarity. The Austrian dialect of the German written language, which then 
emerged, deviated strongly from the Bavarian and has preserved this special feature to this 
day. […] There should be no doubt about the existence of an Austrian national culture, which 
is much more than a copy of German culture. Its contents are: the Austrian literature, which 
does not allow a mingling with German literature at its peak; Austrian art, which in the 
Baroque as well as in the Romantic period represents something completely selfish, sharply 
differentiated from German art; Austrian music, which always had its own paths of 
development which only occasionally touched or crossed the paths of German music; and 
finally also the Austrian science, which, even where it allowed itself to be dragged into the 
wake of the Germans, as in philosophy, history, and natural science, still has peculiarities 
that can not be explained by "stunting nuances" alone. [...] Folk customs, lifestyle, sentiment, 
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form of thinking and outward behaviour are also essential building blocks of a national 
culture. Not only the ethnic ties but also cultural set Germans and Austrians apart, from the 
elites to the common folk.  How deep the differences between Austrians and Germans are, 
has forced us to cooperate with the "German brothers" in recent years drastically enough ad 
oculos demonstrated. The pacifistic spirit of the Austrian alone would be sufficient to 
recognize in him the representative of a nation alien to the Germans, even opposing […] We 
Austrian is embellished with modesty; self-sufficiency. We work to live; the German lives to 
work. We respond to the adversity of life and our nearer environment with serenity, perhaps 
even with rants and grunts, which is not meant so seriously; the German strikes his fist on the 
table and tramples like the elephant in the china shop down everything that does not suit him 
or is incomprehensible. We know it always and everywhere that Austria is not the world, but 
that we are only one of the essential and irreplaceable pieces of the mosaic; the German does 
not see in the other nation its necessary complement, its salutary counterweight, but the 
enemy, whom the opponent Wodans has set into the world, so that the "German nature" takes 
offense at him and the sooner, the better, he makes. The satirical interpretation of the German 
national character: a German - a scholar, two Germans - an association, three Germans - a 
war, holds a most bitter truth, namely the truth that the German people is thoroughly a 
warrior people [...]. But who could say that the Austrian [...] thinks warlike and thinks of 
war? 384  Why to show such a lengthy quotation from Alfred Missong? Because he was the 
person mainly responsible for implementing these ideas into the party programmes of the 
ÖVP385. Even more radically Nadine Paulovic, a conservative member of the Austrian 
parliament wrote in the Österreichische Monatshefte: We Austrians have been able to liberate 
ourselves in the last possible moment from the clutches of a crushing Prussian subhumanness 
(Untermenschentum, because we intrinsically rejected the pan-German error386. A twisted 
echo of the pre-war ideology of Austria as better Germany surfaces here in the form of the 
Nazi terminology. The emotional reaction is clearly visible in the reactions and writings of a 
certain part of the conservative camp. A similar strongly emotionally biased point of view was 
represented by Felix Hurdes whose stark antipathy towards anything that is German is visible 
in his policy introduced in the Ministry of Education387.  The chairman of ÖVP Leopold Figl 
in December 1945 declared that Austria never was a second German state and that Austrians 
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do not come or stem from Germans388. The radical approach of the first post-war years was 
watered down in later years. The 1952 program spoke only about the protection of the 
Austrian independence of the state, protection worthy was also the Austrian cultural heritage 
and mentality389. The disappearance of the Austrian nation as a concept from the party 
programs became a constant in the case of ÖVP. In 1958 there is no mention, in 1965 and 
1972 programmes only the cultural exclusiveness and independence is mentioned390. The 
1995 program the rich and complex cultural identity is the only remark. It is noteworthy that 
ÖVP at the eve of the accession to the European Union the importance of Heimat (not the 
motherland) is mentioned391.  
The socialists had a less straightforward approach towards the concept of the Austrian 
nation and the Austrian national consciousness. For instance in 1946 a socialist newspaper  
Linzer Tagblatt the Austrians as Germans of Austrian citizenship. The nation was to be 
treated as a political entity, but at the same time as a part of the entire German cultural nation. 
Interestingly this article provoked the reaction of the Allied occupying forces forced the editor 
of the Tagblatt to be dismissed392. The fact that the symbolical figure of dr Karl Renner was 
stained by the support of the Anschluss in 1938 was not helping either. In the infamous 
interviews in Neue Wiener Tageblatt Renner spoke: Although not attained by the methods I 
support, the Anschluss is now a finished, historical act. I look at it with satisfaction after the 
humiliation of the 1918 and 1919, the treaties of Saint-Germain and Versailles. Renner was 
also a supporter of the annexation of the Sudentenland to Germany393. After the end of World 
War II Renner tried to distance himself from his past opinions. When Hitler‘s methods of 
oppression, his final intentions, especially the war plans became apparent the overwhelming 
majority of the (Austrian) population rejected the idea of Anschluss with strong hate. Now 
they wish for nothing more than the restoration of the independent Republic of Austria394. 
Nevertheless Renner never fully rejected his pan-German beliefs. On several occasions 
Renner called the Austrians as Germans of the Alpine countries, or when he spoke of the 
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ethnic composition of Austrians he mentioned the mixture of tribes: Bavarians, Swabians, 
Saxons, Franks and Hessians395 And yet Renner managed to find some understanding with the 
conservative camp on the basis of rejection of Nazism as an ideology that was a threat to 
socialists. For instance Friedrich Adler, the son of the founding father of the Austrian socialist 
movement - Victor Adler, did not want all the blame for the crimes of the war to go to the 
Germans. His anti-fascist views led him to the ascertainment that also Austrians were 
complicit in the crimes396. Adler was very vocal in his opinions: The intention of creatinf an 
Austrian nation is, in my opinion, entirely utopian. But if this reactionary, as well as nauseous 
Utopia should ever be realised – should the Austrians, in fact be faced with the choice 
between the Austrian nation and the German nation (which situation I shall fortunately not 
live tose) I would be the one of thos would without hesitation, elect to remain with the nation, 
for which, for example, Goethe‘s Gaust, Wagner‘s Ring of the Nibelungen, Freiligrath‘s 
poems of the revolution and Lassale‘s speeches do not belong to a foreign culture. The 
Austrians are, however, far removed from having to take such decisions. Today it is a matter 
of not allowing oneself to be intimidated and of realising that one can be a good Austrian as 
well as a good member of the German cultural community397. The ambivalence of socialist 
approach towards the Austrian national consciousness does not stem from Renner but he is a 
perfect example of how ideological traditions cause problems with Austrian nation-making. 
The SPÖ quickly learned (especially after interventions of the Allied occupation forces) that it 
is best not to mention the issue of Austrian nation. The programmes of 1947, 1952 and 1958 
make no mention of the Austrian nation. Only the last one briefly touches upon the 
independence and neutrality of the Austrian state398.  The trend continues in the 1978 program 
does not even hint at statements relevant to the issue of Austrian national consciousness. The 
silence is prevalent in the 1998 Grundsatzprogramm as well399.  32 as it does in the most 
recent policy.33 For the SPÖ, the topic is no longer up-to-date, but approaches to 
interpretations of historical events are elsewhere.34 
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In order to get a better glimpse of the  elites‟ point of view the work of William Bluhm 
comes in handy as during his Fulbright scholarship stay in Austrian in the years 1965-1966 he 
managed to conduct around 100 interviews with politicians and party members of different 
levels. The information collected by Bluhm is invaluable for the topic in question. There is of 
course the problem of such interviews as a politician is more inclined to say what is expected 
of him or her rather to speak about personal thoughts. Nevertheless, knowing those 
limitations, the sources can be treated accordingly.   
The (former at the time) Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus when asked about the 
Austrian nation described it as a state nation but at the same time did not believe in the 
separateness of Austrian culture. German is my mothertongue, Austria is my fatherland he 
said400. The reasons for the creation of the Austrian nation were the result of the German 
oppression after the Anschluss in the years 1938-1945. He also insisted that the national 
consciousness could not be decreed it is a result of good policy (both economic and social). In 
everyday life Austrians want to distinguish themselves from the Germans who come as 
tourists to Austria, because being different makes it more attractive from the tourism point of 
view401. The former vice-chancellor Hermann Withalm was similarly avoiding talking about 
the national consciousness as it was a waste of time. Only in action and integration of the 
masses (especially the working class). He believed that the fact that 95% of the population 
were ardent Austrians was the success of the policy of the coalition parties. There was little 
talk about what really constitutes and Austrian and the Austrian nation, the approach of the 
political elite of the conservatives seems to be utterly pragmatic. The definition of Austrian 
nationality is better to be left alone and purposely ambiguous.  
The second group interviewed by Bluhm were the national party functionaries. They 
were the people who connected the leadership with the local party groups and activist, they 
wers also significantly younger than the leaders – mostly men in their thirties. An unnamed 
member (A) of the general secretariat believed Austria to be something older that did not start 
in 1918 as the socialists believe402. The Austrian nation was still in the making and once the 
process would be finished it would be a good weapon to trump over the socialist opposition 
(on a side note, he could not be more wrong – the socialists won the next four consecutive 
elections). Another party clerk (B) rejected the idea of Austrian nation and believed it to be a 
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political problem that needn‟t be touched403. He thought that the idea of Austrian nation was a 
folly used as an immunization against the Anschluss idea and that in the times they were 
living it was no longer necessary. The negative approach was explained by the fact that the 
person connected it with nationalism and the horrors it caused in Europe. The community of 
Austrians is born through everyday problem solving not through ideology. This remark was 
probably the only one in line with the mentality of the ÖVP leadership. On the other hand 
another younger employee of the secretariat (C) was an energetic supporter of the Austrianist 
idea. His understanding of Austrian consciousness was more modern though.  He saw it as 
merger of the „black and red” traditions with liberal Catholicism and integration of workers 
and farmers as equally important. As the hallmark of new identity the neutrality of the 
Austrian state was mentioned. As a conservative he saw the neutrality as continuity of the 
“heart of Europe” and bridge-builder between European nations. Bluhm categorises this new 
and above party lines Austrianism as consensualist404. Bluhm also quantified this approach as 
predominant in the younger party members (among them Erhard Busek the future 
Chancellor). The emotional attachment of this generation of politicians to Austria was 
relatively strong. 
The last group of interviewees came from the local and provincial party structures of 
the ÖVP. More grounded to their electorate a conservative representative in Salzburg 
emphasised the problems of the identification with Austria among older generations. Only the 
economic success and state viability was the glue that held these people together with the 
country. It was the good situation on the job market that decreased social tensions405. The 
conservative governor of Tirol also emphasised his regional identity alongside the Austrian 
one. The Tyroleans were an ethnic mix of people from the north and south, east and west – 
therefore Tirol has a distinct identity406. The official from Salzburg defined Austria as a 
permanent borderland. Nowhere in this country there is a place that is further than 100km 
from a border. It is natural that regions like Salzburg tend to lean towards big economic 
centres outside of the country (Munich in this case).  
The socialist politicians were more outspoken about the German heritage in Austria. 
The mayor of Linz and upper Austrian provincial party chairman Ernst Koref writes in his 
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memoirs that he feels affinity towards his Germannes407. Adofl Schärf said in 1964 that there 
will always be a place for German heritage in Austria408. Bruno Kreisky, presumably in an 
interesting remark for the Polish reader, mentions German lands that are divided into four 
parts: West and East Germany, the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line and Austria. At the same 
time for Kreisky Austria is not purely a German country as it has Slavic and other 
influences409 
Luckily for us also William Bluhm had the chance to interview Kreisky before his 
ascent to power.  In the interview Kreisky said that for the SPÖ Austria means the Republic. 
The nation is defined by the form of government. In fact Kreisky said similar things as his 
conservative counterparts. The Austrian national identity is the result of the Anschluss,  and 
the successful politics of the black-red coalition. The issue of Austrian national consciousness 
was of little importance for Kreisky410. Another interviewee was Karl Czernetz a member of 
the parliament and a prominent ideologue of the SPÖ gave a rather non-ideological answer. 
For Czernetz the Austrian nation was a political one despite the fact that in Central Europe 
nations traditionally were understood as cultural constructs. But most of the Austrian 
population surely did not think in those terms – therefore the issue was useless411.  
A member of the lower level of socialist party apparatus (D) believed that Austrians 
were a state nation since 1945. The commitment to the state and to the constitutional rules of 
the republic preceded the development of a cultural consciousness. An Austrian cultural 
nation was still in the making and was based on the rejection of being German412. Another 
young party member (E) rejected the idea of language constituting a nation. He included 
Goethe as his heritage but on the same level as Dante, he mentions that Mozart was certainly 
Austrian and even Beethoven, despite being born in Bonn, became Austrian413.  On the other 
hand a young socialist ideologue (F) rejected the notion of Austrians as a cultural nation 
because of the issue of common language with Germans. In his mind there was no difference 
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between Austrian and German literature, and they should be treated as one. National 
consciousness is nevertheless of little importance and to be used as a political tool414.  
Going down on the regional level a socialist governor from Tirol spoke of ethnic 
similarities with Bavarians as they come from the same Bayuvar tribe (Bayuvarischer 
Stamm). We have a common language with the Germans. But American are never thought of 
as English are they? Just so in Austria we are not German.  Continuing the Stamm topic: All 
Austrians faw west as the Arlberg are Bayuvaren. The Voralbergers are Alemannen. A press 
officer of the local government of Voralberg also named the people of this land as 
Alemannen415. South Tyrol (which is a German-speaking part of Italy) was a purely German 
territory.  After that remark the governor corrected himself and spoke of  a purely Austrian-
Tyrolean character of South Tyrol.  
Bluhm mentions dozens of other interviews which mainly repeat what already has 
been written above but the most interesting remarks need to be addressed here. For instance a 
respondent from Burgenland (a land with mixed Slavic and Hungarian influences) was 
sceptical of  an idea of an Austrian cultural nation and didn‟t need it416.  Dr Hans Huebmer, a 
press officer in Voralberg local government said that in his heart there are three loyalties: 
Heimat Voralberg, Staat Österreich, Deutsche Kultur417. What was prevalent in the responses 
of the local officials was the emphasis on the locality and the differences between regions 
(Tirol vs east Austria etc.)  At the same time some socialist local party members from 
Innsbruck were against the politics of strengthening local identities. We are Austrians, we 
must build Austria, or we will be sucked up by the Germans. We require an Austrian 
consciousness in order not the be taken economically by the Germans. It is hard to shun the 
impression that the socialists are only sceptical about the regional identity policies because it 
is the domain of conservatives and a way to gain influence in the regions418.  
The image produced both by the analysis of the party programmes as well as the 
interviews show a rather pragmatic if not cynical approach towards Austrian national identity. 
There is little space for ideology. Only in the first years after 1945 some part of the 
conservative camp presented a radical anti-German stance (likes of Missong or Hurdes) but 
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they had to give way to more consensual politicians in the beginning of the 50‟ties. The party 
members tend to be proud of the economic, social and civic achievements of the II Austrian 
Republic regardless of party affiliation. In fact there is hardly any traceable difference 
between young generations of conservatives and socialists. The problem of Austrian national-
identity is better to be avoided as it could cause problems. There is some eagerness to use the 
concept in political rivalry among the younger generations of politicians. For Bluhm this is 
the moment when the Austrian nation is complete. This would in fact correspond with Hrochs 
phase C of nation-making: the establishment of political divisions within a consensus of the 
national idea. The concept of Austria as a cultural nation does not find much footing in the 
local structures and is seen as divisive. The growing consensus in the 60ties in Austria was 
that the nation has to be treated as a state-nation, a political nation of the Western type. Such 
look the political elites that introduced nation-buliding policies in Austria. This would be the 
best place to present a selection of those polices.  
3.2.1 The polices of nation-making 
 
Now that the mentality and Weltanschauung has been presented the next step is to present 
how those political elites used the institutions of the Austrian state in order to construct the 
Austrian nation. Peter Thaler believes that the important precondition for the successful 
employment of the nation building processes was the centralisation of decision making in the 
hands of party elites419.  The two dominant parties governed the country mostly together in 
grand coalitions that represented more than 80% of the Austrian voters, and therefore had 
very strong democratic legitimacy. The fact that the Austrian state also nationalised many 
industries after 1945 only strengthened the importance of political elites and their spheres of 
influence.  As seen in the examples above it was the conservative camp that led the identity 
politics in the II Austrian Republic. The socialists either had problems with their pan-German 
traditions or decided to remain silent on the matter. The fact that the communist politician 
Ernst Fischer adopted much of the conservative images only helped the conservatives. The 
KPÖ did not play a vital role and was soon marginalised politically; nevertheless it was a part 
of the meta-political consensus of the post-war decade before Austria became a neutral state. 
Among the institutional means of nation formation Thaler mentions three: judicial, 
educational and deligitimization420. To these I would also add the inventing of traditions in the 
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spirit of Eric Hobsbawm. Of those four policies the most important is the education policy 
and therefore it needs to be examined in detail.  
The Austrian invented tradition of the biggest prominence is 26th of October 1955 
which commemorates the introduction of the neutrality. The Declaration of Neutrality was a 
declaration by the Austrian Parliament declaring the country permanently neutral as a 
constitutional act. The foreign troops of the Soviet Union, USA, UK and France left Austria 
on 25 October 1955. In legal terms the neutrality is both part of international as well as 
Austrian constitutional law. The holiday is simply called Nationalfeiertag – The National 
Celebration Day. Other state introduced holidays follow the Catholic calendar with Christmas 
and Easter. Also the international Workers Day is celebrated on the 1st of May. It is clear that 
the Nationalfeiertag is the only tradition that was invented and was a part of nation building. 
It also holds the word “nation” in it indicating who the celebration is addressing (the Austrian 
Republic in this case. Usually the day contain several official actions which include the 
Federal President and the Federal Minister for Defense attending a Mass on the Heldenplatz. 
Then the Federal President followed by the Federal Government lay wreaths at the tomb of 
the unknown soldier in the Crypt of the outer Burgtor (the city gate, also known as the 
Heldentor – the gate of heroes). Other official celebrations include a festive meeting of the 
Council of Ministers; the government also attends a concert of classical music in the State 
Opera. 26th of October is also the day when the new recruits to the Austrian army are sworn 
in. It is clear that the celebration of the National Day use actions of typical national repertoire. 
Especially the Gate of Heroes, which plays the role of a monument of the “Unknow soldier”. 
The gate saw heavy fighting during the siege of Vienna in 1683.  The crypt located under the 
gate contains engravings commemorating soldiers of both World Wars. It says: The heroes of 
the World Wars fell under the free sky, and under free sky they shall be honoured. The crypt 
also commemorated the fallen members of the Nazi organisation SA but this was changed 
after 1945. In 1965 the Austrian government decided to honour the victims of the Nazi regime 
who resisted it – in fight for Austrian freedom. Next to the monument there is also a smaller 
one commemorating police officers and gendarmes on duty. The memorial also holds books 
with the names of fallen soldiers, which sparks controversy as some of them were found to be 
war criminals.   
It is interesting that both in the collective memory and in state policy it was not 15th of 
May 1955 – the signing of the State Treaty, which granted Austrian sovereignty but the 26th 
of October which was the final act of regaining sovereignty. Until the year 1965 the 
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Nationalfeiertag was known as the Day of the Flag. On the decennary of the Declaration of 
Neutrality thus eliminating the Day of the Flag from the repertoire of national holidays, it was 
not moved to another day. In a survey asking since when is Austria free 87% respondents 
named the year 1955, and not the end of the II World War in 1945421.  The first decade after 
1945 is seen as a prolonged occupation that started in 1938 with the Anschluss. As an 
Austrian historian Olivier Rathkolb recalls – until the early 60ties in was the departure of 
Allied troops that constituted the bulk of national celebrations. Only later the shift changed to 
the underlining of the Declaration of Neutrality. Neutrality was seen as an important and 
constructive element in the nation-building process with peaceful and calm patriotism as 
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky spoke in his last speech in the Austrian Parliament in 1983422. 
While thousands of people were in the streets to witness the important events of the 
year 1955 the anniversaries never attracted many. In 1965 the tenth anniversary of the signing 
of the State Treaty the new celebration day was established. The Ministry of Education 
prepared special events.  The text of the State Treaty was distributed to pupils and students. 
The school radio system broadcasted speeches by Karl Renner and Julius Raab (the 
Staatsvertragskanzler – “Chancellor of the State Treaty”). The official narrative supported the 
idea of the long occupation of the years 1938 – 1955.  Peter Utgaard quotes two speeches 
made by two teachers G. Rolletschek and E. Hubner. They are worth citing:  … a small 
people, which unlike its great German neighbour – to whose credit has a genial sense for 
planning and order - has rather more of an understanding for affable nonchalance and 
comfortable routine, that this small people achieved the unbelievable and solved problems - 
which even most of the victorious powers had failed to solve after the First World War is 
remarkable. In an inconspicuous and more modest from we Austrians experienced something 
similar to the rebirth of the Old Egyptian Empire in the years before the State Treaty. When 
the people and the government avoided disintegration and chaos, when the parties, forgetting 
old feuds, worked together harmoniously in legislation and rebuilding. But the most beautiful 
fruit from these years full of privation was a newly awakened love of Heimat without pathos 
and conceit, a new openness of the soul for the magic of the landscape and for the innate, 
unmistakable uniqueness of Austrian art and culture423.  
                                                          
421 Rathkolb O., The Paradoxical Republic, New York, Oxfrord 2010,  p. 8. 
422 Ibidem, p. 8.  
423 Rolletschek G., Festrede zur zehnjärighen Wiederkehr der Unterschreibung des österreischischen 
Staatsvertrages, op cit. Utgaard P., p. 150.  
171 
 
Another speech by  Edeltraude Hubner stated: the troops of the victorious powers, who 
in the fight against Hitler‘s Germany also had become the liberators of Austria, were – 
during the then years of hope and disappointment – seen more and more as bothersome 
strangers. Who does not still think of the many seized factories and agricultural enterprises, 
of the chicanery of the checkpoints, of the four in the jeep, or of the identification cards? In a 
solemn declaration by the Allies still during the war, the re-establishment of a fully free and 
independent Austria had been decreed. Based on its experiences, what could Austria, already 
free and sovereign in 1945, have accomplished for world peace. Now after the State Treat our 
red-white-red flag no longer has to flutter modestly next to the flags of the great four; it can 
be the proud symbol of our national will. It can wave above a state whose will to freedom and 
consciousness of cultural mission are documented by the reopening of the State Opera on 5th 
of November 1955 with Fidelio424. 
 This is especially evident in the celebrations prepared for the 50th anniversary of the 
State Treaty and Neutrality in 2005. It was also connected with the celebrations of the 60th 
anniversary of the end of the II World War and the 10th anniversary of Austria joining the 
European Union. While the events prepared sparked interest of several hundred thousand 
people in the whole country (for a Vienna which has around 1.7 million inhabitants the result 
has to be seen as a moderate failure) the events were hijacked by the political elites425. 
Bischof writes that almost all commemorations of the year 2005 were state imposed. The 
elites gathered solemnly and in exclusivity in Parliament, the Austrian Academy of Sciences and 
the Upper Belvedere Palace in the age-old tradition of political institutions operating from the top 
down, indicating that the patronizing ―Josephinism‖ is alive and well. Socialist President Heinz 
Fischer stressed the importance of Allied liberation in a Festakt in Parliament, where the 
founding of the Second Austrian Republic on April 27, 1945, was commemorated. The 60
th 
anniversary of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp in early May gave an 
opportunity to demonstrate a bipartisan awareness of war crimes committed by Austrians during 
World War II in their midst and the demonstration of a dutifully adequate holocaust memory. The 
culmination of the 60
th 
anniversary of the State Treaty on May 15, 1955, when the crème de la 
                                                          
424 Hubner E., Festrede zum Nationalfeireteg am 25. Oktober 1965, op cit. Utgaard P., p. 151. 
425 Many more people went to museums for special exhibitions which included the original of the State Treaty. 
See:  Bischof G.,  The Politics of History in Austria, it is a transcript of the lecture delivered by Bischof at the 
Harvard University on the 7th of April 2006. The whole text can be read online: 




crème of Austrian elites gathered by invitation only in the Belvedere […] Americans love their 
Civil War battle reenactments, Austrians the restaging of grand diplomatic events. The traditional 
iconography of state treaty memorial events was closely adhered to. The historic scene on the 
Belvedere balcony was restaged, as had been done during most previous ―round‖ State Treaty 
anniversary ever since 1965 with the visiting foreign ministers of the signatory powers. The 
governing elites hoped to attract the masses to the Belvedere gardens with an Austropop concert. 
Rather than tens of thousands of ecstatic Austrians showing up like on the historic May 15,1955, 
only thousands came in 2005426. The fact that most people participated in cultural events and not 
in the main celebrations of the most important National Holiday speak volumes about either the 
weakness of the politic of memory conducted by the Austrian state and elites or about the total 
desinteressement  in neutrality as a nation-building base. The Declaration of Neutrality lost its 
integrative role after the end of the Cold War and especially after Austria joined the European 
Union in 1995 – which is a direct breach of the principle of neutrality. It is one of the reasons why 
Switzerland does not agree to join the EU. With comparison to Polish state holidays the Austrian 
National Day seems pretty bleak. Poland celebrates the 3rd May Constitution and Independence 
Day on the 11th of November. While the first celebration day is turned mostly into a grilling 
holiday the second is treated solemnly and the participation in official events is usually very high. 
The Independence Day and the Declaration of Neutrality Day both adhere to sovereignty of a state 
and yet one creates much more emotional attachment than the other. Perhaps the very idea of 
neutrality lost its traction and response among the general Austrian population, neutrality itself is 
not a perquisite for sovereignty and its essence is void. The influence of politics of memory is 
limited and sparks little reaction. 
Another state driven policy is the use of symbols. Aside for the flag and the coat of arms 
and the anthem – it is money that is one of the vital symbolic expressions of the state. Coins and 
banknotes are used on everyday basis and guarantee high exposure of symbols to the general 
public. In 1945, the Allies introduced notes in denominations of 50 groschen, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 
25, 50, 100 and 1,000 schilling. The Austrian Nationalbank also introduced notes in 1945, in 
denominations of 10, 20, 100 and 1,000 schilling. With the banknote reform of 1947, new 
notes were issued in denominations of 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 1,000 schilling. Until 1957, the 
first 500 schilling banknote was issued and the 5 and 10 schilling notes were replaced by 
coins. However, although 20 schilling coins were issued from 1980, the 20 schilling note 
continued to be produced, with 5,000 schilling notes added in 1988. Austria adopted the euro 
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as currency in the 1st of January 1999. The images on the groschen and schilling as well as 
euro coins show a certain pattern. Most groschen use the image of the Austrian coat of arms – 
a black eagle with a sickle and hammer in its claws. The schilling coins include images of the 
edelweiss mountain flower, a horse riding figure resembling Prinz Eugen statue from the 
Heldenplatz, a symbolic representation of nine Austrian provinces, and the Austrian eagle.  Of 
those four policies the most important is the education policy and therefore it needs to be 
examined in detail. The banknotes focus on commemorating distinguished figures of art, 
culture, philosophy and sciences. The figures were accompanied by a corresponding building 
on the reverse of the banknote. On the 20 schilling note the painter Moriz Daffinger is paired 
with the Albertina museum that is the most prestigious painting gallery in Austria. The 50 
schilling note is host to Sigmund Freud and the Josephinum – a medical Academy. 100 
schilling shows the economist of the Austrian school Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, and the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences. 500 schilling note is a showcase of architecture with Otto 
Wagner and one of his architectural creations – the modernist Post Office Service Bank 
building. The 1000 note is reserved for Erwin Schrödinger, a Nobel Prize winner in physics 
and the University of Vienna. The highest value of the schilling – 5000 could not show 
anyone else as the composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and the Viennese State Opera. In 
1997 new editions of the 500 and 1000 notes included a woman Rosa Mayreder – a feminist 
and painter and Karl Landsteiner a biologist responsible for distinguishing the blood types. 
The reverses of the banknotes showed the same persons. It is clear that the Austrian 
symbolism focuses on scientific achievements and culture. The euro coins show continuity 
with the groschen and schilling showing alpine flowers of edelweiss, gentian and primrose. 
The coins continue with Austrian architecture showcasing the landmarks of St.Stephen 
cathedral, Belvedere Palace and the Secession Hall. The only two people to be shown on the 
Austrian euro coins are Bertha von Suttner –a pacifist and (of course) Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart. Bertha von Suttner is on the 2 euro coin emphasising the importance of peace in 
Austrian European policy. What is striking in the images used on coins and banknotes is their 
ideological emptiness. Aside for the two female figures that represent feminism and 
emancipation of women as well as pacifism there is hardly any political statement included in 
the state money. Perhaps the lack of ideology is a statement in itself. The distancing and 
reluctance in making any sharp ideological decisions regarding national symbols resembles 
the mentality of the political elites. Austria was to be the land of culture and scientific 
achievements – the imperial symbols were gone. No freedom fighters and resistance members 
or victims of the Nazi persecution were included in the coins, no generals or national heroes 
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like Andreas Hofer were chosen to be a part of Austrian coins and banknotes. The Polish złoty 
hosts a set of rulers: dukes and kings highlighting the continuity of the Polish statehood, there 
is no such message in the Austrian case. The deliberate refusal to use national heroes was a 
pragmatic choice in order to avoid any controversies. On the one hand such selection limits 
the effects of creating national symbols but at the same time shifts the focus on nature, art and 
sciences – a softer version of nation building.  
For Peter Thaler the most important state-driven policies of nation construction are the 
judicial instruments of nation making. He mentions them even before education (to which I 
would give the precedence in that matter). Even despite the fact that Thaler eventually 
believes that judicial instruments have an indirect influence – because they prevent certain 
actions solely because of fear of being persecuted or simply because of administrative 
problems that one can have when trying to break existing laws. There wrote that because 
Austrian nation-building lay in opposition to an already existing modern national identity, 
which was to be substituted with a new sense of self […] the state and its institutional 
capabilities provided crucial support for a nation-building process that confronted an 
alternative concept of identity427. The first trace of legal anti-Germannes was imposed by the 
Allied occupation forces. Because of their insistence the State Treaty included the following 
passages:  
Article 4. Prohibition of Anschluss 
1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political of economic 
union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria fully recognizes its 
responsibilities in this matter and shall not enter into political or economic union 
with Germany in any form whatsoever.  
2. In order to prevent such union Austria shall not conclude any 
agreement with Germany, nor do any act, nor take any measures likely, directly or 
indirectly, to promote political or economic union with Germany, or to impair its 
territorial integrity or political or economic independence. Austria further 
undertakes to prevent within its territory any act likely, directly or indirectly, to 
promote such union and shall prevent the existence, resurgence and activities of 
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any organisations having as their aim political or economic union with Germany, 
and pan-German propaganda in favour of union with Germany428.  
The separation from Germany was introduced on many levels. All people that 
possessed the citizenship of Germany were to leave Austria under Allied supervision. This 
included the Sudetendeutsche, who were previously part of the Habsburg Empire. The policy 
of expulsion was then preceded by internal Austrian legislation that interdicted the usage of 
the name “German” in any association or club. At the same time any organisation that even 
implied that there is a German ethnicity in Austria or that there are ethnic connection between 
Austria and West Germany were banned from operating429. The courts in Austria when 
confronted with organisations that tried to register themselves or re-establish themselves after 
the war prevented these actions on the premise that such action would be a violation of the 
State Treaty. The attempt to register an association of German Burgenländers met with the 
judicial response that the national populace of the independent Republic of Austrian consists 
of Austria430. It has to be mentioned that only Germans could not register their organisation in 
the aforementioned fashion – other ethnic groups and minorities like Croats, Slovenes, and 
Hungarians had no problems. It was just the fact that the sole existence of German ethnicity in 
Austria could threat the integrity of the new nation, as the majority of the population could 
identify with German (or mixed German) ethnicity. So one could not call himself a German 
Carithian but Slovenian Carinthians were accepted by the state431. Ethnicity was considered 
and equated with ideology and as a concept it was supposed to be rooted out. 
There is one more minor and yet interesting tool of nation making. During its 
accession to the European Union, Austria secured 23 term in Austrian German that were to be 
legally used in all EU official documents. The accession protocol included the clause:  The 
specific Austrian terms of the German language contained in the Austrian legal order and 
listed in the Annex to this Protocol shall have the same status and may be used with the same 
legal effect as the corresponding terms used in Germany listed in that Annex.  The Annex 
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contains 23 terms. Austrian German is the only pluricentric language that is recognised not 
only by the EU but also International Law432. 
Another issue that will not be discussed here in detail are other means of state nation 
building. One significant aspect is represented by sports. In the Austrian case it were the 
winter-sports, especially ski related (like ski-jumping) that helped to create positive images 
and a community feeling at the same time a clear demarcation from the biggest rival of 
Austria – Germany. Austria devoted substantial resources in order to create a solid support for 
winter sports and brand them as typical Austrian territory433. The assessment of how 
influential sport was in nation making is impossible. With certainty one could say that it did 
contribute to some extent. The generous spending of the Austrian state only supports that 




3.2.2 Education policies of nation-building 
 
Who controls the past, controls also the future – that cynical quote from the George 
Orwell‟s Year 1984 is a fine example of how twisted the understanding of the role of 
historiography in the XX century had become. History and its scribes were drawn into the 
vortex of various ideologies, which served as glasses through which the past was seen. The 
ideologies or strong ideas dictated the content of history books. Nationalisms, fascism or 
communism created their own versions and interpretations of history. Some heroes and events 
were elevated and revered and some were cast aside. The selective treatment of history is 
however not the domain of totalitarian systems. Even democracies are not free from these 
accusations. Any system or political regime has its agenda that is found also in history books, 
and especially in schoolbooks.  
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In 1945 one of the biggest conflicts in world history was just fading and the scale of 
the Second World War was unprecedented. At this very time Austria found itself in a very 
peculiar position. Defeated and occupied by allied forces it was also regarded as the first 
victim of German aggression and the alpine republic was recreated as an independent state.  
The Austrian elites, very much like after the end of the Great War, were only passive actors of 
the changes. However they did not have to construct the state from scratch, and they already 
had some experience in the reconstruction of state institutions. Between the years 1918 and 
1945 Austria changed its forms of government several times: from a hereditary monarchy it 
transformed into the First Republic, which in turn was overthrown by a fascist regime of 
Engelbert Dolfuss. The Austrofascist regime had to give way to the strength of the 
Wehrmacht, which took over Austria without a shot and incorporated Austria as Ostmark 
directly into the Third Reich. Eight years later this time under the occupation and supervision 
of the victorious allies Austria became a republic once more. The Second Austrian Republic 
was built by the very same people who remembered the times of Franz Joseph and its 
administration. While the systems changed the elites remained the same. The new goals for 
the reborn republic were set and one of the most prominent of all was to convince the general 
public that they constitute an Austrian nation. This might come as quite a surprise as the 
provisional government had to tackle issues and problems like the shortages of food, medicine 
and apartments. Yet, as Peter Utgaard ascertains, for the survival of the state it was essential 
for the survival of the new state to create a new political, social and cultural identity that 
would be clearly distinguishable from the German one. In that way a basis for negotiations 
with the Allies would be solidified and in the long run the longevity of the state would be 
secured.434. The Allies were also interested in the formation of such national identity, which 
was just putting to motion the texts of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 as well as the 
Proclamation of the 27th of April 1945 which nullified the Anschluss. The Austrian political 
elites set on the course of nation building. Because the socialists were rather reluctant and 
distanced towards the idea of an Austrian nation it was the conservatives that played the 
dominant role. The socialists focused mainly on economic issues and left education in the 
hands of the conservatives. Already during the Dolfuss and Schuschnigg regime the 
conservatives started to implement elements of Austrian identity to the schoolbooks. The 
problem was that the Austrian identity was defined as a part of a broader German one. 
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Whoever is a good Austrian is also a good German435.. The sentence from a children‟s book 
is a perfect exemplification of the weak attempts to form an Austrian identity before 1945, 
nevertheless it was an attempt and has to be noted. The children‟s book was unintentionaly 
inciting German patriotism and Austria was presented on a comparable level with Saxony or 
Bavaria (as a German region). Yet the Ständestaat propaganda emphasised the importance of 
locality and values connected to the little motherlands, the natural beauty of the regions: the 
true Austrian Heimat. Quite possibly it was the weakness of the Austro-fascist propaganda in 
schools and the wide spread acceptance of the German idea that enabled the Nazis to make an 
easy take over the schooling system in Austria after the Anschluss. Of course the racist and 
Nazi propaganda elements were added to the school curriculum but the history of Austria did 
not need to be rewritten completely. The schooling system quickly was equated with the one 
functioning in the Third Reich. The Nazis that were persecuted during the Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg regimes were given positions in the Ostmark administration. Not many clerks 
were needed to come from Germany to Austria as the numbers of Austrian Nazis were 
sufficient the Gleichschaltung was an easy task.  
Shortly after the II World War the main goal was to reverse the effects of the 
Gleichschaltung. Thanks to a pragmatic approach and the pressure from the occupying Allied 
forces the Austrian elites were quick to reach an agreement. It has to mentioned that Austria 
had limited sovereignty at the time and officials from the public administration as well as the 
system of education was under Allied supervision. Thanks to a surprising unity of thought 
between the Austrian conservatives and the communist politician Ernst Fischer, the socialists 
had no other choice as to succumb to the ideas that were not so popular among them.  
Schools were organised in the same fashion as in the time of the I Republic (which in 
turn were based on the old imperial system). The Allies also supported the reestablishment of 
the school system in Austria. The main goals of the Allied powers were: denazification and 
upbringing of the youth in the spirit of democratic values436. The denazification process was 
treated by the Allies rather personally – people involved in the Nazi movement and party were 
banned from teaching in the first years of the II Republic. This caused some problems as 
around 50-60% of teachers were either members of the NSDAP or in one way or another 
involved in the Nazi regime. This situation only weakened the denazification process in 
schools. Another problem was caused by the lack of coordination between the Allies in 
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various occupation zones. One thing however was universally agreed upon: to get rid of the 
Nazi-era school books. Already in 1948 first makeshift schoolbooks were published. They 
focused on democratic values and emphasised the independence of Austrian culture437. In the 
same year the Allied censorship of Nazi schoolbooks was partially lifted: with the exception 
of geography and history. In chaotic actions books from the US were brought and translated 
into German. It were the Americans who most of pressured for the creation of a new, positive 
identity that would be rooted in democratic values. It were the Americans who proposed to 
get rid of all mentions of Germannes from the teaching programmes and pushed to replace it 
with Austriannes438. It was no easy task and problems were plenty. There was a shortage of 
teaching material, the numbers of former Nazis in the school system were too high, there as a 
need for a swift creation of a new teaching programme and re-education of the people 
schooled in the years 1938-1945. The person who was responsible for those changes was 
Ernst Fischer – a communist activist. In the provisional government of Karl Renner it was 
Fischer who supervised the Ministry of Information. Fischer quickly accepted the 
conservative viewpoints on Austrianist exceptionalism. He spoke: we are a nation of unique 
history and culture. I am aware that not all in our past and present is praiseworthy, but we 
can still present our contributions to the world culture. It is worth highlighting. I do not deny 
that we are proud of Haydn and Mozart, Schubert and Bruckner, Grillparzer, Raimund and 
Nestroy. We are proud of our magnificent architects, who created the Cathedral of 
St.Stephen, the Karlskirche or the Belvedere. We are proud of our peasant leader and our 
Viennese, we are proud of the battles and achievements of the Austrian working class439. In 
this very inclusive message the thing that is string the most is how little is mentioned about 
both peasants and the working class. Fischer spoke as if he were a conservative focusing on 
artists from the imperial times. In the background of this scenery the idea of Austrians as a 
Kulturnation is eminent. It is here that the national myth of Austrians as a nation of high 
culture is born. It is exactly history and culture that is the main focus of the communist 
Fischer. The politics of consensus reached a high point at that moment. Thanks to Fischer the 
dominant narratives of the conservative camp made through to the school system.   
Ernst Fischer was not occupying the position of the minister of education for long. 
With the electoral failure of the Austrian Communist Party, he was replaced by the 
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representative of the triumphant conservatives – Felix Hurdes. It was Hurdes who had the 
biggest influence in shaping the shaping of the teaching programme. His personal beliefs and 
experiences created the basis for the idea of the new Austrian nation. Hurdes was a prisoner of 
the Dachau and Mauthausen concentration camps and managed to survive the times of the II 
World War. His experience developed a staunch anti-German sentiment.  He was not only an 
enemy of Germany as a state but Gemrmannes (Deutschtum) in general. He wanted Austria to 
be the antithesis of Germany and the radical cutting of Germany was supposed to create 
unconditional Austrians. The medieval traditions, baroque culture and Catholicism were the 
biggest differentiates from Germany. Some socialdemocrats, like Friedrich Adler opposed the 
ideas but for the greater good they have toned down their criticism.  
In his first days in office Hurdes strove to get rid of everything that was un-Austrian. 
Teachers were supposed to promote Austropatriotism that was rooted in democratic values 
and rejected racism. The teaching programme prepared under Hurdes obliged the teachers to 
strengthening the love of the local fatherlands (Heimat) through folk tales, poems and songs. 
Older pupils should have read more Austrian authors, who praised the beauty of Austria. 
The Hurdes teaching programme is also an example of postimperial (postcolonial?) 
mentality. It mentions the special role that Austria played in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
unique Austrian burden was to spread Western civilisation into the smaller countries in the 
region440. This image of Austria strengthened the main narrative that presented Austrians as 
the nation of high culture, a culture higher than the ones of its neighbours. At the same time it 
deprived the states of Central Europe of their connection to the Western civilisation. The new 
divisions of the Cold War era only strengthened those points of views.  
Aside for the preparation of the new programme Hurdes also introduced additional 
civic classes that focused on enumerating the achievements of Austria and Austrians.  The 
stark anti-German sentiment of Hurdes led to the replacement of the German language classes 
(the ones that teach literature, grammar etc.) with the “language of the lesson” 
Unterrichtsschprache. The change was made solely to exclude the word German from the 
school schedules. In a joking manner the “language of the lesson” was nicknamed Hurdestani. 
This rather absurd idea did not take hold for too long, a reform of 1952 that was tailored to 
accommodate the language needs of the minorities (Hungarian, Slovenian etc.) changed the 
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name into a strangely sounding Deutsche Unterrichtssprache. It was only in 1955 that the 
simple name Deutsch returned. Another changes included the abandonment of the German 
font (Deutsche Normalschrift) and reintroduction of the Holy Cross to the classrooms to 
strengthen the bond between Austria and Catholicism.  
The eagerness and stubbornness of Felix Hurdes may seem meticulous and a tad 
grotesque but it is true that two years after end of the II World War the young generations 
were exposed to Austrianist ideas at school. The pupils read poems about the beauty of the 
Austrian Alps and the heroism or ingenuity of historical figures. Hurdes‟ actions were 
supposed to be temporary but as in many cases the temporary turned out to be quite long 
lasting. Another example of this rule is the German constitution - Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland that was enacted under Allied supervision in 1949 and operates 
till this day. Hurdes created a canon of ideas and narratives that influenced several generations 
to come. The Austropatriotism, the underlining of the importance of high culture and the 
beauty of the Heimat resonate till this day. Now that the reasons behind creating new 
schoolbooks are known the next step is to analyse the textbooks themselves.  
 
3.2.3. Textbook analysis 
 
  
Textbooks are by far the most generous sources to study. The youth is exposed to them 
for a significant part of their lives and are obliged to do so by the state it is mass activity that 
encompasses a majority of the society. This does not mean that schoolbooks are the only 
source of knowledge about history and the surrounding world.  The monopoly of the 
schoolbooks is often broken by the media, press articles, television programmes, movies, 
computer games, internet blogs and YouTube videos. Yet only schoolbooks are so rigorously 
and meticulously checked in order to present objective facts. The task of the textbooks is and 
in extenso the whole schooling system is not only to transfer knowledge but also to bring up 
the young generations. At the same time the schoolbooks are the only source of said 
knowledge that is used on mass scale with a clear target group and with clear teaching 
methods. Despite all that efforts made by the state it is near impossible to measure the 
influence that textbooks have on the future opinions and state of knowledge of pupils. With 
all those problems stacking up why is it worth to investigate the schoolbooks? They are a 
generous source because of a different factor. The schoolbook is the perfect source for 
investigating the representation of the official, state and institutional vision of history. In 
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theory the schoolbook represents what the society wants to teach and which values it holds 
dear and in high esteem to pass them on to future generations441. The textbooks are an 
expression of the expectations that the older generations lays upon the younger.  
There is no consistent theory on school textbook analysis. One can only use indirect 
tools. I have decided to use the methods of discourse and image analysis in my inquiry.  In 
this case I will be analysing the texts and images from the most important Austrian history 
textbooks. The first step would be contextual analysis: who wrote the text, who is the 
predicted recipient and in what circumstances the text was created. To be more specific the 
questions about the teaching programme that served as guidelines for textbook creation need 
to be asked. When was the textbook published? Are there new editions? If yes than what 
changes were made in comparison with the older versions? The contextual analysis allows 
reaching the basics of the construction of the historical narrative. The next step would be to 
conduct an objective, systematic and qualitative description of the contents and information 
transfer. Then the contents of the text needs to be reduced to the most important signifiers,  
most common words, topics and the dominant grammatical and semantic forms. The point of 
reference will be linked to the main narrative that appears in the textbooks. Additionally the 
analysis will also include the purposeful omissions and gaps in the edifice of the text. These 
are called – significant omissions because they too, through their omissions create signifiers 
in the narrative.  
A more detailed analysis will be conducted on four levels: 
1. The language level will allow to determine what words and language constructions have 
been used to describe Austria and Austrians. Are these constructions active or passive? Are 
personalizations or anonymities used in the text? What adjectives and adverbs do you use and 
what metaphors are used in the text? 
2. Mixed level: what diagrams and statistics, and any other mixed forms (text and image) are 
used. What is the purpose of their use? 
3. Visual level: what images are used? Are they just an illustration or are they with 
commentary? What emotions does the image evoke? Is the image relevant to the text at which 
it appeared? 
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4. The level of science and didactics: is the situation presented adequate to reality, whether the 
subject is presented objectively or subjectively442?  
 
The main axis of the analysis will focus on the crucial events that constitute the myths 
of the establishment of the Austrian nation. While some lean back on history and reach as far 
as medieval times, it was the events of the XXth century that prove vital for the sake of this 
research. How the discourse was constructed around issues like: National Socialism (who 
were the perpetrators, and who the victims?) the Anschluss (how is it presented, is the 
opposition towards the Anschluss presented in the textbook?), World War II (how is the 
conflict presented? Is the focus laid on the military endeavours or the occupation terror and 
genocide mentioned?), the Holocaust (is it presented separately from the topic of World War 
II, are Austrians presented as perpetrators or victims?) etc.  
By far the most important schoolbook in postwar Austria was Zeiten, Völker, Kulturen 
(ZVK). For decades till the mid-seventies it was almost exclusively used as the only 
textbook443! The most important for these considerations history of the XXth century was 
taught in the fourth class of the main school (Hauptschule). Pupils were at the age of 14-15 
and it was their first contact with the topic of World War II and National Socialism in their 
education. The state monopoly on history textbook publishing made the ZVK a convenient 
source for analysis. The schoolbook was authored by Franz Berger, Herman Schnell, Edith 
Löbenstein and Klemens Zens and was first published in 1957 – a whole seven years after the 
end of World War II. Before that date prewar school plans were used and supplemented with 
the materials provided by the Allies Erziehungsdirektorium der Alliierten Kommission für 
Österreich (Directorate of Education of the Allied Commission for Austria XXth century was 
                                                          
442 This methodology as well as the bulk of the analysis borrows from: Markova I , Wie Vegangenheit neu 
erzählt wird, Marburg 2013 p. 112-114.  Also Peter Utgaard prepared an analysis of main narratives of one of 
the schoolbooks but he focused solely on the most superficial level of main narratives. For more information see: 
Utgaard P., Remembering and forgetting Nazism, New York, Oxford, 2003 p. 71-160.  Both Utgaard and 
Markova focus on the same issues: the Anschluss, World War II, the Holocaust, the Austrian Resistance, the 
reconstruction of Austria and the State Treaty. The “Austria as the first victim” myth is also heavily focused on.  
Both of the scholars completely avoid earlier history of Austria.  
443 In 1953 Allgemeine Geschichte der Neuzeit von der Mitte des 19. Jarhunderts bis zur Gegenwart authored by 
Franz Heilsberg and Friedrich Kroger was published. Till 1957 it was the only textbook to write about the 
Second World War.  For a short description of the textbook see: Utgaard P., Remembering and forgetting 
Nazism, New York, Oxford, 2003, p. 53. The textbook makes a clear distinction of what is Austrian an German. 
The Austrians are presented as people who were forced to join the German army and fight for Hitler. The 
concentration camps were also clearly German. What is Austrian is the resistance against the Germans.  
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issued in 1957, two years after the State Treaty444. The aims of the textbook are to construct 
understanding and interest in history with a special emphasis on the history of Austria. The 
most important topic and the narrative axis were the political and cultural processes of nation 
formation. The teaching of history with ZVK was supposed to create authentic love for one‟s 
nation (Volk) and fatherland (Vaterland). The axiology was based on freedom, humanism and 
rationalism.)445. 
The historical period in question had been scheduled for the chapter of the teaching 
programme named Fascism and National Socialism as destroyers of world peace. World War 
II. The programme names the two ideologies and movements as the opponents of the free and 
civilised world. Italy, Germany and Japan are the countries which were overrun by fascism 
and pushed for war. Fascism is the main perpetrator for the civilisation breakdown of World 
War II. And the blame for the success of fascist ideologies in Germany lies in the reactionary, 
Prussian militarism446. The teaching programme makes the topics mentioned above 
obligatory to teach. Interestingly neither the role of Austria and Austrians in the structures of 
the III Reich or the Holocaust are mentioned.  
Because the 1952 and 1957 editions of ZVK are almost identical I shall focus on the 
latter. Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen from 1957 got a new subtitle: Das Zeitalter der Weltpolitik 
und Technik. It encompasses the history from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the 
proclamation of the Charter of United Nations in 1945. It is divided into thematic blocs 
named in chronologic order: Reaction and revolution, Nazism-Socialism-Imperialism, World 
Wars and peace. The narrative that is of my interest starts with the economic crisis. The rising 
unemployment rates led to social unrest and general discontent that undermined the existing 
democratic system. The suffering of the general populace was then used by unsuitable people, 
who spread anxiety and chaos through their energetic speeches. Their criticism of the then 
existing status quo they also pointed at possible solutions to the problems. This led to rapid 
rise to the movements led by those people447. Such looks the first and introductory 
description. The first thing that strikes the most is anonymisation. There is a complete lack of 
any specific examples and stories of specific people. The responsibility for future events is 
sharply limited to a small group of people who deluded and beguiled the masses. Later on the 
                                                          
444 The only difference is the introduction of the text of the Charter of the United Nations at the end. Some texts 
were reshuffled and reorganised but the content was not changed at all.  
445 Wassermann H,, Verfälschte Geschichte im Unterricht, Nationalsozialismus und Osterreich nach 1945, 
Innsbruck 2004, p. 37. 
446 Ibidem, p. 42-43. 
447 Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen, Vienna 1957, p. 168. 
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only personal example is mentioned and it is Adolf Hitler who created a homogenous 
Germany. Hitler enchanted people of all social classes because he used effective propaganda 
with no scruples448. Hitler is the only perpetrator. One could have the impression that he 
himself swayed the masses and conducted warfare alone.  The narrative continues with the 
descriptions of the action of the secret police, which surveilled the public and private life of 
citizens. Without any remorse it disposed of political and personal enemies of Hitler. Those 
who were not caught by the secret police had to flee abroad. People were jailed without trial 
and placed in concentration camps where they met with inhuman treatment. In many cases the 
camps were the final destination. The Jews were persecuted through racial driven reforms and 
in many instances they were deprived from their property. From many places they were 
transported to concentration camps or later death camps where they were murdered with 
poisonous gas. The recent estimates do not show exact numbers – in those camps more than 
six million people were murdered! Six million people is almost the entire population of 
Austria! What misery, despair, physical torture and spiritual hardships are hidden behind 
that number of six million!449  
The description of the tragedy of the Jewish population and enemies is brief, laconic 
and short. It does not stand out from the overall style of the textbook – it is fully written like 
this: short passages that usually take the space of half a page. The main characteristic of the 
narrative is the complete anonymity of the terror apparatus of the Third Reich. All the 
grammar forms used in the passages are in passive voice. It seems that this edition of ZVK 
creates more questions than it answers. It mentions some opponents of Hitler but does not 
specify who these people were. It does not describe the situation of people in concentration 
and death camps. It does not describe the annihilation of the Jews. The pupil will not know if 
the civilians were aware of the genocide and the existence of the camps. Who built and 
maintained the camps? All the information given is so laconic that there is no space for such 
considerations. The quoted ending of the passage is somewhat exceptional as it strives to 
evoke empathy towards the victims. Especially the comparison to the Austrian population 
subliminally equates the victims to Austrian which can work in both ways. It can help to 
empathise by making the comparison to Austrians (and the pupils reading the book were also 
Austrians) or could indirectly lead to creating an image of Austrians as victims. When taking 
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into account the contents of the next subchapter the intentions are clear – the Austria as the 
first victim of Nazi aggression is the main narrative.  
After the short description of world history the next subchapter deals with Austria, 
more specifically with Austrofascism and the Anschluss. The examples set by Italy and 
Germany resonated in a part of the Austrian society and drove it to plan similar changes in the 
Alpine Republic. The results of the actions undertaken were the dissolution of political parties 
and the suspending of the democratic constitution. The biggest opponent of those changes was 
the socialdemocracy, which was also the most repressed under the new regime. At the same 
time the political tensions were deepened by the economic crisis. Those to blame for the fall 
of democracy is the Heimwehr (a nationalist grouping of several paramilitary organisations). 
After the assassination of Chancellor Dolfuss by the (aufständisch) National Socialists, Hitler 
began to meddle more and more in Austria politics. Eventually under pressure the Austrian 
government fell and the Nazis took power. Simultaneously the Austrian border was crossed  
by armed German soldiers, tanks and planes. In that way our Vaterland lost its freedom and 
independence450. This description omits the social background of the Anschluss – it is only a 
violent assault. There is no mention of the fact that the killers of Dollfuss were Austrian Nazis 
and very little is mentioned about the movement in Austria. The passive voice is still 
prevalent. 
The next chapter focuses on the World Wars of which the important part for this thesis 
is the description of World War II. This part of the textbook is the first one to contain visual 
images – pictures. A map presents the results of the annexations made by Hitler as well as his 
military movements. This image is accompanied by a picture of a military cemetery with the 
fallen from both World Wars. The description under the photo reads: Here lies more than 
40.000 fallen. Next to the photo there is short text with the information about the number of 
victims of the two World Wars. The textbook informs about ten million killed in action and 
twenty one million wounded for the Great War and the numbers of thirty millions of killed in 
action and thirty five million wounded for World War II. The text is accompanied by a 
infograph where 1 million of people is symbolised by a white cross with a soldiers helmet on 
top. The description under the infograph simply states: victims of war451.  
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The narrative about World War II reduced the events of 1939-1945 to solely military 
meaning. Only the soldiers are victims, no civilian casualties or victims of the politics of 
terror are mentioned. There cannot be any talk about total war or genocidal war tactics in such 
case. There is also a narrative continuity between the First and Second World Wars. This 
emphasises the military aspect of the second one. Also the infograph shows that the Second 
World War was much bloodier and much worse. The blame for the outbreak of the war is put 
on the dictators and their aggressive policies. The first international victim of Hitler‟s attacks 
was little Austria, which became just a province of the Grossdeutsches Reich. The Western 
powers only protested and did nothing to stop Hitler from further acts of aggression. Their 
passiveness only encouraged Hitler. The catastrophe of Austria meant a catastrophe for the 
whole world452. The outbreak of the Second World War is described like this: …after (Hitler) 
submitted sequential demands towards Poland responsible people from France and UK 
protested and allied with that country. Hitler believed the alliance to be insincere and after 
bad advice from his Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded that they will not risk war. Hitler 
made a pact of non-agression with USSR and occupied Poland (hat Polen besetzt). The 
Western Powers declared war on Hitler. Such began World War II453. What is striking is the 
fact that Hitler is the only perpetrator. He is the one occupying Poland (by himself). It is his 
troops that invade Denmark and Norway and France. Hitler attacked UK and the USSR and 
also occupied the Balkans and Greece. The war engulfed Africa and the Pacific as well. Next 
to the information about the attack on the USSR there is a footnote telling to compare the 
campaign with the 1812 Napoleonic invasion of Russia. What follows is the description of the 
battle of Stalingrad. According to the textbook it was one of the biggest tragedies of mankind. 
Despite warnings from his generals Hitler demanded the troops in Stalingrad to stay and fight. 
After many weeks of fighting and heavy Soviet attacks more than 160.000 soldiers fell 
because of war, cold and hunger. Thousands were held captive. The battle was the turning 
point of the war in Europe454.  The chapter suggest that the Second World War was just 
another military conflict in the long history of Europe and the world. The schoolbook places 
the war in the context of the conflicts of the Napoleonic era and the Great War. The victims 
are limited to soldiers. It is no surprise that when limiting itself to military endeavours it is the 
battle of Stalingrad that holds the main focus. It is this battle that is the biggest humane 
tragedy. Not the civilian victims of planned genocide, not even the victims of mass bombings 
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– these people are not mentioned at all. The schoolbook tries to separate the war theatre from 
the actions of National Socialists. The movement had its own previous chapter. The only 
perpetrator of the narrative is Adolf Hitler, occasionally taking bad advice or dismissing good 
advice. It is Hitler who is responsible for the great tragedy, which was the battle of Stalingrad. 
The soldiers of Wehrmacht are not depicted as aggressors, conquerors or actors of genocide. 
Actually the Wehrmacht seems to be almost the only victim of the war455! As there is no 
information about the fallen soldiers from other countries (USSR, France, Poland etc.) the 
focus stays with the German/Austrian troops. Stalingrad became an important symbol, and a 
myth456. The narrative is reinforced by the picture of a German military cemetery. It is 
finished with the date of the 8th of May 1945 when the shots became silent. The textbook 
describes the aftermath of the war as a sea of rubble and a sea of spilt blood.457 
The issue of ZVK from the year 1957 has a chapter about the first years of the Second 
Austrian Republic, which makes it a better source to analyse than the first edition of the year 
1952.  The narrative starts with the month of march of 1945 when Soviet troops poured 
through the Austrian border. The Nazis fled to the west leaving the Austrian population to 
their own fate. There was chaos and fighting and many people tried to flee to the west. The 
Austrian resistance fighters wanted to stop the destruction of their country, but were too weak 
to achieve this goal. Goods were plundered, people robbed and murdered, one‘s life had no 
value at all. Such had the Austrians lived through the sad end of the total war458.  This 
passage is important because it is the very first time that the Austrian resistance is mentioned 
(which did not happen in the chapter about the war). The times that came later were filled 
with hunger and problems with shortage of basic need goods, which went even worse because 
of the occupation459. The country was divided into four occupation zones – this information is 
reinforced by a map of partitioned Austria – crossing the borders between the zones was a 
troublesome activity that needed to be mentioned in the textbook.  The same page shows also 
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a photograph of the destruction in the old parts of Vienna. The army of the Allies is depicted 
as an occupation force not really as liberators. Austria is of course the first victim of Hitler, as 
confirmed by the said new occupation force of the Allies in the Moscow Declaration. The 
reconstruction of the state is limited to the economic aspect – no signs of cultural or moral 
rebirth. The stereotype of Austrians as the nation of high culture also has its place in the 
schoolbook. Despite the hardships, Austrians protected their affection and interest towards 
fine arts. Examples of reopened State Opera and Theater as well as the reintroduction of 
Salzburg concerts are given as examples of cultural affinity460.  Then the Austrian government 
worked for the true independence and sovereignty of their country which led to the signing of 
the State Treaty, departure of the Allied troops and introduction of neutrality. The actions of 
the Allies are presented as if they had a debt to pay to Austria. The year 1955 is crucial – the 
true end of the long occupation that started in 1938 it is the true end of the war narrative.  
There are also more photos in this subchapter. Aside for the destruction of monument is the 
centre of Vienna, a train station and bridge are juxtaposed in their destroyed form and after 
reconstruction461. Other photos can be categorised as a showcase of modernity: new airports, 
dams, factories etc. pointing at the new prosperity of the Republic. The most important 
pictures of this subchapter are however the iconic signing of the State Treaty in the Belvedere 
and a picture of a crowd subtitled: Austrian nation greets its freedom462. The narratives are 
closed with quotations by Theodor Körner (President), Julius Raab (Chancellor), Leopold Figl 
(Chancellor) and Adolf Schärf (Vice-cancellor, later President). Even in the textbook the 
Proporzsystem is present: Körner and Schärf were socialdemocrats and Raab and Figl 
conservatives. Thus the politics of consensus are a part of the narrative in the school textbook, 
and this consensus led to modernisation and allowed to escape the hardships of the times of 
Allied occupation.  
In the year 1962 a new subject was added to the school curriculum –  Social Science 
(Sozialkunde). At the same time a new teaching programme was ushered. The programme 
strove to put more details into the contents of the schoolbooks. The next edition of ZVK 
comes from 1967, so five years later after the new programme. The authors remained the 
same, as well as the contents. The biggest change was adding the Sozialkunde texts into the 
schoolbook. To some chapters additional paragraphs were inserted in order to broaden the 
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understanding of society its changes and developments. The 1967 edition of ZVK has a 
slightly different font and more pictures and photographs.  
The chapter Nazism-Socialism-Imperialism has paragraphs added that describe the 
dissolution of the state, which deprived of the footing of the rule of law, human rights, 
constitution and independent judiciary is easy to turn on an ordinary citizen, who has no 
means of protection. It is not only the freedom that is limited but also the state starts to 
become an intruder into the private life. Everyone can be treated in an inhumane way or even 
killed without a proper trial.  Każdy może zostać nieludzko potraktowany, a nawet zabity bez 
sprawiedliwego procesu sądowego. The reasons that amount to state persecution are political 
and religious beliefs. Only a democratic state with rule of law the freedoms and human 
dignity is protected463. The authors of the textbook want to set the example of the democracy 
of the Western type against the totalitarian system of the III Reich. The description does not 
include persecution based on racial premises – only political views are mentioned (which suits 
the Austrian narrative, where the conservatives and socialists were persecuted under the Nazi 
regime). As Ina Markova adds only a year later in 1968 an annex to the schoolbook includes 
the topic of race. Surprisingly the text focuses on the difficult situation of the Black 
community in the United States of America. The hatred of white people against Blacks is 
compared with the hatred towards Jews, best exemplified by the Third Reich464. There is no in 
depth analysis of European anti-Semitism, no German or Austrian examples. The main 
narrative of this subchapter is based on the example of the USA. Of course the conclusions 
lead to a general, humanistic outcome but perhaps the local example could do a better job.  
Also the narrative about Hitler‟s rise to power has been expanded. After the 
description of the economic crisis it is pointed out that Hitler used Jews in his propaganda and 
presented them as an unworthy race that stood behind all the economic failings and hardships. 
For the first time it is mentioned that Hitler employed policies, that developed industry and 
provided jobs for the unemployed masses. In the passage about Hitler‟s political enemies a 
new set was added, including: Jews, Catholics, socialists and communists. They were sent to 
concentration camps where six million people perished. Hitler is still the main perpetrator and 
the villain of the 1933-1945 narrative. The use of grammar strengthens this message: (Hitler) 
er verfolgte – he persecuted, er bereitete den Krieg vor – he prepared the war465. The Jews are 
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mentioned as political opponents of Hitler rather than victims of his racial policies. The 
Catholics are supposed to represent the conservative camp in Austria.  
The next subchapter similarly to the previous editions treats about the Anschluss. The 
contents are not changed, only several paragraphs were added. They stress the persecution of 
Austrians after 1938. After the loss of independence and freedom tens of thousands honest 
Austrians were imprisoned in concentration camps. Despite the perilous circumstances, it was 
possible to form groups that resisted Nazism and oppression. The textbook also delivers the 
information that the property of the bank of Austria, of the Catholic and evangelical churches 
and Jewish possessions were taken by Hitler to Germany (despite the fact that after the 
Anschluss Austria was a part of Germany)466.   
The description of the Second World War was not changed either. Paragraphs about 
the resistance were added. Every man has not only the right but an obligation to resist against 
inhumane treatment. It is the obligation to oppose any state violence and any order, which 
would infringe the integrity and freedom of another human person. A footnote gives an 
example of the bomb assassination attempt of the 20th of June 1944 conducted by Claus 
Stauffenberg. The Bavarian officer is an interesting example of resistance. He was no 
Austrian but his example helps to solidify the Wehrmacht officers as positive figures (it was 
against their council that Hitler made mistakes)467. Perhaps he was chosen as an example 
simply because of the notoriety of his act. Stauffenberg assassination attempt is the only 
personal example of resistance against Nazis in the book.  
The subchapter about the reconstruction of Austria is almost identical. The important 
additions are mainly visual and include changed and expanded iconography. A photo of 
Allied troops is added. The myth of Austria as a bridge between cultures is reinforces by a 
photo of the Europabrücke which was finished in 1963. The construction of the bridge plays a 
double role as it also strengthens the industrial development theme. There is also a photo of 
Nikita Khrushchev and J.F. Kennedy meeting in Vienna in 1961. Here the narration of the 
Austria as bridge, as well as Austria as a neutral country between two great power blocks is 
symbolically shown468.  
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The next schoolbook that went under analytical scrutiny is the 1977 edition of the 
ZVK. It was redone by original authors and a workbook was added to the original textbook. 
The text was virtually unchanged since 1957, so for 20 years it remained the same, and the 
dominant narrative thought at school also did not change with it. One could surmise that 
during those two decades no new academic research was done regarding the time of World 
War II.  What did change was the addition of new photographs. Three new pictures show the 
iconic NSDAP gathering in Nurnberg in 1936, the second one a group of Jewish children 
forced to wear clothes with the Star of David and the Jud signature. The last photo shows a 
group of concentration camp survivors469. What is the reasoning behind including those 
photographs? They clearly are supposed to evoke emotions in the reader. The first picture is 
one of the most well-known Nazi propaganda images it shows perfect geometric lines of 
infantry with three swastikas in the background. It is a perfect depiction of power, will and 
organisational skills of the Nazi regime. There is no explanation given under the photograph, 
as the authors expect for the images to speak for themselves.  The next two photos are 
showing the consequences of the actions undertaken by the regime – they focus on the victims 
and the use of children, which are at a similar age as the pupils in the history class clearly is 
aimed at evoking empathy. As for the photograph of the camp inmates, one of the people on 
the picture is kneeling next to the other in such a way that can evoke the image of the pieta 
and associate it with the Christian cultural code of sacrifice and victimhood.  .  
The next chapter about ”Authoritarian Austria” did not get the luxury of additional 
photos. Instead an emotional dialogue between Adolf Hitler and Kurt Schuschnigg was added. 
Hitler was supposed to say: Austria did not do anything that would prove to be useful of the 
German Reich. All its history is a constant betrayal of the nation! I say, I shall solve the 
Austrian question, one way or another! Shuschnigg responded: In this hour I separate myself 
from the Austrian nation with a Geman saying and a desire of the heart: „Gott schütze 
Österreich470! (God protect Austria!) With the unchanged overall narrative of the textbook the 
inclusion of the quotation only serves emotional purposes. It is a very franc juxtaposition of 
the small Austria and the Great German Reich.  The choice of this quote also influences the 
idea of Austria as the first victim of the hitlerite aggression. Again it is Adolf Hitler who is the 
main perpetrator and the villain of the story. Hitler threatens the existence of the alpine 
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republic while Schuschnigg bids farewell to the nation. The issue of how the Austrian nation 
should be understood in Schuschnigg‟s words is not raised by the schoolbook.   
Finally, change has come to the chapter that treats about World War II. For the first 
time soldiers were not the only actors on the stage of history – this time civilian populations 
were also included. But to stop this enthusiasm it has to be stated that the changes were rather 
minor in character. A new graph representing the civilian losses of World War I and World 
War II was added, as well as a graph depicting civilian losses in Europe and Asia. Asia is 
treated as a whole; in Europe six countries are specified: USSR, Germany, Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Austria. The graph does not identify the victims of genocide or concentration 
camps it is just an overall number. The information about genocide is still a part of the 
narrative of the previous subchapter about Nazism in Germany and not treated as a part of the 
war.   
World War II in the 1977 edition has new photographs included. One of which 
presents the total destruction of Warsaw471. The photograph depicts standing ruins and piles 
of rubble without any silhouette of a man. Another picture shows street fighting in Stalingrad. 
Several German soldiers walk through ruins and rubble. The picture of the Stalingrad 
reinforces the importance of this battle in the overall narrative. Several pictures were added at 
the end of the subchapter – they focus on mass bombings and their victims. One of them 
depicts a carpet bombing conducted by Allied planes, and the second one shows civilians 
among ruins of Vienna. The pictures in the 1977 edition play, a minor supportive role to the 
text. They emphasise the narrative in which World War II was a tragedy of humankind, a 
civilizational breakdown – for Austria and the world. The Austria as a victim message is 
strengthened by the photographs of Allied bombings and Viennese civilians suffering. No 
new changes in this schoolbook that would validate the turning of the narrative.  
What is however interesting is the addition of the workbook. It contains not only 
exercises to fill in by the pupils but also additional reading texts. Most of the exercises focus 
on connecting historical persons to dates or certain events. Some exercises reinforce the 
message delivered by the main schoolbook. For instance on page 60 the pupil is required to 
list several arguments and explain why Hitler was a dictator. On the next page texts 
presenting victims of Nazism are prepared. The first example is a description of a typical day 
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of an Austrian political prisoner in captivity – Manes Sperber472. Another text is a letter of a 
Wehrmacht soldier writing to his father from Stalingrad. The juxtaposition of both texts 
creates the impression that both of them were victims of the times – both Austrians and 
soldiers. In the main schoolbook also the destruction of cities was depicted by the suffering of 
Viennese civilians and soldiers fighting in Stalingrad. The workbook achieves synergy with 
the schoolbook. The workbook also included “numbers to think about” – not an exercise but 
solely an informative addition.  The Austrian victims of war are listed as follows: soldiers - 
170.000, concentration and death camps – 35.000, victims of air raids and bombardment – 
25.000. Jews were not separated as a distinct group of Austrian victims473. The narrative that 
comes out of the textbook is similar to the main schoolbook: the victims of National 
Socialism were mainly political opponents; the suffering of Wehrmacht soldiers is equated 
with the suffering of civilian populations. The suffering topic was continued in the next 
chapter of the schoolbook (The Austria reborn). The text is unchanged albeit organised a little 
differently. Similarly like with previous chapters additional photos were added. The hard 
times after 1945 are represented by school-children receiving a meal of a soup and yet another 
picture of people walking in the destroyed streets of Vienna474. A small change in the 
photographs of the signing of the State Treaty occurred as the picture is zoomed in on the 
figure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Leopold Figl (his name is also given in the 
description of the photograph).  
The biggest change came (finally!) in the 1988 edition of Zeiten, Völker, Kulturen. 
Two new authors were added to the group namely Oskar Achs and Werned Adelmaier. The 
schoolbook changed completely, became rewritten and reorganised. It also took a more 
modern form. Instead of being a small book with text divided in short chapters it started to 
look like the schoolbooks that are used till this day – full of pictures in colour and info-
graphics with short passages of texts.  Also the font used in the book is much bigger than in 
its predecessors. The visual makeover was accompanied by a change in the contents. Pupils 
are now encouraged to analyse and discuss texts and photographs during the lesson time.  
Exercises are added to the main body of the textbook and are not published separately. The 
cherry on top of the makeover is the new subtitle of the textbook:  The time of politics and 
technology. (Das Zeitalter der Politik und der Technik). For the Polish reader it can be a 
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pleasant surprise that the cover of the schoolbook includes many photos and among them a 
picture of the Pope John Paul II addressing a crowd in 1983. The technology is represented by 
a starting rocket, so the Pope has to represent politics in that case. Maybe the importance of 
his pilgrimages to the countries of the Eastern Bloc made an impression on the authors.   
Classically the chapters that are put under analytical scrutiny are divided into subparts 
similar to what came before: German National Socialism and Holocaust, Authoritarian 
Austria and under the swastika, II World War. What strikes the most that the Holocaust 
finally included in the curriculum is not treated as a part of the Second World War. It took 
forty three years since the end of the war for the Holocaust to be a part of the teaching plan 
and to become a separate narrative. For instance in Germany this topic became obligatory to 
teach in 1962, twenty five years (so one generation) earlier.475 Also the framing National 
Socialism as German (and not even partially Austrian) is noteworthy.  
One can be under the impression that it was the Waldheim Affair of the year 1986 that 
was behind the long awaited change of the textbooks. Just to recap Kurt Waldheim, elected 
president of Austria in 1986 was discovered to lie in his autobiography about his activity in 
the years 1938-1945 hiding is participation in atrocities committed in the Balkans and Greece 
during the war. The scandal that broke out resulted in a heated discussion within and abroad 
of Austria. The Austria as victim myth started to show cracks and eventually broke. However 
that is just pure coincidence. The spirit of the times was already subverting the almost four 
decade long narratives. The teaching plans for the new schoolbooks were actually prepared in 
1985 and only then the books went into the preparation phase. It is within the reach of 
possibility that the massive influence of the Waldheim affair had some impact on the authors 
of the schoolbook. Nevertheless the teaching programme of 1985 already suggested to present 
totalitarians systems (fascism, Nazism and communism) and to include the topics such as 
anti-Semitism, genocide, mass murders, racism, resistance and exile476. The fact that these 
topics were taken into consideration a year before the Waldheim affair is proof that they are a 
sign of broader shift in historical narratives and tendencies. So how did the textbook address 
the tasks laid upon in by the teaching plan?  
                                                          
475 Markova I., Wie Vergangenheit neu erzählt wird, Marburg 2013, p. 175. The topic of Holocaust was not 
immediately included in the curricula of school textbooks in Europe. It took decades for the assessment of the 
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a process of narrative. It became universalized. See: Carrier P., Fuchs E., Messinger T., The International status 
of education about the Holocaust: a global mapping of textbooks and curricula, 2014.  
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The first subchapter focuses on the fall of democracy and the creation of German 
fascism. The description is much more detailed than in previous editions. The economic 
hardships of the working classes, while still present are expanded by the perspective of the 
middle class and its discontent with the worsening of the economic situation. The German 
ruling classes were accused not only of a lost war but also of treacherous payments of war 
reparations to the Western Allies. Many people turned their backs not just to the politicians in 
power but to democracy as a system. Surprisingly the text continues with the unchanged 
decryption from 1957 edition about unemployment and Hitler‟s propaganda (his and his 
only!). The text is followed by a reprint of a NSDAP propaganda poster showing a sea of 
unemployed workers477.   
If the first step was propaganda then the second one had to be terror. The first victims 
of the NSDAP regime were communists – political opponents. A graph depicts next 
categories of victims: communists, Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, liberal, freemasons, 
Marxists, Negroes, minority groups and socialists. On the one hand Jews were not described 
as the main target of Nazi repressions but the list is surprisingly broad and inclusive. The 
political opposition message is stronger than the racial enemies – there is also no mention of 
Slavs (Poles, Russians etc).  Anti-Semitism has been described for the very first time. Its 
geographical source is located in the city of Vienna where Hitler encountered the radical 
attitudes towards Jewry in his youth and decided to make it one of the pillars of Nazi 
ideology478. Again Hitler is the ultimate driving force behind the evil. 
Another novelty is a detailed description of how democracy was dismantled by the 
members of the NSDAP. The changes in legislation and new racial laws are given as 
examples. The famous Nurnberg NSDAP meeting is now captioned as a propaganda – and an 
exposition of force. The pupils are then asked by the book to discuss the issue of dismantling 
democracy479. The pupils are also confronted with the reality of being a child in a fascist 
system. The subchapter describes the lives of youth, their participation in Nazi organisations 
as well as engagement through sports and other means. The racial and exclusive character of 
those organisations is emphasised480.  
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The depiction of resistance against the Nazi regime is presented solely from an 
Austrian perspective. The representatives of resistance groups are limited to Christian 
Socialists (the conservative camp) and the Socialists – conveniently representing the two big 
political blocks that formed after 1945. The first character presented in the textbook is a 
Catholic monk Roman Scholz and a socialist partisan Otto Hass481.  This example is an 
interesting transposition of the political shape of the II Austrian Republic to the fascist 
Ständestaat (where socialists were a prosecuted group – but this nuancing is absent from the 
textbook). The reason for is is the fact that the main narrative focuses on an idealised version 
of common resistance against a common enemy – German Nazis. The fact that the majority of 
Austrian guerrilla fighters composed of Communists is omitted.  
The most important addition to the 1988 textbook is a systemic representation of 
knowledge about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. This time the already used picture with 
children bearing the Jud signature is accompanied by the photograph depicting Austrian Jews 
forced to clean anti-Nazi slogans from building facades and streets482. Under the photographs 
a short text passage describes the tragic situation of Jews under the National Socialist regime. 
Jewish shops were closed and Jews were expelled out of their apartments and deprived of 
property. Then came the enforcement of ghettos and eventually, after the Wannsee 
conference, the genocide. A picture showing a group of Jews in the Warsaw ghetto and the 
rail ramp in the Auschwitz death camp underline the description. The textbook mentions the 
utter destruction of the Warsaw ghetto and the deportation of more than 400.000 people from 
Warsaw483. A brief mention of the suppression of societies of Germany and Ostmark also 
appears in the text. The Ostmark was a part of Germany at the time so this serves only the 
purpose of artificially specifying the „Austrian experience”. The chapter ends with a 
description of the world of concentration camps. Aside for the pictures of barbed wire and 
guard towers the process of mass killing (gas chambers and burning of the bodies in furnaces) 
is described. The whole paragraph is written in the passive voice and do not point at any 
perpetrators. At the same time the textbook asks a provocative question: Also Austrians 
participated in the Holocaust. What does that mean for today484? This is noteworthy, as it is 
the very first time that Austrians are mentioned differently than presented as something else 
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than just mere victims. The textbook also encourages both the teachers and pupils to meet 
with witnesses of history (former concentration camps inmates).  
The following chapter about the Anschluss is also much more nuanced and detailed 
than before. The lack of any resistance of the Austrian troops during the German aggression is 
pointed out. With the taking of the country Hitler found many supporters in Austria. However 
in the society there were also those who resisted485. The visual representation of these event 
show the dichotomy of supporters and opponents. One photograph shows Hitler speaking to a 
cheering crowd in Heldenplatz in Vienna, the other one shows Austrian politicians being 
transported to Dachau concentration camp. This picture is significant because it strengthens 
the overall narrative arch of the textbook and one of the most important myths of lying at the 
base of the II Austrian Republic – the myth of the “common concentration camp experience” 
that brought Austrian politicians together. The caption under the Dachau picture mentions the 
Christian Democrats and Socialists (omitting other political groups) who suffered together 
under the Nazi regime486.  
The topic of repressions against the Jewish population of Austria returns in this 
subchapter. Many Austrians turned to racial hate and anti-Semitism, which resulted in 
violence. The subchapter ends with deliberations about the question why so many Austrians 
were so happy to greet Hitler. The text continues however to mention that while many said 
“yes” to the Anschluss, some did it out of fear. Another part of the Austrian society wanted 
the unification with Germany already in 1918 and many doubted the viability of the I Austrian 
Republic487. 
The II World War subchapter, while visually enhanced, clings to the Hitler as the only 
perpetrator trope. The war started with Hitler‟s plans – and only his. The message is supported 
by caricatures of Adolf Hitler from the period in question as well as a photograph of marching 
Wehrmacht soldiers. The text tries to rationalise Hitler‟s reasons for war listing: the urge for 
conquest and the necessity to acquire cheap labour force.  Druga Wojna Światowa zaczęła się 
od planów Hitlera i tylko wyłącznie jego488. The first conquest of Hitler was little Austria. 
The description of the war itself is rather vague. The turning point of the war is still the battle 
of Stalingrad now shown with a photograph of a triumphant Soviet soldier rising the red 
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scythe and hammer banner above the ruins of the city (somewhat reminiscent of the famous 
photo of hanging the same banner on the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin). The “great human 
tragedy” of previous textbook edition was changed to “a military defeat”. The narrative about 
the battle of Stalingrad did not change much. It is still Hitler who is responsible for this 
defeat, as he did not heed the advice of his rational military aides. The madness of Hitler is 
emphasised with quote from gen. Franz Halder who described the Führer as a screaming, 
mad, fist raising and behaving somewhat idiotic489.  
The Allied bombardment of German and Austrian cities is mentioned in greater detail 
this time. The destruction of Dresden is described in detail. Also the devastation of 37.000 
apartments in Vienna is added to the Dresden example. The paragraph enlists the destroyed 
buildings of importance: the St. Stephen Cathedra, the Opera, Vienna University, museums 
and theatres. The choice of the listed buildings is by no means arbitrary. It not only shows the 
barbarity of the Allies but also conveys the image of Austria as a land of high culture.  The 
schoolbook really tries to equate the devastation caused by the Axis and Allies. The Germans 
dropped around 74.000 tonnes of explosives while the Allies used 1.9995.000 tonnes. The 
photographs show women and children standing next to destroyed building and piles of 
rubble490. This trope evokes the iconic figure of the Trümmerfrau (woman of the ruins) – 
many women were employed after the war to clean up the rubble after the destruction caused 
by the war. Another topic that victimises the German population that is accompanied by 
pictures of women and children is the issue of the refugees from the East. The description is 
very vague and only briefly mentions the issue. But its inclusion is noteworthy.  
The resistance movements in Europe during the II World War is mentioned briefly as 
well. There are only two examples given – the Stauffenberg assassination plot and the French 
resistance action and the massacre of the population of Oradour-sur-Glane491.  The narrative 
about the Second World War ends with the description of yet another Allied bombing – the 
two atomic bomb attacks on Japan. The perpetrator of this crime is mentioned by name – 
Mayor Thomas w. Ferebee – a member of the Enola Gay bomber crew. He is the only named 
perpetrator of the war that is mentioned by name in the textbook (aside for Adolf Hitler). The 
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photographs next to the text show the devastation of Hiroshima and children exposed to 
radiation from the nuclear blast. The chapter ends with a graph enumerating the number of 
war casualties, including civilians. Similarly to the first edition of ZVK the narrative ends 
with a moral call about the scale of horrors and destruction that the biggest conflict in history 
brought to millions of people492.  
 The next chapter treats about the liberation and reconstruction of Austria after 1945. 
While the narrative about the uncertainty of new times and economic hardships (shown by the 
photo of children getting their soup rations), the 1988 edition of ZVK introduces new 
elements. The year 1945 is to be regarded in more positive tones as the year of liberation. The 
narrative of the long occupation of the years 1938-1955 is broken493. Photographs show the 
devastation of Vienna‟s landmarks (Cathedral etc.) but also includes a scene of Soviet soldiers 
fighting in the streets of the Austrian capital city. As a source text from the historical period 
the whole contents of the Moscow Declaration is included – also with the passages about the 
Austrian responsibilities for war crimes. If anything defines the 1988 edition of ZVK it is the 
breaking of old narratives and introduction of new ones instead. The modernisation brought 
by the Marshall-Plan is another way of painting the Allies in more positive light than the 
bombing descriptions and photographs did in the previous chapter. The reconstruction process 
is more les s the same as before with a bigger focus on the persona of Bruno Kreisky (which 
does not surprise considering his 4 term chancellorship). Karl Renner also is given much more 
space and is even quoted. Renner is the symbolic figure of the reestablishment of the Austrian 
state, Kreisky‟s role is small but nevertheless his presence is noted during the events of 1955 
and the signing of the State Treaty494. Similarly as in other chapters this edition has much 
more visual content. The everyday problems of the reconstruction times are exemplified by 
the picture of corpses‟ removal from bombed buildings, and are juxtaposed with the 
stabilisation of later times – construction of industry, usage of machinery in agriculture and 
even the re-establishment of cultural life in the shape of examples of theatre plays (two photos 
are devoted to theatre and film)495. The significance of cultural life has been elevated in 
comparison with the earlier editions and the narrative of Austria as a land of culture is 
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prevalent in almost all chapters now. Noteworthy is also a short inclusion of the topic of 
denazification – a policy introduced by the Allies that stands valid till this day496. 
The ZVK edition from 1996 is very similar to the previous one – yet it includes some 
changes that have to be mentioned. First of all the textbook is actually a bit shorter than 
before. The John Paul II photo from the cover is gone. There are several paragraphs that were 
erased – like the information about the Austrian roots of Adolf Hitler. Also the information 
about anti-Semisim as basis of NSDAP ideology is gone. The textbook proposes a more 
general overview of the history of anti-Semitism since the Roman times and the destruction of 
the Jerusalem Temple, through the medieval ages and early modern pogroms of the Jews till 
the Holocaust as the final act of anti-Semitism497. Other changes and additions include as 
question for the teacher and pupils to be discussed in class about the role violence plays in 
politics (on the occasion of the assassination of Engelbert Dolfuss, other examples include the 
Sarajevo assassination of Franz Ferdinand and terrorist attacks conducted by radical-right 
winged groups498. 
The subchapter about World War II did not change much. There is less photos than in 
the previous edition. What has been added is a short description about the fate of Wehrmacht 
soldiers in captivity that is accompanied by a co-example of the fate of Soviet soldiers499.  The 
depiction of this issue is a photograph of a German soldier behind barbed wire of a Soviet 
detention camp. The photograph of bombed Vienna is replaced with an even more symbolical 
and emblematical devastation of the city of Mozart – Salzburg. The message of Austria: small 
country of great culture that fell victim to the turmoil of the XXth century.  The subchapter 
about Austria after 1945 – sees an interesting shift in narrative. It is again the year 1955 and 
the signing of the State Treaty that is central to the reconstruction and success of the II 
Austrian Republic. The role of 1945 as the year of liberation, while present is less 
significant500.  
The narrative presented by the Zeiten Völker und Kulturen schoolbook in many of its 
aspects did not change through the timespan of more than forty years influencing at least two 
generations of Austrians. The first stellar backbone of the ZVK narrative arch is the 
positioning of Adolf Hitler as the sole perpetrator of the disasters of the XXth century. It was 
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in Hitler‟s head that all the mad plans of war and genocide were born. It also seems that he is 
the only one who put those ideas into motion. The prevalent use of passive voice when 
describing Nazi war crimes creates an illusion of National Socialism without real people 
behind the ideology. One could expect that with the progress in World War II research would 
transfer eventually to the world of the textbooks and the narrative would be nuanced in the 
later editions of ZVK. The opposite is true. The sole authorship of crimes of Hitler has been 
reinforced by the additions that appear in later editions. The quotes, photographs and 
examples serve as reinforcement of narrative not as mean to broaden it. Only after 1988 the 
question of the role that Austrians played during the difficult times of 1938-1945 are asked.  
The cracks in the edifice of the main narrative are not coherent with what came before and do 
not constitute a new quality, feel rushed and feel included because of some forced necessity. 
The new formula of open questions to be discussed in class prove to be a positive example 
leaving the initiative on the side of the teachers and encourage free though and discussion. 
They might serve as narrative breaker but with the same amount of possibility they could 
encourage pupils to repeat what they just have read in the textbook and help to implement the 
main narrative.  
The second prevalent part of the narrative is the approach towards victims and 
victimhood. The continuity is obvious – while the 1988 edition and onward nuances the 
Austrian guilt and responsibility the main Austria as a victim narrative is not broken at all. 
Austria was the victim of German but also Allied aggression. The secon part of this statement 
changed only in the newer editions of ZVK – the Allies were presented as both liberators and 
perpetrators (bombings, Hiroshima). With the implementation of new visual means – 
photographs and quotes from diaries and other sources what can be notices is the rising 
employment of emotions in the narrative. There is an increasing use of photographs of women 
and children as well as a military victims of war (Wehrmacht soldiers mainly). The Austrian 
casualties of war are always used in context of the fallen soldiers and later with civilians from 
Poland, USSR or Japan, German refugees expelled from the East etc. The narrative creates a 
“community of victimhood” for all those people. Late editions of ZVK also start to focus 
more on the suffering of the Jewish population – but even their special case is treated in the 
context of the war as a civilizational breakdown that equals the victims. The biggest change in 
this narrative is the inclusion of civilians. Firstly the only victims of war were the soldiers and 
World War II was treated similarly to other historical military conflicts (like the Thirty Years 
War, Napoleonic wars or the Great War). The shift is noticeable: firstly only soldiers 
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mattered, than the civilian themes were introduced and eventually the civilian history became 
the majority of the material presented to the pupils. The moral evocation of the first editions 
of ZVK was replaced by a more and more emotional and empathic message. Importantly to 
take note, the emotional connection is most of all built by the depiction of the fate of 
Wehrmacht soldiers, Austrian political prisoners or most notably the civilian victims of Allied 
bombardment.   
The Austrian state is often described as if it existed in spirit in the years 1938-1945. 
The Ostmark is separated from Germany on several occasions in the narrative, as if there was 
continuity in the existence of the Austrian state. At the same time this narrative is one sided, 
the authors only write about the Alpine Republic in terms of continuity when it comes to 
positive examples (like the resistance against Nazism. When the topics delve into war crimes 
it is always the Third Reich that is responsible. A notable exception is the inclusion of the full 
text of the Moscow Declaration but that is a source text and not a part of the narrative 
prepared by Austrian historians. A certain narrative fiction is being created that wants to show 
the Gründerzeit – times of the founders of new Austria and the chaos that came before it501. 
After the chaos came peace and prosperity – the heroes of the story are the politicians like 
Renner, Figl or later Kreisky. With their governance came times of modernisation and cultural 
growth – a success story of a small country of high culture. While there is little mention of the 
Austrian nation per se – the narrative about the vital years creates the basic mythos: common 
suffering and common work towards the restoration of Austria. The narrative represents the 
„epic” meta-narrative of Haydn White – an integrative synecdoche, a story where the events 
of the outside world (forces of nature) lead the hero to the achievement of self-identity. While 
not stated expressis verbis in the textbook – this is the meta-level of the narrative of the 
history of the XXth century. The catalyst for the “hero journey” is the economic crisis of the 
late twenties that leads to rise of fascism and Nazism, wars and then successful 
reconstruction. The “good” triumphs over the “evil” in the form of economic and, most of all, 
cultural development and achievements – in which Austria excels.  
There are of course many more school textbooks issued by various publishers. To 
include them in this inquiry would be desirable but has to be left for further research. The 
reasons for this is that after Zeiten, Völker und Kulturen the number of available textbooks 
grew significantly and they present a new and different quality. The de facto monopoly of 
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ZVK was broken ushering a new period. At the same time the period between 1945 till 1988 
seems sufficient enough as a time framework and the focus on the dominant textbook and its 
evolution can show the process of change of narratives better than the more scattered and 
dissimilar textbooks created on the free market. This statement does not exclude expanding 
the research of Austrian textbooks into the future for comparative reasons.  
 
3.3 Breaking the consensus. Failed opposition - FPÖ 
 
The main axis of political conflict in Austria goes between the two main camps the 
socialists (SPÖ)  and the Christian-democrats (ÖVP).  However, already in 1949 the two main 
parties were accompanied by a small formation of the Independents. In the American 
occupation zone in Salzburg on the 25th of March 1949 Herber Alois Kraus and Viktor 
Reimann created  Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU). – Union of the Independent. On the  9th 
of October of the same year the formation joined the elections as Wahlpartei der  
Unabhängigen and received 11.17% - the best result in the short history of this political 
party502.  The vast majority of the party‟s electorate recruited from former Nazis and German 
repatriates from Czechia, Moravia and Poland. SPÖ believed that the new political movement 
would be another right-wing party and will take the electorate away from ÖVP. They could 
not be more wrong as VdU managed to gather support from traditional electorates of both 
socialists and conservatives. VdU‟s main goal was to create a formation that would be in 
opposition to the “grand coalition” parties. At the same time they have positioned themselves 
on the political spectrum as liberals, with the freedom of the single person as ideological 
basis. However because of the significant influence of former Nazis the party also featured 
German-national undertones503. One of the main objectives of VdU was the restitution of all 
rights to former Nazis. In 1953 elections VdU received a little below 11%, a small downfall. 
The second elections were the catalyst for the resurfacing of all the institutional problems of 
VdU that had much higher electoral ambitions. A strife within the party led to political 
infighting. This process led to the resolution of the party in 1956. The members of the 
Austrian parliament that were elected from the lists of VdU suddenly had nowhere to go. In 
order to survive politically they have created a new political party in Vienna on the 7th May 
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of 1956. The party‟s name was Freicheitliche Partei Österreich, FPÖ (Freedom Party of 
Austria) and as future will show it became one of the most significant movements in Austria. 
Anton Reinthaller became the first chairman of the party. He was an ardent Nazi and a 
member of the NSDAP. During the times of Ostmark he served as the Minister of Agriculture 
in the Seyss-Inquart government. FPÖ in the 1956 elections recieved only 6,5% of the total 
votes. Considering the situation it was a success as the new formation managed to cross the 
election threshold. In 1958 the nationalistic Reinthaller became replaced by a much more 
liberal Friedrich Peter. The support for FPÖ stabilised at 7% in the 1962 election. Friedrich 
Peter, a former member of the Waffen-SS took a more liberal course, but did not totally 
discard the German-national elements. His strategy was to become a reliable collation partner 
for other Austrian parties. His policy led to a split in the party – in 1963, the national wing of 
the party formed Nationaldemokratische Partei – NDP (later this pary became illegal because 
of adherence to National Socialism). The breaking in the party led to the loss of a part of 
electorate. Peter tried in vain to convince people that both liberals and nationals can have a 
place in FPÖ504.  In the elections of 1966 and 1970 the party barely made it above the election 
threshold and got results slightly above 5% in both cases. 
 
Then came the year 1970 – a significant year for the Third Camp. It was the year when 
the long four-term chancellorship of Bruno Kreisky started. In the 1970 elections SPÖ 
recieved 48% of the vote share. Instead of going for the grand coalition with ÖVP.  Kreisky 
decided for a minority government. He could only do this because he managed to secure 
political stability thanks to the Members of the Parliament who entered if from FPÖ. Friedrich 
Peter‟s risky game finally paid off. The coalition was only informal but a first step for FPÖ to 
position itself outside of the anti-establishment image. The first support from Kreisky came in 
the form of the reform of electoral system that strengthened smaller parties, and gave them 
more seats in the Nationalrat (the lower house of Austrian parliament).  The new law was 
tailored specially for FPÖ. At the same time, in a surprising twist of events Kreisky began to 
use the discourse and narratives that was associated with the national-liberal camp. An 
unlikely development for a social-democrat such as Kreisky. This was most exemplified with 
the rather anti-Semitic quarrel between Kreisky and the famous Nazi hunter Simon 
Wiesenthal. Kreisky went as far as suggesting that Wiesenthal collaborated with the Gestapo 
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during World War II505. The political flirt between the socialists and the Third Camp reached 
its peak in 1983 when the socialists lost absolute majority in the elections and FPÖ was 
invited to form a coalition government. Without a doubt Kreisky‟s attitude towards the 
national-liberal camp allowed it to flourish and grow stronger. However the fruit of this 
growth were seen later after the Kreisky era. In the years 1971, 1975 and 1979 the electoral 
results of FPÖ was stable and did not surpass 5-6%. Yet the results while providing stability 
were unsatisfactory for the young generation of politicians and activists. In 1978 Peter resigns 
from leading the party and is replaced by the former mayor of Graz Alexander Götz. Only two 
years later Götz resigned in favour of the liberal Norbert Steger. In 1983 despite being a part 
of the government the party barely passes the threshold with 5%. It was the worst result since 
1953. In 1986 the revolution finally came in the form of young and ambitious politician Jörg 
Haider. His ascent to chairmanship was the herald of a new era of populism and redefined the 
role of FPÖ in Austrian politics.  
The upcoming campaigns were much different for the national-liberal camp. Despite 
the fact that it was conducted in the shadow of the Kurt Waldheim affair, Haider decided to 
use this moment to attack the two main parties, as part of the establishment as well as to reject 
the lie of “Austrian nation” that created the Waldheim affair in the first place506. More 
importantly the style of Haider was different – he posed to be a celebrity rather than a 
politician. In 1990 FPÖ received a smashing result of 16, 6%, and it was just the beginning. 
At first Haider decided to flirt with the pan-German ideas of the past issuing controversial 
statements. Of those the one that got the most attention was praising the employment policies 
of the Third Reich in 1991, or calling the members of Waffen-SS „men of honour” in 1995507. 
This course led to another break in the party as in 1993 a liberal wing of FPÖ decided to 
create a new movement called Liberal Forum. This did not stop Haider from achieving even 
more success. In 1994 in local elections in Carinthia FPÖ got one third of the votes and in the 
parliamentary elections it received a record 22,5%.  Since that time Carinthia became the 
stronghold of the Third camp. In 1999 in the local election to the Carinthian Landtag FPÖ got 
42% of the votes and became the strongest party in the region. In the federal elections of the 
same year the Third Camp received 27% of votes becoming the second biggest party in the 
parliament for the first time. While the socialist secured victory ÖVP formed a coalition with 
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FPÖ that governed twice till 2006 causing massive discontent both in Austria and abroad. 
European countries decided to implement diplomatic sanctions on Austria for including a far-
right party in the government. Despite the fact that in the coalition government Haider did not 
her any position (he even resigned from chairing his party in order not to become a vice-
chancellor) the backlash was strong. The president of Austria Thomas Kleistl requested a 
declaration from the government that it will abide to the rule of law, pluralism and 
democracy508. Being part of the government meant problems for the anti-establishment party 
that FPÖ used to be. In hastened elections of 2002 it received only 10% of the vote leading to 
a crisis that led eventually to the departure of Haider and the creation of a splinter populist 
party called Bundnis Zukunfst Österreichs (BZÖ) – The Alliance for the future of Austria. The 
party however fell into disarray after the death of Jörg Haider in a car crash in October 2008. 
FPÖ under a new young leader Heinz-Christian Strache managed to regain the support and 
reach 27% levels of electoral support. As of early 2019 the party is again in coalition with the 
Christian-democrats forming a coalition government under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. 
 
After presenting an outline of the political history of the Third Camp after 1945 the 
next step is to investigate the vision of nation held within this camp. Unfortunately William T. 
Bluhm did not conduct any in-depth interviews with the representatives of FPÖ; perhaps 
because during his stay in Austria in the sixties it was not a significant party and nothing 
hinted at the future success. Nevertheless there are sources that can be referenced: namely the 
political programmes. VdU – the ideological and structural predecessor to FPÖ during its 
short lifetime managed to produce two of such programmes. FPÖ made programmes in 1957, 
1968, 1985, 1997 and in 2011. BZÖ delivered a programme in 2013.    
When the Allies allowed political life in Austria in 1949 one of the groups that used 
this allowance was VdU: a liberal, democratic and national formation. The party positioned 
itself as German-national since the very beginning509. Other tropes as reconstruction of 
sovereignty, critique of the Proporzsystem or broader inclusion of mechanism of direct 
democracy became main tropes for the Third Camp. Of course during the Allied occupation 
the VdU could not be very open about the German-national ideas. They were just subtly 
hinted. For the protection of state independence it was necessary to acknowledge the 
membership in deutsches Volkstum. (German “peopleness” nationality)510. The 1954 
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programme from Aussee went much further. While the first point of the programme 
emphasises the sovereignty of Austria the second directly states that Österreich ist ein 
deutscher Staat511. Austria is a German state and has to take into account the entirety of the 
German nation, not only the part that lives in Austria but also outside of its borders (including 
South Tirol). VdU wanted to promote the idea of participation in the German culture but also 
a common identity for all Germans512. The pan-German elements are also visible in the plan 
for foreign policy where nation states should become the corner stone for United Europe513. 
The Aussee programme is full of ideas that adhere to the times of National Socialism. The 
economy should serve the purpose of building a healthy and united nation. State 
interventionism was considered as a viable option, which is surprising for a liberal party. The 
first FPÖ programme was highly influenced by the Aussee programme of VdU. The state 
policy should be national, liberal and social (in that order)514. Additionally FPÖ named itself 
„the national party in Austria”. It goes without saying that there was one word missing from 
that slogan – „German-national”.  FPÖ set the goal to protect German Austrians and their 
identity not only on the territory of the Alpine Republic but especially in South Tirol. 
Austrians are bound by history and culture with the German nation for thousands of years, 
without this connection there cannot be an Austrian identity515. Being a part of German 
culture meant also being a part of European culture. Having said all that there was no trace of 
undermining the Austrian statehood in the programme, there was any talk of unification with 
Germany516.  
Under the chairmanship of Friedrich Peter the liberal wing of the party rose to 
significance. A strong anti-communist tone was adopted (an interesting call-back to the anti-
communist attitudes of National Socialists). The future will belong to communism or to 
freedom spoke Peter in 1964 speech517. It seemed that freedom and democracy was more 
important than maintaining the German identity in Austria.  The 1968 programme of Bad 
Ischl highlights just that. The defence of freedom and Austrian neutrality became to 
priority518. This declaration was followed by another: we acknowledge our participation in the 
democratic Austrian state and at the same time to the German national and cultural 
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community519. In more detail this idea meant the support for German culture in Austria as well 
as support for the German speaking population of South Tirol. The next programme came in 
1985. The so called Salzburg programme emphasised Austrian neutrality, ecological issues 
but also protested against too little representation of German history in Austrian 
schoolbooks520. The traditional South Tirol issue was broadened and now included all German 
speaking minorities in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire521. The year 
1985 could be described as the peak of the liberal influence in FPÖ and the party itself could 
be described at the time as liberal-national and not the opposite.  The year 1986 brougth a 
giant change with the start of the Haider era. In this moment it is important to mention the 
populist pivot and modernisation processes that Jörg Haider introduced in FPÖ as it is crucial 
to understand the approach of this party towards the idea of Austrian nation. For Haider 
ideology had secondary significance, everyday issues came first. FPÖ became an anti-
establishment, protest party that focused on criticising the broken political system of Austria. 
With the change of content the more important change concerned the style of politics. Haider 
was a hyperactive politician, always ready to be in the news, to comment or to provoke. He 
used the tabloids to promote himself. Only the effectiveness in gathering support mattered, the 
results were stunning – a growth from 5% to 27%. Perhaps this is why during the 
chairmanship of Haider FPÖ produced only one programme in 1997. Perhaps the document 
was not necessary as once noted, the only programme FPÖ needed was Jörg Haider522. While 
the party did not produce many programmes at that period it did however use short lists 
pointing at current problems. In 1993 FPÖ proposed 24 theses for political renewal of Austria. 
It concentrated on bashing SPÖ and ÖVP, and presented FPÖ as the only „party of change”. 
Other issues included ecology, immigration and support of the families. Austria was 
mentioned in point 3: Austria is our homeland and this is a basic presupposition for all our 
actions. We want to protect the natural habitat and cultural heritage of our forefathers in 
order to present it to future generations. The love of one‘s country should breed love for other 
nations. This positive patriotism is a response to rabid nationalism as well as the utopia of 
multiculturalism. Point 7 stated: Austria for Austrians. Uncontrolled migration is beyond 
common sense. The protection of culture, identity and social progress necessitates the 
limitation of immigration. Obligatory identity check at the borders and systemic deportation 
of illegal immigrants is the only way to ensure effective migration rights. The last point (23) 
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adds: We are for protection of natural ethnic groups and protection of their identity and 
culture. However this protection must not be extended to immigrants. Austria is not a country 
of immigration523. There is little mention of the traditional pan-German identity and it seemed 
at the moment that it was a theme of the past. Other political actions of Haider focused on 
destroying the corrupt system of the II Austrian Republic and a proposal to create a Third 
Republic with a presidential system. In 1997 FPÖ proposed a new programme in Linz. The 
first striking content is evocation to Christian values, something that the rather secular Third 
Camp never did before and to some extent it was an anti-clerical party524. Belonging to 
Christian Europe has to be understood in the context of Muslim migration. All in all the 
traditional landscape of Austria includes church bell-towers and not minarets. Between the 
liberal camp and the Church there is a supposed Wertkonsens – common values.  Austria is 
mentioned only in the context of having a „right to a homeland” Recht auf Heimat. Heimat 
became the leitmotif of FPÖ – a new idea of Austro-patriotism emerged. Austro-patriotism 
includes: the need to belong to Austria, a democratic state, with the rule of law and rights of 
man. It is a need to belong to Austria that protects its cultural heritage and its natural 
resources and landscapes. Austria is a country which developed in connection with German 
and European history, which possesses many specific (only for Austria) traditions and 
regional identities525. Austro-patriotism also means the protection of various ethnic and 
national groups, including the German speaking minority in South Tirol, as well as all the 
German speaking populations of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Support is crucial 
for the economic and cultural survival of those communities526. The right for homeland 
expands the traditional understanding of nation in the Third Camp. While the majority of 
Austrians belonged to the German cultural circle, the Habsburg Empire was multinational: 
Germans, Croats, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenes, Czechs and Hungarians are all part of Austrian 
heritage and these groups have the right to develop their traditions and achievements. The 
coexistence of those groups created the specific separateness of Austria. At the same time the 
programme rejects immigration and multiculturalism (these mistakes should not be repeated 
on Austrian soil527. The last component of Austro-patriotism is ecology and protection of 
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traditional farming528. Later the programme states that Austrian school system should cherish 
the Austrian idiosyncrasy529. The Linz programme of 1997 did not bring many changes 
regarding the liberal part but when it comes to the German-national traditions it is 
revolutionary. FPÖ which was a Germanist formation since conception abandoned the 
German trenches and moved completely into the safe zone of the Austrian Alps. The 1997 
programme may indeed support the idea that Austrians are actually ethnic Germans but the 
nation is considered as a statenation, a demos – where everyone can nourish his or her 
identity.  The German cultural influence over Austria was reduced to one small mention that is 
not significant when compared to the descriptions of other imperial influences. The main 
motto of the programme shows where the important issues lie: Österreich ist kein 
Einwanderungsland. 
The ideas of Heimat were continued in 2011 where FPÖ positions itself not as the national 
party in Austria but as Soziale Heimatpartei530. Populist policies completely transformed FPÖ 
– from liberalism it went into third-way socialism of Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder. The 
only German remark appears with the never-ending topic of South-Tirol. The move towards 
social-democracy and political centre seems to be stable and constant. The communitarian 
ideas of national (or maybe patriotic?) community took over the liberalism that was dominant 
in FPÖ for decades531.   
BZÖ was formed in 2005 and this party was just a one man show of Jörg Haider. With 
his death in 2008 the party slipped into insignificance. The party had no true political 
programme using slogans like Den sozialen Weg gehen. BZÖ was supposed to be 
ideologiefrei aber zukunfstorientiert – free of ideological influences and oriented towards the 
future532. That future ended with the abrupt death of the party leader in a car crash. Before that 
Haider managed to publish two books that show a more personal account of a journey from a 
German nationalism to Austro-patriotism.  
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Die Freiheit die ich meine the first of Haider‟s books was published in 1993, and the 
second one Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts, four years later in 1997. Those four 
year seem fundamental in the breakthrough in Haider‟s thinking, and since he was the 
charismatic leader of the Third Camp at the time he influenced the whole political party. The 
evolution of Haider‟s thinking is evident. The first book looks like scriptures of an opposition 
revolutionary, who wants to change the whole system. The second is a much calmer analysis 
of the political situation of the time. The first book is more of a manifesto the second one 
looks to the future problems in more detail. In 1988 Haider stated that the Austrian nation was 
a freak (child monster), an ideological freak, you know, as well as I, that belonging to one 
nation is one thing and belonging to a state is another533. (Das wissen sie so gut wie ich, dass 
die österreichische Nation eine Missgeburt gewesen ist, eine ideologische Missgeburt, denn 
die Volkszugehörigkeit ist die eine Sache und die Staatszugehörigkeit ist die andere Sache). 
The people who Haider lists as his inspiration are Margaret Thatcher, Karl Raymond Popper 
and Bruno Kreisky. He believes himself to be the heir of the revolution of 1848 and a radical 
liberal534. The revolts of 1848 combined both of Haider‟s ideological footholds: liberalism 
and nationalism, and were an expression of achieving national sovereignty. The claim for a 
democratic Germany is also of importance here. Liberalism is the core of Haider‟s ideology. 
The liberalism of John Stuart Mill, Robert Blum or Freidrich von Hayek is the answer to the 
problems of the XXth century (Jahrhundert der Unfreiheit – age of unfliberty). The modern 
liberalism had nothing to do with its true roots and serves only to disintegrate society with 
hedonism, anarchy and egoism535. The term liberty has always been connected with the 
responsibility for the community. There is no freedom without responsibility and limitations. 
The freedom of one ends when the freedom of another starts536. It goes without saying that the 
community that Haider mentions means a nation. Nation became the symbol of liberal 
emancipation since the French Revolution. This was the true meaning of revolution that was 
distorted by Marx and his acolytes of the year 1968537. Modernity in Europe, continues 
Haider, expresses the will of national sovereignty. The national identity is an exponent and at 
the same time  the key to understand the variety of life. [...] Every nation aspired to national 
independenc. Every nation aspired to cultural and identity variety. Imperialisms such as the 
Soviet, French or Yugoslavian were successfully repelled538. When Haider speaks about the 
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freedom to choose an identity he mentions three levels: the level of family and friends, the 
spiritual-religious level as well as regional level and the belonging to a nation state as the final 
level. A national identity can only develop and flourish in the conditions of liberty. In such a 
way – the struggle for national identity is the struggle for freedom. 
How does all that compare to the Austrian case? There are only specific identities and 
specific nations. A man believes in the stupid idea of the Constitutional patriotism 
(Verfassungspatriotismus)., […] Austrians were or are Celts, Illirians, Slovenians, Croats, 
Hungarians, Roma or Jews but in their majority they were Germans. From this multitude in 
the framework of German culture an independent identity was created, it is unchangabe and 
uncomarable with any other! […] The German elites threw the word nation from their 
dictionary. […] German self-hate and national masochism is tragic and worthy only of pity. 
Us, as Austrians, do not want to participate in this. We want to go our onw way539 Austrians 
are the nation of the same culture (Kulturnation),  as Germans but not the nation of the same 
constitution Verfassungsnation). Haider continues his thought about the relations between 
Austrians and Germans in the next chapter which is devoted to the understanding of the past. 
He strongly criticises the mainstream historical narrative that the main proponents of which 
are ÖVP and SPÖ.  He believed that: a fiction is created that Austria was the „first victim og 
Hitler‖ and because of that the responsibility for the past disappears. [...] Because of that 
everything what happened in the years 1938-1945 is ascribed to a „different nation‖, namely 
the Germans. Through this approach in the idea of the Austrian nation the ties to the German 
past are cut. Austrian history and identity is inseparably connected to the history of 
Germany540. Haider later adds: Austrians do not bear any collective guilt for this darkest 
chapter in history, but are as much responsible as the Germans. Such is the truth541. Haider 
does not shy away from the troubled past, he affirms it because it the only way to still be a 
part of the German nation and German culture. He accepts the baggage of history 
unapologetically. Perhaps in this context his controversial remarks about the „men of honour” 
make more sense. Haider concludes: Who goes with me, supports FPÖwithout brown stains. 
Supports also the lack of fear in discussions about the past and supports historical truth. Who 
goes with me supports FPÖ, which is distanced to the times of National Socialism, but which 
approaches the generation, that after bitter experiences managed to find the way to 
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democracy, with respect. [...] Who goes with me, chooses FPÖ, which presents not 
materialistic but cultural values, which is supporting respect towards minorities and which 
clearly distances itself from racism and anti-Semitism542. Late on he adds: There is nothing to 
justify national-socialism. No normal man, who is sane, will pursue such a path543. The clear 
demarcation from the Nazi-past is the result of the scandal that resulted in Haiders 
controversial remarks about the benefits of employment policies of the Third Reich that 
coasted him the seat of the governor of Carinthia. That is one explanation. The other given by 
prof. Klaus Ottomeyer from Klagenfurt states that what Haider did resembled Catholic 
sacrament of confession. When Haider spoke he did not speak to former Nazis, he spoke to 
the generation of the children and grandchildren of former National-Socialist. In a moment of 
expiation Haider proposed a kollektiver Unschuld – a collective plea of  being not-guilty544. In 
meta-cultural terms Haider played the role of the prophet Jesus – by taking the whole guilt on 
himself, he lifted the burden of the Austrian population545. The ability to play with cultural 
roles and skilfully use pop-cultural references (like a Robin Hood carnival costume – stealing 
from the rich, fighting the establishment) Haider became such a successful politician.  
Having established what the Austrian nation meant for Haider, he enumerated the 
troubles and dangers that threatened it: multicultural society and Islam, which in his views is 
incompatible with Western democracy and its values. The rest of the book is devoted to the 
project of the Third Austrian Republic. The fight for the renewal of Austria is a cultural war – 
a Kulturkampf of the XXIst century546. 
Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts appeared only 4 years later after De 
Freiheit die ich meine and the books is a clear love letter to the electorate of the Social-
Democrats. While in the previous book Haider was a revolutionary in the second one he is a 
timid reformer who wants to co-govern Austria. Gone is the project of the Third Republic. 
The main focus is the problems with global capitalism and the situation of the workers. 
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of alcohol many conspiracy theories were devised instead. See: Wisniewski G, Jörg Haider. Umfall, Mord oder 




Haider proposes a project similar to the Third Way of Tony Blair‟s New Labour547. The main 
source of inspiration for Haider is once again Bruno Kreisky, this time without the company 
of Margaret Thatcher. FPÖ, writes Haider, is in many ways in the position of the old 
socialdemocracy from the Kreisky era. We are a social and democratic freedom party. We 
want less Marxism, but more social market economy. We want less levelling down, but more 
development. We want less group egoism and more community. We want less clerks and more 
democracy for nations instead548. Even the crucial idea of liberty is presented in the context of 
social welfare: Without social safety there is no freedom, and without freedom there is no 
social safety. Then only tutelage and administration that breaks human dignity exist549. The 
rest of the book is a plea to get rid of the ideological fossils like neo-liberalism and socialism. 
There should be policy without left and right, as there should be social policy without 
socialism. Ideologies are just substitutes for religions. Instead of ideologies specific problems 
need to be addressed in an efficient way550. FPÖ should pursue a new path that will be open to 
all sides and not limited by any ideological straight-jackets. The future belongs to freedom 
and movements that represent it. The future belongs to parties that can enter coalitions not 
with other parties but with their voters551. The populism that Haider employed as a political 
strategy changed his worldview and steered him into the realm of direct democracy. Haider 
was a herald of a new era of populism that reached the surface after the 2008 financial crisis 
and the crisis in the Euro-zone. This populism however let him abandon the traditional pan-
German views of his political camp. If the majority of the population did not want something 
than he would not pursue this kind of policy. The process of Austrian nation building was a 
success. It hard to find better evidence for the failure of the pan-German movement in Austria 
than the almost complete abandonment of the topic by the major opposition force. FPÖ lost 
the battle for the German soul of Austria but by this they have one the political battle for 
power. FPÖ is once again in government of Austria and its nation.  
 
3.4. Closing comments         
 
  The analysis of the activity of political actors and their use of state institution in nation-
                                                          
547 Haider J., Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts, Vienna 2001, p. 87. 
548 Ibidem, p. 18. 
549 Ibidem, p. 30.  
550 Ibidem, p. 29, 34,  
551 Ibidem, p. 11.  
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building processes show how political elites use the requirements of a modern administrative 
state in the nation building process. The phases of nation building by the elites could be 
divided into two: the radical phase that ended symbolically in 1955 with the State Treaty and 
adoption of neutrality. Then came the appeasement phase – soft nation building. . The first 
phase was the most significant as it was this decade that influenced the main narratives the 
most. This is the most evident when it comes to education. The teaching programmes as well 
schoolbooks that were prepared in the 50ties continued to influence another post-war 
generation of Austrians for more than thirty years. The Austria as victim myth was reinforced 
by anti-German legislation that forbid using the very term German at schools or the existence 
of German associations. The elites devised several symbols for the new nation which include 
neutrality, devotion to high-culture etc. The politics of demarcation from Germany can be 
seen in surprising places like with the example of 23 Austrian-German terms that need to be 
used in legal texts of the European Union.  The conservative camp was the one that led the 
Austrian political elites through the radical period of nation-building from 1945 to 1955. The 
socialists and later social-democrats decided to roll with these types of policies despite their 
traditional pan-German attitudes. While after 1955 the politics of consensus required toning 
down the topic and issue of Austrian nation all the policies that were set in motion during the 
radical period were still in force. At the same time an insignificant opposition in the form of 
the national-liberal movement tried to oppose the idea of a distinct Austrian nation but with 
little success. Only after 1986: the Waldheim affair and the introduction of populist polices of 
Jörg Haider the main narratives started to change. The national-liberals adopted a more 
Austrianist Heimat approach and the political and historical discussions were now much more 
balanced and nuanced. The Austrian nation could afford the discussion about its founding 
myths and possibly a reconfiguration of national myths. They were most useful in the first 
radical phase and done their job. The vision of the nation shared among the political elites was 
firstly that of a cultural one, even ethnic in some instances. The Austrians were supposed to 
come from a different Germanic tribe than the rest of the Germans and this was enough to 
justify the existence of the Austrian nation. As the socialists gained power the shift from 
Kulturnation to a political nation (demos) became more and more evident. Even the national-
liberal opposition accepted Austrians as a political nation of different cultural backgrounds 
but predominantly German. An Austrian version of Verfassungspatriotismus was the result of 
the state nation building. Fritz Fellner said that Austrians are the last “old nation” of Europe, 
but his perspective is Western and limited to state nations. There are also old and historical 
culture nations in existence (like the Polish one). Austrian nation-building process started with 
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the foundations for a Kulturnation but quickly the process became automated by the state with 
judicial, educational and symbolical policies. Thus a state-nation of the Western type with 
elements of Kulturnation was formed. At the same time the state driven commemorations and 
symbolism does not evoke much emotion and does not sway the general population. The 































4. Conclusions and closing comments 
 
Insel der Seligen – The isle of the blessed is an unofficial name for the Alpine Republic of 
Austria. It shows Austria as a country of happy people.  While the term can be traced back to 
early medieval period it was Bruno Kreisky who reformulated and old topos with new 
meaning: A state of developed social market economy with high standards of living. In 2007 
The Economist – wrote a piece on Austrian economy titled The sound of success (a call back 
to the famous musical Sounds of Music that takes place in Nazi occupied Austria).  The 
nation-building processes of the Austrian elites: historians, politicians et consortes is another 
success of the isle of the blessed.  In 1956 only 49% of Austrian citizens believed that 
Austrians are a people (Volk) of their own, while 46% believed that Austrians were a part of 
the German people552. In 1964 people who believed that Austrians were a nation or were 
becoming a nations was as high as 70,4%. Only 15.3% expressed the view that Austrians are 
not a nation. The numbers went up in 1970 when 82% belived that Austrians are or are 
becoming a nation and only 8% believed that they are not. In 1994 survey the vast majority of 
86% believed that Austrians were or were becoming a nation. The number of people rejecting 
the idea of Austrian nation capped at 8%553. When asked the question if:  
1. Nationhood was based upon people‟s endorsement of the state in which they 
live; even if these people spoke different languages as for example in Switzerland  
2. Nationhood is based upon a common language; no matter, if the people 
speaking the language live in one or more states 
70% chose the first answer and 28% answered the second option554. This question 
does not however take the feeling of Austrian German dialects as distinct from the German 
dialects of Germany. The surveys mentioned above lead to the conclusion that the acceptance 
of German culture as one‟s own is more common among Austrians than the feeling of being 
part of the German nation (which is estimated at 5-8%).  
Other surveys show that the acceptance of Austrian nation was higher among the 
voters of SPÖ (79,5%) and ÖVP (74,5%) than that of FPÖ (44%). The rejection of Austrian 
nation among voters also shows the distinction with SPÖ (8.7%) ÖVP (11,4%) and FPÖ 
                                                          
552 Wagner G., Österreich Zweite Republik, Vienna, Thaur 1987, p. 2:1432 
553 Op.cit.Ibidem, p. 1433-1436. Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity, West Lafayette 2000 p. 167-168.  
554 Op cit. Ibidem, p. 173 
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(53%)555.  The poll was conducted in 1965/1966. The electoral results of FPÖ at the time were 
around 5%, so the high number of people rejecting the idea of Austrian nation and embracing 
the Germanist approach did not constitute a significant part of the society.  
 In 1990 in a world survey about national pride Austria ranked as the second most proud 
nation. The first place was occupied by the Polish556. 
The creation of the Austrian nation was a success and there are various scientific 
inquiries in what the Austrian national identity actually entails. Olivier Rathkolb lists the most 
important aspects:  
1. Pro-Western neutrality 
2. Demarcation vis-à-vis Germany and Eastern Europe 
3. Demarcation vis-à-vis the Slavic roots 
4. The Austrian welfare state – a community of solidarity 
5. Austria as a nation of culture557 
Rathkolb correctly identifies the neutrality as the key component of Austrian‟s 
identity. The topic has resurfaced in the education policies of the Second Austrian Republic. 
The year 1955 is presented as the true moment of liberation, independence and sovereignty. 
The economic hardships of the years 1945-1955 can be attributed to the Allied occupation of 
Austria, with the economic development came also the neutrality and the two are now 
intertwined. Austria saw unprecedented progress since 1955 developing a stable, high-wage, 
social market economy. The importance of the era of Bruno Kreisky was the introduction of 
developed social policies that served as integration. The education policies also show the 
idealised vision of Austria as the nation of (high) culture and natural beauty. The demarcation 
from Germany is more evident is the stance of historians and politicians especially in the first 
decade after 1945. The not so evident point 3 – the demarcation vis-à-vis the Slavic roots is 
also traceable. While the historians are aware of the mixed ethnic composition of Austria and 
used that fact as an argument against Austria being German – the Slavic part of Austrian 
history is often overlook if not absent from the school curriculum. The politicians interviewed 
by Bluhm show an ethnic understanding of their national ancestry and trace it back to 
                                                          
555 Op.cit Bruckmüller E, p. 62. 
556 Rathkolb O., The Paradoxical Republic. Austria 1945-2005, New York Oxford 2014 p. 6. 
557 Ibidem, p. 1-25. 
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Germanic tribes of Bayuvaren not to the mix of Illirians, Celts and Slavs558. The Slavic 
components of history are also usually absent in the history books for schools.  
Ruth Wodak with her research team analysed the discursive identity and after the 
investigation concluded that to be part of Austrian nation means in general to be an Austrian 
citizen, to be proud of the social and economic achievements of the state, to be glad for the 
peace (in the context of wars in former Yugoslavia), and only then comes the first symbol of 
the neutrality. Wodak constitutes that Austrians feel more multi-cultural than mono-ethnic 
(Germanic) about themselves. Austrians are proud of their natural beauty and ecologic 
policies, the political stability (which is partially a myth perpetrated by the politics of 
consensus) and successes in sports. The symbols that people usually adhere to are the anthem 
and the flag. Wodak summarises the work by naming the Austrians as a “state nation” with 
components of cultural nation (encountered in informal discourse, almost absent from the 
official one) and to some extent an essentialist nation – especially connected to the strong 
feeling of regionalism and Heimat. In one point Wodak would agree with Rathkolb the 
Austrians give little place for minorities in their national understanding and mostly identify 
with the German-speaking majority. Especially the Carinthian Slovenians are mentally kept at 
a distance from the Austrian nation559. In broader terms Austrians feel that the immigrants 
from the south (Balkans) East and the Islamic regions are foreigners and not Austrians, 
despite their long stay in the country. Wodak also finds out that the demarcation against 
Germany is still a prevalent component of the Austrian identity. It is most easily identifiable 
in the use of the Austrian dialect in Austria in such a way as Hochdeutsch is used in Germany. 
The different wording is crucial as exemplified with the case of the legal texts in the EU. 
Austrians also have a rather negative attitude of the Habsburg-monarchy seeing it as chaotic 
and full of strife, quarrels, political infighting and eventually a failed state. The national myths 
are concentrated on the years 1945-1955 (liberation, neutrality). The periods of the First 
Republic as well as times Ostmark  are taboo and not eagerly talked about. Those times are a 
part of collective “un-memory”. It is clear that from the discursive analysis the Austrian 
nation starts in the period after the Second World War. The Austria as victim myth is still 
prevalent despite the changes done in the historiography and academia. The politicians still 
                                                          
558 This is even more evident in the border land of Carinthia which is home to a Slovenian minority. It is no 
coincidence that this land sees the most pro-German stances in all of Austria.  For more see: Bigham J., The 
politics of memory in the Austrian province of Carinthia: How distinctive are the collective memories of the 
three main political parties of Carinthia?,  doctoral thesis defended at University of Aberdeen, 2008.  
559 Wodak, Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 487-490. 
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continue to follow the path set by Felix Kreissler and focus on the Austrian resistance against 
the Nazis. 
What does that all mean for the theoretical level? In his analysis Peter Thaler promised 
to deliver an answer but never actually delivered. Firstly the easiest confrontation would be 
with the ideal type of the nation od Małgorzata Budyta-Budzyńska. A nation should have:  
1. A name (own or given by others but accepted by the community). 
2. Language, which is treated as a mother tongue 
3. Territory (also called motherland), which is inhabited by at least a part of the 
nation 
4. A belief in common ancestry 
5. Own history 
6. Own culture in which a significant part of the community participates and 
identifies with 
7. Own state or a desire to poses a sovereign state organization 
8. A feeling of emotional bond 
9. A feeling of otherness towards other communities and the feeling of worth560 
 
The Austrians in the First Republic did have a name, but it was interchanged with Austrian-
Germans (1) but did not consider their language distinct from German (2). The national 
territory was regarded as divided into several Germanic states (3). Also the belief of common 
ancestry, history and own culture was shared by the Germans (4,5,6).Austrians possessed the 
state but had no desire to continue in possessing it (7).  The emotional bond was also shared 
with Germans and there was no true feeling of otherness (8,9). If using the framework of 
Budyta-Budzyńska it becomes evident that there could be no talk of Austrian nation in the 
times of 1918-1938. Not one point is truly fulfilled in that case. When looking at the period 
since 1945 it becomes evident that that situation was drastically different. The name became 
distinct to the point that every mention of German was rejected (1). The language, while 
shared with the rest of Germans is treated as a distinct dialect and codified that way. The case 
of Hurdestani – Unterrichtssprache is further evidence that effort was put into making a clear 
demarcation from German while still using it – a truly schizoid development (2). The territory 
is clearly distinct now and it can be seen in the works of Austrian historians as well as 
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schoolbooks that the current shape of the state is projected into the past creating a false sense 
of continuity (3). The belief in common ancestry is more complex – while the historians did 
their best to highlight the non-Germanic components of the Austrian ethnic composition, the 
political elites focused on the distinct German tribal differences. This created tensions 
between the understanding of Austrians as a state nation or Kulturnation. The path of 
Kulturnation had to lead to the inevitable acceptance of German influences in Austria and the 
state-nation was much safer territory (4). While in fact most of Austrian history was shared in 
one form or another with Germany the predominant narrative uses every instance of semi-
independent or independent statehood to justify the existence of a separate nation. The myth 
serves its function (5). The insurance of using high-culture with a mixture of regional 
components is prevalent in the works of historians, in school textbooks, in the visions and 
actions of politicians and used on the currencies. The myth of Austrian nation as a nation of 
high-culture is one of the most significant components of national identity (6). The possession 
of one‟s state was a key component of the Austrian politicians, especially in the period of 
1945-1955. The State Treaty and Neutrality are the cornerstones of the Austrian – state nation 
identity with immense symbolical influence. Politicians and their politics of commemoration 
are centered on regaining of sovereignty. The narrative is prevalent especially in schoolbooks. 
The point 7 of the ideal type of national identity perhaps is the strongest difference from the 
period of 1918-1938. The strict policy was introduced by the Allied powers during the post-
war years and the political elites of Austria accepted this with little to no opposition. While 
the FPÖ tried to undermine the idea of the existence of the separate nation it never broke the 
politics of consensus and tried to advocate the unification with Germany. The legal 
enforcement proved critical in this regard. The Historikerstreit following Karl Dietrich 
Erdmann‟s publication shows that there is consensus also among historians (even if some of 
them accept the vision of Austrians as a German – cultural nation, there will to have an 
independent Austria is never broken)561(7). The feeling of bond and the clear demarcation 
from Germans is the result of the policies introduced by the politics of consensus of the two 
main political parties. Even the traditionally pro-German Third Camp had to reject their 
German-national ideas in favour of more locally understood identity. (8,9).  In the case of the 
Austrian nation after 1945 all the points of Budyta-Budzyńska are fulfilled positively with the 
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exception of point 4 which is more blurry and complex but does not hinder the general 
outlook. The Austrian nation is positively confirmed as fulfilling the requirements of the ideal 
type of a nation. 
The narratives that were created and used by the historians and politicians cannot be 
attributed to one subgroup of approaches towards nation formation summarized in the graph 
below: 












               
 
   Constructivist 
 
The two major subgroups of historical narratives that shine through the graph are on 
the opposite edges of the primordial-natural and constructivist-historical axis. This is hardly a 
surprise. This process can be traced in historiographies of other nations but it was usually 
spread out much more broadly across the time. In the Austrian case the constructivist turn 
away from primordialism took just 30 years - a generation. The other mixes of possibilities 
are more of an intellectual curiosity (even if of highest quality). It also has to be noted that the 
border between the natural axis and primordial/historical is less obvious than the graph shows 
and for instance Massiczek has to be listed in both categories. Also notehworthy all the 
historians writing from the outside perspective (from the Anglo-Saxon world) are 
predominantly constructivists and were so before the constructivist turn in Austria. Most 
historians understood the Austrian nation as a cultural one – only after the constructivist turn 
it became treated as a state/political nation. Olivier Rathkolb and Anont Pelinka are the best 
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examples. Ernst Bruckmüller could be as well, if it were not for his ahistorical projections of 
the Austrian nation into the past (even if done within the constructivist framework).  
The political elites in their majority perceived the Austrian nation as their own 
construct – something that was the result of their successful policies, and as a political tool to 
mobilise the voters. The exceptions from this consensus came from the early stage of ÖVP (in 
the years of 1945-1955) when the fierce anti-Germanism and a cultural understanding of the 
nation were predominant among the conservatives – which is best exemplified by Missong‟s 
writings. The interviews conducted by Bluhm also show that lower tier politicians had no 
problem with identifying Austrians even in ethnic terms. Nevertheless the projects of ethnic 
and cultural Austrian nation were burdened with the danger of bringing the Germans too 
close. The cultural and ethnic similarities were historically too close. Only the acceptance of 
the political nation could guarantee the achievement of the main goal: demarcation from 
Germany. The same can be said about the constructivist approach – if there was no longer any 
need to justify the historical existence of the Austrian nation there were no obstacles from 
showing that it was in fact constructed after 1945. This consensus was slowly accepted even 
by the national-liberal Third Camp. The FPÖ eventually in the 90ties accepted Austrians as a 
political nation. Perhaps it was the persistence of the Germanist camp that the cultural idea of 
the nation was rejected as inconvenient.  
Let us examine now the process of Austrian nation making according to theories. 
Firstly the model of Józef Chlebowczyk will be confronted with the Austrian example:  
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The Austrian case seems to follow the pattern outlined by Chlebowczyk. However 
upon more detailed inspection it turnes out that the Phase I was very short and superficial. 
While the establishement of the canon of Austrian culture was not that difficult concerning 
the heritage of the Habsburg Empire the language issue proved problematic – there were 
attempts at trying to disavow German but not as a language but as a name. The Hurdestani 
issue is the best example. The official support for regional dialect and the making of the 
Bavarian-Austrian dialect as standard language serves the purpose. The work of historians 
shows that there was a need for narratives that projected not only the Austrian historical 
conscousness but also the Austrian statehood into the past. As for the Phase II the political 
struggle of the years 1945-1955, and to some extent the myth of the resistance in the years of 
1938-1945 construct the bulk of the Phase II – the struggle for souveregnity. The signing of 
the State Treaty became the pivotal date in the main narratives both in schoolbooks as well as 
in political symbolism. The goal of the national movement was established – self-
determination. That is why Vienna has one of the most monumental statues honoring the Red 
Army – which is treated as a liberator and not as occupation force. Liberation form Nazi 
Germany was the first step for national souveregnity, the Neutrality was the final act of the 
national struggle. In this sense the Austrians seem to be a typical example of nation making 
processes and polices according to Chlebowczyk. The one thing that stands out is the short 
time period of the process that took barely the time of  one (or one and a half) generation. 
Also worth mentioning because it was a state driven process – there was a state before there 
was a nation Austrians fall into the Chlebowczyk category of Western European nation-
making and not the Central-Eastern nations.  
Hroch‟s phases A-B-C (elites - mass mobilisation - politicisation) occurred in Austria 
simultainously showing the fact that Austria had a developed social structure in 1945 and was 
a latecomer to the nation-buliding processes. While it were the elites, as usuall started the 
nation formation the mass participation in political life as well as a high development level 
contributed to the fact that there could be no distinction of phases in the Austrian case (maybe 
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the elite phase A could be distinguished but it would last only for a short period of time and 
there is little merit in doing so).  
However Hroch‟s typology of the models of the timeline of nation-formation show 
one intresting thing. The Austrian model according to Hroch‟s typology would look like this:  
PP – IR-/AB/BC/BR - NS562 
The economic history of Austria shows that the industrialisation levels in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire where high they did not occur in the core Austrian lands of the Empire 
(with the exception of Styria). It was the times of the Ostmark and then the use of Marshall 
Plan funds in modernisation of the economy and thus social structure that finally allowed the 
formation of the modern Austrian nation. All the perquisites: Industrial Revolution (IR), the 
arrival of constitutionality and democracy (BR) as well as phases of elites/mass 
mobilisation/politicisation (ABC/PP) led to the achievement of sovereignty (NS). The 
processes here described. While the political stricture developed much earlier even in the 
times of the Habsburg Empire – it was not accompanied (yet) by a modern societal structure. 
The industrialisation started before the phases of political agitation but continued to happen 
simultaneously after 1945. Because all of the processes happened in a short time span – the 
Austrian model of nation making should be framed as: delayed simultaneous nation 
formation. The catalyst for the creation of the Austrian post-war nation was the trauma of 
Nazi rule and even more importantly the trauma of the Second World War. As Budyta-
Budzyńska and Hroch pointed out – war and trauma as well an existence of conflict of interest 
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Transformation within national movements:  
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are among the major factors that start and then lead populations through the process of 
national emergence.  
Another question that needs to be answered is the role of nationalism in Austrian 
nation-building. Anton Pelinka believes that the Austrian nation was devised without 
nationalism. But if we were to treat this term in a more neutral way, as Gellner, did than the 
modernisation processes of the Austrian economy would prove his thesis. The change in 
society was first and then came the nation. The negative anti-German attitude that was 
noticeable in the decade of 1945-1955 could constitute some ersatz of nationalism. The 
negative emotion towards everything that was German was transformed into a positive 
identity of belonging to the Austrian state. This process was noticed by Ruth Wodak in her 
discourse analysis.  
The main historical narratives of Austrian historians exemplify the main myths of 
Topolski‟s categorisation of narratives. First of all the historiography is based predominantly 
on the myth of revolution – the revolutionary moment being the long occupation of the years 
1938-1945. The strict categorisation shows that everything that happened before the 
revolutionary period is considered inferior – that is true especially when talking about the 
First Austrian Republic. This meta-narrative of Topolski also explains why there is a strong 
reluctance to identify with the earlier periods and the imperial past. Both the socialists and the 
liberals adhere to the fight against monarchy, and the conservatives remain silent on the topic 
because of their complicity in the crimes of the Austro-fascist regime which for the sake of 
consensus are better to be left alone. Another meta-narrative is the myth of the sublime but 
only in regard of the Austrian high-culture, one of the cornerstones of modern Austrian 
national identity.  
What lessons for the theory does the Austrian example bring? It seems that the 
Austrian nation confirms the constructivist (modernist) theories. Peter Thaler proved in his 
book that there is little merit when talking about an Austrian nation before 1945. At the same 
time the rules of Paul James‟s abstract communities are the same whether they happen among 
the Austrian population that considered itself German in 1918 or Austrian in 1960. James‟s 
approach however does not show the true content of change of national identity, as well as the 
transition period. Anthony Smith‟s ethno-symbolism is only partially true. While some 
Austrianist historians tried to find as much continuity in the population that inhabits the 
territories that now constitute Austria this did not lead to the formation of an Austrian nation, 
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even when including the ahistorical constructs of Bruckmüller like the Hofratsnation. On the 
other hand the primordialists do have a point. There would be no Austrian nation without the 
tradition of the existence of Austrian statehood. Contradictory to what Heer wrote – the 
expansion of the Habsburgs into the Protestant Czech lands and other provinces made Austria 
a centre of the Empire thus creating a group of elites that were always interested in keeping 
Austria as a separate state – as shown by Katzenstein. The structural factors of being separate 
were not enough though. It was only the trauma of Anschluss and war, a dream come true in a 
nightmarish form. Had the Third Reich won World War II there probably would not be an 
Austrian nation, but history showed otherwise. Austrian nation was created out of necessity. 
Austria was not a subject but an object of history since 1938 and the decisions regarding the 
country and its population were made elsewhere – among the Allies. The Allies policy found 
avid followers among the Austrian conservatives but also among several socialists and even 
communists. In the most crucial phase of nation building it were the conservatives from ÖVP 
that set the tone. The socialists had a more moderating effect since the mid-sixties 
transforming the Austrian nation into a political one. The political elites begun their labour 
and delivered an Austrian nation in the time-span of one generation – quite an achievement.  
The existence of the Austrian nation nowadays is beyond doubt, but the Austrian 
national identity is not without its problems. Because the nation-formation processes were so 
rapid the results are superficial. Oliver Rathkolb points out that in the era of globalisation and 
its problems many Austrians prefer to shelter themselves in the safe cluster of regional 
identities (which are supported geopolitically through the remoteness of Austrian valleys and 
mountains that separate the regions). At the same time a small but significant part of Austrian 
society exhibits a lean towards cosmopolitism – either European or global563. The Austrian 
identity was the strongest in the 1980ties, and then slowly started to give way to regional 
identities – a fact which was used by Jörg Haider to gain electoral success, especially in the 
land of Carinthia. The weak turnout and involvement in national celebrations like the 
thousand years of Austria in 1995-1996 as well as the celebrations of fifty years of neutrality 
show that the society is not that engaged emotionally in their national identity. In fact the 
neutrality is perhaps the best metaphor for the Austrian national identity – it is as Robert 
Musil wrote -  without qualities564. 
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